As the RELOS is largely technical and remains to be operationalised, it signals continuity rather than a strategic breakthrough in India-Russia military ties
The India-Russia defence partnership has quietly been regaining its footing, with several agreements in the pipeline and bilateral military exercises returning to a regular pace. Although the Indian and Russian defence ministers met in New Delhi to co-chair the intergovernmental commission on military-technical cooperation, any defence deals were peculiarly omitted from the outcomes of the December 2025 bilateral summit. One such item that has been widely discussed in the media yet remained officially unannounced as a deliverable is the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics (RELOS) agreement. Signed in February 2025 and ratified by Moscow in late 2025, it has not yet been operationalised and has been kept low-profile by New Delhi, with little insight into its meaning and repercussions for bilateral ties.
Discussions between Moscow and New Delhi regarding the RELOS began in 2018. Since then, expectations of concluding the agreement have accompanied every bilateral summit. In December 2021, it was reported that the RELOS was in its “final stages,” with both sides keen to secure “an institutional arrangement for the reciprocal provision of logistical support and services for the Armed Forces”. However, the agreement was deferred due to technical issues and remaining differences over the wording. The war in Ukraine has further protracted the process, casting doubt over the timeliness of the initiative.
As the formal exchange of instruments of ratification has not been completed, the RELOS has not yet entered into force.
The issue of RELOS resurfaced in the lead-up to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow in July 2024, after the Russian government released the draft document. It is now evident that, by that time, the text had been entirely finalised, with only bureaucratic formalities pending.
The conclusion of the agreement in February 2025 highlighted two key aspects of the India-Russia military partnership. First, defence cooperation has been rekindled, with both New Delhi and Moscow appearing to view their relationship in this area as a win-win. As a sign of their enduring commitment to sustaining defence ties, India and Russia have reached several MoUs on the joint production of defence equipment and have resumed joint military exercises. For example, the ‘Indra’ drills, suspended for three years, were conducted again in March-April, October, and December 2025.
Second, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, New Delhi has tended to keep its military engagements with Moscow under the radar, without drawing attention to any achievements. The two countries are positioned differently, as was reflected in their respective presentations of the RELOS. Since Russia is striving to cement existing partnerships and find new allies, the RELOS ratification by the Russian parliament was designed to set the scene for President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi. For India, seeking to retain its unique position as a Vishwamitra (a friend of the world), the priority is to ensure that any new agreement solidifying its partnership with Moscow does not disrupt progress in other relationships. For this reason, the RELOS was not mentioned at all by Indian officials either prior to or following the bilateral summit.
The agreement delineates the procedures for the movement of military formations, warships, and military aircraft during joint exercises and training operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. In addition to the deployment of troops and equipment, the document outlines the logistical support required for these operations, such as the provision of accommodation, medical care, transport, water and electricity, and other conditions necessary for military personnel.
A careful reading of the agreement reveals its technical nature, with no significant departure from the existing practice of bilateral military cooperation.
The exchange of logistics also includes a range of specific services provided by the receiving country. For warships, this entails port and repair services, as well as the delivery of water, food, technical resources, and other supplies. In the case of military aircraft, these involve air traffic control, aeronautical data, the processing of flight requests, the use of military navigation systems, and aircraft parking and security. Aviation fuel, lubricants, and special fluids, along with the restoration of failed equipment, are offered on a reimbursable basis.
Notably, the agreement outlines restrictions on the number of troops (3,000 personnel), vessels (five warships), and aircraft (10 military aircraft) that can be present in the territory and airspace of the partner state at any one point in time.
The RELOS agreement is valid for five years, with automatic extensions for subsequent five-year periods. While the Russian parliament approved the agreement and President Putin signed it into law, the legal process on the Indian side is still pending. As the formal exchange of instruments of ratification has not been completed, the RELOS has not yet entered into force.
The RELOS ratification by the Russian parliament prompted a flurry of opinions, with many experts proclaiming the agreement to be a “game-changer” or as representing “an entirely new level” in the India-Russia partnership. Such analysis is based on the premise that this agreement will unlock access to new geographies for the navies of India and Russia. There are growing expectations of an increased Indian maritime presence in the Arctic and the Far East, which would rely on “new opportunities” for refuelling, replenishment, and maintenance in Russian ports. Following this logic, Russia could benefit from access to Indian facilities to enhance its “global military posture” and operations in the Indian Ocean.
The RELOS points to enduring defence cooperation and mutual interest between India and Russia in strengthening bilateral ties.
In reality, such views appear somewhat exaggerated. A careful reading of the agreement reveals its technical nature, with no significant departure from the existing practice of bilateral military cooperation. Its primary focus is on facilitating bilateral engagements during exercises. The text does not explicitly mention any new provisions for stationing troops or granting access to each other’s designated bases, leaving this matter ambiguous. As before, any requirement for a port call will necessitate coordination on a case-by-case basis. Foreign troops can enter the territory of the partner state for joint manoeuvres only after all bureaucratic formalities have been observed and an application has been filed in advance.
It is difficult to identify any advances in terms of port access, refuelling, or servicing for Indian and Russian warships. In fact, even without an agreement on logistics support exchange, Indian naval vessels have previously made frequent port calls to Russia for bilateral exercises, friendly visits, and restocking during long-range deployments. For example, in the 21st century, Indian warships have called at Vladivostok eight times. The last visit, however, was quite some time ago, in 2018, for the Indra Navy exercises.
The RELOS points to enduring defence cooperation and mutual interest between India and Russia in strengthening bilateral ties. The agreement provides an institutional framework for breathing new life into bilateral exercises, which in previous years were disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. That said, the strategic significance of the RELOS should not be overstated. Its effectiveness will depend on the alignment of India’s and Russia’s geopolitical outlooks, as well as their respective appetite for projecting power in distant regions. As long as their affinity in the Indo-Pacific is questionable and their strategic presence in the Arctic (in India’s case) and the Indian Ocean (in Russia’s case) remains limited, the RELOS will most likely serve only a technical purpose.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow, Russia & Eurasia, with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
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