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Anura Kumara Dissanyake’s response to structural issues and domestic politics will largely shape India’s policy towards Sri Lanka on the Tamil issue
On 11 November 2025, the government of Sri Lanka chaired a high-level meeting to release privately-owned lands in Tamil-dominated provinces that have been under military use since the end of the Civil War. The release of lands, a contentious and only partially implemented promise by previous governments, is a major electoral pledge by President Anura Dissanayake (AKD). Once a Sinhala-Marxist outfit opposed to any kind of federal demands, the current Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led coalition government is emphasising reconciliation and non-discriminatory politics. This pinch of pragmatism has led India to publicly refrain from reprimanding or pressuring the current government on the Tamil issue. In AKD, India finds a genuine commitment to further the Tamil cause. However, domestic politics and structural challenges will continue to pose challenges to AKD’s reform agenda and India’s pragmatic policy.
Since its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka’s treatment of Tamils has been a major issue of interest for India. Delhi’s demands have been two-fold: one, to ensure that the Tamils remain integrated in the broader Sri Lankan polity with certain autonomy and rights, and two, to avert the Sri Lankan government from employing extreme violence or discrimination against the Tamils. With the outbreak of the civil war in the 1980s, India adopted a muscular approach, nudging the government to implement the 13th amendment, which would give provinces greater federal powers and autonomy. However, it shifted to a hands-off approach in the 1990s following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. During the final Eelam War (2006 - 2009), it criticised the government for employing extensive force, but at the same time provided intelligence and assistance to the government to end the civil war.
With the outbreak of the civil war in the 1980s, India adopted a muscular approach, nudging the government to implement the 13th amendment, which would give provinces greater federal powers and autonomy.
The Sri Lankan government’s use of force, India’s dual approach to the issue, and the West’s pressure left a significant vacuum for China to increase its presence in the country. By the end of the war, China offered major financial assistance and infrastructure projects. This convinced India that the more it coerces a victorious government, the more it would isolate itself from the elites and the majority, leaving space for China. The end of the war also meant that the Sri Lankan state was the sole stakeholder on the issue, necessitating India’s engagement. The Modi government’s majority in the parliament in 2014 also immunised the ties to domestic politics and lobbying from Tamil parties. While the Indian government continued to push for reconciliation of the Tamils, this to date remains less influenced by Tamil Nadu politics.
Partly to reintegrate the Tamil community and partly to avoid international (and Indian) scrutiny, subsequent Sri Lankan governments introduced measures such as Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, Office on Missing Persons, Office for Reparations, and Office for National Unity and Reconciliation. Nonetheless, real efforts at reintegration or accountability remained scant due to high political costs. Emerging victorious from the war, the Buddhist clergy, the army, sections of the political class, and even the populace saw no need for compromises or over-compensating with the Tamils. As a result, despite Indian reservations and concerns, leaders safeguarded the military and political elites from scrutiny, delayed provincial elections, and the complete implementation of the 13th amendment.
However, the new JVP-NPP government has given much-needed hope for India on the Tamil issue. First, while India engaged with the previous governments, it saw little progress in meaningful reintegration. India’s disenchantment with Sri Lankan traditional elites and their tepid promises closely coincided with their growing domestic unpopularity and call for structural reforms. Hence, AKD’s victory offered a new opportunity to usher in structural reforms, including pledges of discrimination-free politics. Thus, nudging India to wait and watch. This was further re-entrenched by the party’s performance in Tamil provinces during the parliamentary elections, indicating the party’s pan-national appeal.
The government sees the Tamil cause with sympathy, especially considering how the Tamils and the JVP were similarly impacted by state-sponsored violence.
Second, the JVP-led government does not reflect the same statist thinking and ideology of the previous governments. They unapologetically remain close to their ideology and history of insurgency. In fact, the president and the party recently marked the 36th commemoration of November Heroes, honouring members killed by the Sri Lankan forces and state during their two uprisings (1971; 1987-89). Hence, the government sees the Tamil cause with sympathy, especially considering how the Tamils and the JVP were similarly impacted by state-sponsored violence. For instance, the second resurrection of JVP alone saw an unofficial estimate of 60,000-80,000 killings and 20,000 disappearances. The government also, for the first time, tabled the 1998 Batalanda Commission Report, highlighting human rights abuses of JVP cadres and demanding accountability.
Third, the government places reforms at the centre of politics and is cautiously nurturing an image that differentiates them from their predecessors. They claim that the wars of the past were designed by leaders who exploited extremism, conflict, and racism to retain power and strengthen their voter base. As such, the government aims to break free from the past and introduce a comprehensive roadmap to help flourish and rebuild a peaceful and co-existent Sri Lanka. AKD has promised power devolution, accountability, justice, the elimination of the presidency, provincial elections, demilitarisation, the return of lands, and drafting a new constitution - largely addressing India’s concerns over the Tamil issue. It has also promised to replace the draconian Anti-Terrorism Act and strengthen existing institutions/offices on missing persons, reparations, and reconciliation.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, who visited Sri Lanka in June 2025, expressed a notable shift in discourse on inclusivity. The Jaffna-Palali road, among others, has opened up, and regular meetings are taking place on returning land to Tamils and providing infrastructure in the war-affected region. The government has continued to support the excavation of the Chemmani mass grave without intervening and is committed to establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is largely due to this progress that India has avoided mentioning the 13th amendment in any of its joint statements with the current government - the only exception being the External Affairs Minister’s first visit and interaction with the new government. That said, Indian leadership has maintained ties with Tamil leaders, has regular meetings with them, and stressed on the government fulfilling Tamil aspirations (without mentioning how).
India’s pragmatic yet cautious approach is also marked by the country’s larger structural and political challenges. Primarily, the society and polity remain largely fragmented. While demands for accountability and equality have increased since the Aragalaya, it remains to be seen how society and politics will accommodate these changes. Generally, Sinhala politicians, Buddhist monks, and hardliners still see themselves as the victors of the war. There are recurring disputes between Buddhist clergy intending to build temples in Tamil-dominated regions. The visit of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the site of a mass grave and the UNHRC’s recent resolution to extend the mandate of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have also invoked domestic criticism against the government’s little willingness to push back.
The arrest of former President Ranil Wickremesinghe has further unified political parties and rekindled debates of democratic backsliding and revenge politics.
The army also enjoys immense popularity, complicating any efforts at accountability. The institution also remains anxious about extensive demilitarisation that could jeopardise security, as seen with the Easter blasts of 2019. In fact, allegations of surveillance, intimidation, and harassment of family members of disappeared people, and the army assaulting and abducting Tamil youth have continued to recur. Politically, too, while the government enjoys popularity, it is facing increasing pressure from the joint opposition. The arrest of former President Ranil Wickremesinghe has further unified political parties and rekindled debates of democratic backsliding and revenge politics. On the other hand, Tamil parties have continued to see the JVP with suspicion and deem it as an extension of majoritarian Sinhala politics.
These political, structural, and social factors are deeply ingrained in the Sri Lankan state. An immense crackdown and call for reforms and accountability can pose significant political costs for the government, especially by unifying the religious and political elites and certain state institutions. AKD’s need to balance these forces will largely shape the ability and nature of reforms. While AKD remains India and Sri Lanka’s best hope on the Tamil issue, structural issues and domestic politics will largely shape his ability to deliver on reforms, and thereby India’s policy towards Sri Lanka on the Tamil issue.
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme's Neighbourhood Studies Initiative, Observer Research Foundation.
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