India’s PRAHAAR Blueprint: The Case for Cumulative Deterrence

The Ministry of Home Affairs of India released a counter-terrorism policy and strategy doctrine named PRAHAAR to address threats and challenges posed by non-state actors, including those supported by third-party actors.  The doctrine comes against the backdrop of Operation Sindoor, India’s kinetic response against terrorism, and the subsequent unveiling of a new policy of ‘zero tolerance’ against terrorism by PM Modi. However, given New Delhi's developmental agenda, an Operation Sindoor-style response may not always be affordable or sustainable. As the PRAHAAR document suggests, denial-based capabilities thus become an obvious and relatively more feasible option. At the same time, serious (covert) offensive capabilities need to be developed and build a robust mix of denial-punishment-based deterrence regime against terrorism in the long term. 

Modes of Deterrence-Based Counter-Terrorism

Deterrence as a concept is critical to both examine the challenge and explore policy pathways to ensure an effective counter-terrorism strategy against non-state actors and their sponsor states. At its core, deterrence comprises three key elements: capability, will, and communication. These elements are critical to influence the adversary’s behaviour by ensuring that the perceived costs of its actions outweigh the benefits.

Here, two key distinct yet supplementary modes of deterrence—denial and punishment—come into action. The distinction between them is critical, as each supports the policies and subsequent efforts which determine different courses of action.

Deterrence as a concept is critical to both examine the challenge and explore policy pathways to ensure an effective counter-terrorism strategy against non-state actors and their sponsor states.

Deterrence through denial and punishment presents two key mechanisms for counter-terrorism strategy. First, deterrence through denial is not foolproof but can help shift the attack from high-value targets to lower ones to deny a strategic victory to the adversary. Second, deterrence through the punishment mode is necessary to add to the cumulative effect, but, on its own, is insufficient to attain strategic victory in the long term. Therefore, denial-based measures need to be supplemented with covert and less costly non-offensive measures to ensure a range of options for long-term effectiveness of the counter-terrorism strategy. Deterrence will fail if a state lacks both the capability to impose punishment and the political will to act when an adversary violates the status quo. Thus, a deterrence framework that blends denial and punishment offers a range of options for pursuing rational calculations in a preferred order.

Threat Matrix and Pillars of PRAHAAR

For India, given the historical record and prevailing threat environment, the threat matrix is far and wide. It includes access to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Electronic and Digital (CBRNED), social media platforms and related tools for propaganda, recruitment, as well as communication. The nexus between organised crime and terrorism channelised by the external state actors (primarily Pakistan) becomes another major trend in the post-Operation Sindoor environment for New Delhi. The cultivation and employment of sleeper cells by adversaries is another major source of externally driven internal security challenges for India. Given the decades-old policy of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts,’ Pakistan aims to create a structural asymmetric warfare to test and break India’s will and undermine its development goals. Against this backdrop, there is a clear description of the transnational character and origins of terrorism and how the infrastructure, terrain and logistics of local outfits become a way to commit acts of terrorism. To counter these threats, PRAHAAR outlines ongoing counter-terrorism efforts to strengthen the deterrence-through-denial-based framework. Despite serious efforts, numerous challenges remain. The three core elements of PRAHAAR are as follows:

• Building Capacity and Capabilities Together

Capacity and capabilities are two pillars of counter-terrorism strategy. Capacity building, including training and modernisation of law enforcement agencies and internal security forces, is imperative. The state police forces remain a weak link in India’s counter-terrorism architecture and require better training to meet the demands of urban warfare against the non-state actors. The oversight and regulation of instruments of force also remain a challenge. Balancing the protection of human rights with adverse operational circumstances requires a better understanding and sensitivity, speedier redressal mechanisms to strengthen the law and justice element of counter-terrorism.

NIA is mandated to cover a range of scheduled and linked non-scheduled offences, overstretching both capabilities and manpower of the organisation.

• Intelligence and Inter-agency Coordination

The collection, processing, and sharing of intelligence are key to framing a response and denying the advantage to the adversary. The 26/11 Mumbai terror attack represents a template for how not to frame a counter-terrorism response. Despite sufficient intelligence, the lack of proactive measures within the critical timeframe emerged as a key problem. In the aftermath, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) was established as an institutional remedy. Today, NIA is mandated to cover a range of scheduled and linked non-scheduled offences, overstretching both capabilities and manpower of the organisation. Alongside the multi-agency centres (MAC)-based framework for information sharing serves as a core mechanism for multiple security stakeholders. However, the institutional guarding of information and bureaucratic turf wars pose structural challenges. For denial-based measures, the high-priority cases are likely to follow a top-down approach, which may expose the gap in the chain of information and response to the existing threat. This delay could result in tactical to strategic gaps and failures. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), conceptualised in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks to centralise and sync the national-level intelligence coordination, has not materialised owing to the framework of federalism in India. In its absence, MAC remains a half measure to enable coordination among multiple internal security stakeholders. 

• Whole-of-Nation & Whole-of-Society Approach

According to PRAHAAR, private stakeholders can support critical tasks, including surveillance and counter-intelligence-related objectives. Integrating multiple government stakeholders, as well as the private sectors and start-ups, formulates the whole-of-nation approach. This approach can help strengthen societal cohesion and resilience against plausible terror incidents in future. Ensuring resilience, sensitisation, and preparedness among the general population becomes a key focus. Further, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation initiatives go beyond legal measures to include communities, religious leaders, and NGOs. A better top-down approach is needed for systemic coordination at the centre-state-community levels to engage the youth.

Integrating multiple government stakeholders, as well as the private sectors and start-ups, formulates the whole-of-nation approach.

PM Modi’s ‘zero-tolerance-for-terror’ approach has established a new normal for India’s response-centric counter-terrorism. It has two-fold implications. First, it brings a domestic audience cost as every future act of terror linked to Pakistan will put pressure to frame a response in future. It also affects the global image of India, raising doubts about the effectiveness of counter-terrorism architecture. Second, Operation Sindooor has highlighted an omnipresent element of escalation if India pursues a conventional military response, with associated costs for New Delhi. Pakistan’s grand strategy of jihad aims to project power by inflicting costs on New Delhi. To this end, emphasis on denial measures becomes necessary but not sufficient in itself. Therefore, amassing military capabilities, covert intelligence and attrition-based capabilities, to target logistics, infrastructure, and the support base for terrorists should remain a superior priority for New Delhi. In this regard, deterrence by denial is a half-measure which needs to be supplemented with deterrence by punishment using covert offensive measures. Such a framework would support India to take the epicentre of terrorism away from its own territory and cut down the costs for itself.

Conclusion 

Amidst the pressing need to meet new deterrence demands, India’s PRAHAAR-based national counter-terrorism policy is a progressive step in the right direction. PRAHAAR serves a dual-capacity role as policy and strategy to identify and enhance the toolbox of counter-terrorism-based deterrence measures for New Delhi. However, it suffers from two key limitations. First, it is an MHA-led document which does not cover the external and offensive dimension of counter-terrorism. As a consequence, the armed forces and external intelligence agencies appear to have no clear role to support the PRAHAAR strategy. Owing to overlapping functions as well as organisational cultures and turf wars, there is a likelihood of operational limitations in practice. A strong intelligence-based attrition offence element would supplement the denial regime against terrorism. Second, there is no clear mention of the role and agency of the political leadership, as it ensures both the strategic priority as well as accountability to maintain security within the country. Ultimately, the strategic focus of the executive is a major determinant in ensuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and responses.

Rahul Rawat is a  Research Assistant with the  Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• Defence and Security
• Terrorism
• India
• CBRNED threats
• deterrence by denial
• deterrence by punishment
• India counter-terrorism strategy
• intelligence coordination
• Operation Sindoor
• Pakistan-sponsored terrorism
• Prahaar doctrine
• sleeper cells
• whole-of-nation approach

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