Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Aug 17, 2022
India and most of Latin America view the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a ‘regional’ war limited to Europe, but one that has a massive impact on global financial markets and commodity prices.
India's strategic autonomy versus Latin America's active non-alignment “Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humour, or caprice?” This quote from former US president George Washington’s 1796 farewell address could easily be attributed to a leader from the developing world today—be it India, Mexico, South Africa, or Brazil—and their stance on the war in Ukraine. The fact that a quote from 1796 remains so relevant in 2022 speaks to the intrinsic nature of a state’s foreign policy: To protect its own interests and maintain autonomy in global affairs. This is as true today as it was in 1796.

A large part of the developing world is far more concerned with domestic issues and a post-COVID economic recovery that has been exacerbated by massive disruptions to global commodity and financial markets.

Every country has its own unique interests and designs policies to safeguard them to whatever extent possible. This is what underlines the positions taken by much of the developing world, particularly India, Latin America, and Africa, with regard to the ongoing war in Ukraine. A large part of the developing world is far more concerned with domestic issues and a post-COVID economic recovery that has been exacerbated by massive disruptions to global commodity and financial markets. Many countries are struggling to cope with record-high commodity prices of essential agricultural and energy products.

Decoding India’s and Latin America’s positions on Ukraine

Much has already been discussed about India’s position on the war in Ukraine, determined largely by New Delhi’s historic relationship with Russia (predating Putin) as well as its own economic interests related to energy and arms supplies. As expected, India has been on the receiving end of much criticism regarding its stance, particularly for Delhi’s reluctance to condemn Russian aggressiveness. Yet, India’s position should not come as a surprise: New Delhi has a history of independent foreign policy often at odds with positions taken by the West or any other bloc. In the past, it was non-alignment; today, it is ‘strategic autonomy,’ and tomorrow, it is likely to be ‘multi-alignment.’ As India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar notes in his book “the India Way”, “Taking off on non-alignment, it is sometimes useful to speak of multi-alignment. It appears more energetic and participative as compared to an earlier posture of abstention or non-involvement. The difficulty is that it also appears opportunistic, whereas India is really seeking strategic convergence rather than tactical convenience.” Although the West views the conflict through the lens of Russian authoritarianism versus a democratic Ukraine, this finds little to no resonance in India, which has for decades been forced to deal with authoritarian and military-led governments, specifically in neighbouring China, Myanmar, or Pakistan. As academic Krzysztof Iwanek’s recent paper analysing Indian media reports of the war in Ukraine confirms, “Most Indian commentators described the war as a result of clashing national interests, not a just war or a conflict resulting from ideological divides.” More importantly, Indian media from the left, right, and centre all seem to agree that India should follow its own national interests, maintaining its good relations with both the West and Russia.

Although the West views the conflict through the lens of Russian authoritarianism versus a democratic Ukraine, this finds little to no resonance in India, which has for decades been forced to deal with authoritarian and military-led governments, specifically in neighbouring China, Myanmar, or Pakistan.

India is certainly not alone in its approach to the war in Ukraine. The Latin American region, too, has taken similar positions with regard to its stance on Ukraine. Just as India abstained in the April vote to expel Russia from the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, so did Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico. Even as Brazil voted to condemn Russia in a UN General Assembly resolution on 2 March, the country’s permanent representative to the UN decried the “indiscriminate application of sanctions”, noting that such initiatives are “not conducive to the proper resumption of a constructive diplomatic dialogue and risk further escalating tensions with unpredictable consequences to the region and beyond.” Like India, Latin America has also not signed onto the western sanctions programme against Russia. Ana Palacio, a former Spanish foreign minister and member of the European Parliament, confirmed in a recent op-ed that “many Latin American governments have refused to join the West in imposing sanctions on Russia. This has fueled speculation that the region is set to reprise a Cold War-style posture of non-alignment.” Many see Latin America’s posturing as part of a larger pattern, one where the region has sought to actively shield itself from the perils of a ‘new Cold war’ fought between the US and China.  Ecuador’s former Foreign Minister Guillaume Long asserts that “over the long term, you are going to see a lot of Latin America not wanting to choose sides in this new Cold War because China is very present in Latin America now. You are not going to have a Latin America aligning, as it did in the first Cold War, against the Soviet Union with the United States.” The similarities between India and Latin America in their positions regarding the war in Ukraine stand in stark contrast to the West’s framing of the conflict. One thing is certain: While the West views the war as a threat to a rules-based, global order, India and most of Latin America view this as a ‘regional’ war limited to Europe, but one that has a massive impact on global financial markets and commodity prices. Table 1. India, Latin America, and the West’s positions on the war in Ukraine As the table above highlights, India’s and Latin America’s positions on the war in Ukraine remain similar. Neither is likely to insert itself in the war in any meaningful fashion, preferring not to take sides in a European conflict. They also have their own domestic preoccupations and regional conflicts to attend to that are of more immediate concern. What India today calls ‘strategic autonomy’ is referred to in Latin America as ‘Active non-alignment,’ as Jorge Heine, Carlos Fortin, and Carlos Ominami note in their new book ‘Active Non-Alignment and Latin America: A Doctrine for the New Century’. In both cases, countries are vying to maintain their autonomy and cater to their own interests.

Conclusion

As one of India’s most seasoned diplomats, Chinmaya R. Garekhan, once noted, an independent foreign policy suggests that “The government must take positions on international issues guided solely by national interests, without worrying about how other governments might react to its stance or what action they might take should they feel unhappy.” Yet, he admitted that “It would perhaps be fair to suggest that the stronger a country—economically, militarily, and socially in terms of its domestic cohesion and sense of values—the less difficult it will be for it to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy.” We can expect India and Latin America to take similar positions on future conflicts too, and possibly follow a policy of multi-alignment, but as Garekhan suggests, in the long run, they may fare better if they strengthen their own domestic institutions, becoming more economically, militarily, and socially independent.
The views expressed are the author’s and do not reflect the opinions of the Colombian government.
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Author

Marina de Carvalho

Marina de Carvalho

Marina de Carvalho Knowledge Management Officer United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Brazil

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