India’s bold nuclear push promises clean energy and self-reliance—but can reforms, talent, and financing keep pace with the towering ambition?
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India’s nuclear energy sector is at the cusp of substantial transformation, aiming to play a pivotal role in achieving energy independence and economic growth. The government plans to introduce sweeping policy reforms and significant investments in research and development to accelerate nuclear capacity expansion and enable private sector participation—steps critical to making atomic power a cornerstone of the nation’s energy strategy. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s Independence Day speech unveiled this ambitious vision, targeting a more than tenfold increase in nuclear energy capacity by 2047, positioning the sector as central to India’s long-term development goals. Yet, beneath the surface optimism, questions linger: Are the wheels of reform truly moving, or do bureaucratic roadblocks and legislative delays threaten to derail India's nuclear ambitions? As new laws, regulatory amendments, and incentives are promised, time will tell whether these wagons of nuclear progress roll steadily onward or remain hamstrung by inertia.
India’s nuclear energy sector is at the cusp of substantial transformation, aiming to play a pivotal role in achieving energy independence and economic growth.
Despite the hopeful tone set by recent announcements and budgetary reforms, India’s nuclear energy sector continues to face a complex web of roadblocks that hinder rapid advancement. Legislative bottlenecks remain a key challenge. Crucial amendments to the 1962 Atomic Energy Act and the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLINDA), which are essential for enabling private and foreign investment, are still mired in parliamentary procedures, causing regulatory uncertainty for stakeholders. Liability concerns persist, with the broad interpretation of supplier liability and “right of recourse” provisions deterring major multinational vendors, despite proposed amendments to limit supplier exposure and clarify liability caps remaining under discussion.
Regulatory ambiguity, though easing in some respects, still presents challenges. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) continues to enforce international-standard safety and security protocols for all reactors, including new Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Notably, the government has clarified that exclusion zones for upcoming SMR designs, such as the 55 MWe modular reactors and the Bharat Small Modular Reactor (BSMR-200), will be ‘not beyond the plant boundary’ or ‘significantly lower’ than the conventional 1km standard for large nuclear plants. This marks an important regulatory adaptation, aligning safety requirements proportionally with reactor size and modern design, and directly addresses earlier uncertainties over whether traditional exclusion norms would hinder SMR deployment. However, the AERB has not yet indicated if it will form a specialised regulatory vertical for SMRs, though all such designs are subjected to rigorous validation and safety assessment in accordance with national and international norms.
Despite this regulatory progress, India continues to face significant challenges in infrastructure development and land acquisition, often exacerbated by local opposition and legal battles. This has also added to delayed timelines at key sites such as Jaitapur and Kovvada. India’s nuclear manufacturing ecosystem, although strengthened, still heavily depends on imports for sophisticated reactor components and materials, increasing costs and vulnerability to supply disruptions.
In addition to these challenges, financial viability and market risks further weigh down the sector. Nuclear projects are capital-intensive with long payback periods and uncertainties over tariffs, power purchase agreements, and grid integration limit investment interest. Finally, ambitions for rapid expansion face challenges from a shortage of skilled nuclear engineers, regulators, and project managers, as the education and training infrastructure is still developing. Collectively, these obstacles raise the question of whether upcoming reforms and initiatives will sufficiently accelerate progress or if entrenched challenges will make India’s nuclear energy ambitions slow-paced and uncertain.
The government is signalling its serious interest in nuclear energy. The Union Budget 2025–26 unveiled a “Nuclear Energy Mission for Viksit Bharat”, earmarking INR20,000 crore for research and development (R&D) in SMR. As part of the roadmap, the targets are to have at least five indigenously designed operational SMRs by 2033 and to scale up nuclear capacity to 100 GW by 2047, from the current 8.88 GW. An interim milestone of 22.48 GW by 2031–32 is on track, with 10 reactors under construction in six states and plans for the flagship Indo-United States (US) plant at Kovvada.
On the legislative front, the government has amended the Atomic Energy Act to allow for the Public-Private Partnership Model. Simultaneously, over 11 amendments to the CLNDA are in the pipeline, including changes to the “right of recourse” and a clear limitation of vendor liability, which would bring India in line with global safety and investment norms
To catalyse the reforms, committees have been constituted in the Department with Members from the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), AERB, NITI Aayog, and the Ministry of Law & Justice to discuss and propose amendments to the acts, facilitating the participation of private parties within the Nuclear sector.
A crucial yet often overlooked obstacle to these ambitions is the dwindling academic interest and institutional capacity for nuclear engineering within the country. Despite growing policy support and ambitious capacity targets, the educational ecosystem has been moving in the opposite direction. Between 2010 and 2020, at least eight Indian universities established MTech programmes in nuclear engineering.
Despite growing policy support and ambitious capacity targets, the educational ecosystem has been moving in the opposite direction.
Today, nearly all have shut down these specialised courses—except for Amity University and Jadavpur University. The others—including the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Madras, IIT Bombay, Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University (JNTU), Pandit Deendayal Energy University (PDEU, formerly PDPU), UPES Dehradun, and Mody University—have discontinued their offerings. This widespread retreat among academic institutions outside of DAE-affiliated entities signals a troubling trend: non-DAE universities are phasing out nuclear engineering programmes, exacerbating the disconnect between policy aspirations and an adequate pipeline of qualified technical talent.
Such an academic contraction undermines the vital process of capacity building, essential for safe and scalable nuclear energy growth at a time of projected exponential expansion. Fewer graduates translate to fewer candidates available for reactor operation, regulatory roles, and emergency preparedness, hampering efforts to maintain global safety and training standards. To bridge this widening gap, reviving nuclear engineering programmes across universities with targeted grants and incentives is imperative.
Nonetheless, talent alone cannot sustain the sector without parallel efforts to build strong institutional frameworks for risk and resource management, especially as private and foreign players expand their participation. The industry’s resilience depends not only on technology and skilled expertise but also on financial safeguards that protect infrastructure and people. In this regard, nuclear insurance pools play a central role, underpinning both plant liability coverage and workforce stability. However, while legislative attention has largely centred on refining the CLINDA to limit supplier risk, private investors require more expansive mechanisms that also secure their capital and provide comprehensive insurance coverage. Embedding accident, liability, and indemnity insurance within the sector’s safety net is therefore essential to inspire confidence and attract sustained investment.
Embedding accident, liability, and indemnity insurance within the sector’s safety net is therefore essential to inspire confidence and attract sustained investment.
Operationally, managing supply chains and minimising delays is another often underappreciated hurdle. NPCIL’s fleet-mode construction strategy for 2 x 700 MWe Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) plants employs about 25 major supply packages, 10 Engineering Procurement and Construction Packages (EPC), and 4 major site contracts to maintain clarity over vendor responsibilities and streamline procurement. While a strong domestic manufacturing base exists, India still depends on imports for specialised components such as heavy forgings, large seamless pipes, high-precision valves, and radiation-resistant instrumentation. Challenges such as cash flow constraints, quality issues from talent shortages, and financial weaknesses from contractors can slow projects and increase costs.
Finally, nuclear project financing remains a linchpin frequently underestimated in the sector’s growth equation. Nuclear plants demand enormous upfront capital, have long gestation periods, and entail complex regulatory, tariff, and market risks. Although government funds currently underwrite most projects, expanding private sector participation requires innovative financial mechanisms. These include long-tenor, low-interest loans suited to nuclear timelines; risk-sharing instruments such as viability gap funding (VGF) or green bonds; and comprehensive insurance pools covering construction delays, supply interruptions, and workforce risks. Without clear, transparent regulatory frameworks guaranteeing revenue certainty and robust financial infrastructure tailored to such capital-intensive ventures, even the most promising projects may struggle to secure investment.
Realising India’s nuclear ambitions depends not only on passing legislative reforms but equally on revitalising academic capacity, instituting comprehensive insurance protections, bolstering supply chain robustness, and developing tailored financial solutions. Neglecting any of these interconnected challenges risks leaving the nuclear energy wagon stalled despite policy momentum.
India’s nuclear journey, therefore, stands at a crossroads: between visionary policy and practical execution, between promise and the stubborn complexity of transformation.
India’s renewed nuclear ambitions signal a bold vision for clean energy, marked by significant budget allocations, ambitious capacity targets, and landmark regulatory reforms. The government’s commitment—anchored by innovative technologies such as SMRs and opening the sector to private players—could finally unlock the momentum needed for energy security, low-carbon growth, and technological self-reliance. Yet, progress remains constrained by legislative delays, unresolved liability frameworks, regulatory uncertainties, and infrastructure bottlenecks. Underlying these are critical challenges: dwindling nuclear engineering programmes, fragile supply chains reliant on imports, and the urgent need for innovative financing and robust insurance to de-risk investments.
India’s nuclear journey, therefore, stands at a crossroads: between visionary policy and practical execution, between promise and the stubborn complexity of transformation. The wagons of reform and growth can move forward, but only if momentum is sustained and obstacles systematically addressed. The future of India’s clean energy hinges not just on what is planned, but on what is delivered.
Kavya Wadhwa is a nuclear energy advocate and policy analyst dedicated to promoting sustainable energy solutions and driving policy reforms.
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Kavya Wadhwa is a nuclear energy advocate and policy analyst dedicated to promoting sustainable energy solutions and driving policy reforms. His research primarily focuses on ...
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