The Indian Army’s rejection of the Stryker highlights the need to field domestically developed armoured platforms
Image Source: Wikimedia
The Indian Army’s (IA) recent decision to scrap the purchase of the American-built Stryker Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) is not entirely unsurprising. Evidently, the decision to eliminate the Stryker APC following trials appears to stem from its lack of horsepower (HP) to perform effectively in high-altitude terrain where the air density is low. The initial decision by the IA and Ministry of Defence (MoD) to permit the Stryker APC for operational and field trials was erroneous and somewhat perplexing when an undertrial indigenously-built Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) Wheeled Armoured Platform (WhAP) Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV) was already under trial. Moreover, there was already evidence to indicate that the Stryker APC was incapable of meeting the IA’s Qualitative Requirements (QRs) for high-altitude warfare, unless it underwent significant modification.
The decision to eliminate the Stryker APC following trials appears to stem from its lack of horsepower (HP) to perform effectively in high-altitude terrain where the air density is low.
IA and MoD should prioritise domestically-built ground vehicles over any foreign-origin ground combat system. The TASL-built IFV initial variant has already witnessed limited use by the IA and paramilitary forces. A troop-carrying variant of the Tata WhAP 8x8, known as the Infantry Protected Mobility Vehicle, has been deployed in Ladakh since 2022. There are different variants of IFVs—some performing ambulatory functions, whereas others are geared for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) missions, and a third category includes a 30 mm auto cannon with a remote turret. The IA is not giving the domestically produced variants of the APC a fair opportunity at meeting its requirements. Exhausting the options available within the domestic industry should be the norm before proceeding to consider foreign variants of APCs. India must prioritise self-reliance in ground combat vehicles. IFVs, mobile artillery, and armoured vehicles are technologies that are, for the most part, within the technological capabilities of India’s defence industry. Ironically, India’s defence industry has performed better in developing surface vessels for the Indian Navy (IN) such as frigates, destroyers and corvettes. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has embraced the Tejas—Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) despite all the developmental challenges. The IA has struggled to display the same level of enthusiasm for domestically developed defence equipment as reflected in its decision to proceed with testing the American-built Stryker.
Exhausting the options available within the domestic industry should be the norm before proceeding to consider foreign variants of APCs.
The IA and MoD’s decision to consider the Stryker APC is particularly striking in the face of Taa’s export of the WhAP ICV. TASL has established a manufacturing facility in Morocco with indigenous content reaching 30 percent. More recently, Greece indicated interest in acquiring the 8X8 wheeled vehicles following tests on mobility, crew protection, and performance in the country’s variable terrain. Further, the IA has deployed a small number of WhaP ICVs in Ladakh, with a larger order expected. In the face of the export performance and the IA’s acquisition of the WhAP ICV, the case for a foreign-built ICV is redundant. The Tata-built ICV comes in two variants. The first variant comes with a 30x113mm autocannon, a 7.62x51 mm coaxial gun and an automatic grenade launcher. The second model is equipped with a BMP-2 turret that has a 30mm autocannon. Improvements can be made to both variants of the ICV through extensive testing and field trials.
Against these developments, the IA’s military planners and MoD must focus on developing indigenous defence equipment. The IA should rely on imports only where the domestic industry cannot deliver optimally to service the operational and capability requirements. Second, 100 percent indigenisation is impossible across the entire spectrum of military products for the IA. The IA’s acquisitions for some ground combat vehicles have largely taken a pragmatic course. A few prominent examples include the under-development of the Zorawar Light Battle Tank (LBT) chassis, which is natively built, but its engine and 105 mm main gun are imported. In due course, the American-built Cummins engine currently in use by the Zorawar prototypes is expected to be replaced by a domestically-built 800 horsepower (HP) engine. Similarly, the in-service Arjun Heavy Main Battle Tank (HMBT) has a number of components and subsystems that are imported. Indeed, the larger quest to achieve domestic self-sufficiency in ground combat vehicles remains imperative. India continues to rely significantly on the Russian Federation for ground combat systems.
The IA should rely on imports only where the domestic industry cannot deliver optimally to service the operational and capability requirements.
Finally, a shift in defence procurement from Moscow to Washington may not align with New Delhi’s long-term interests. External defence dependence gives foreign vendors leverage, which may not always be exercised deliberately but can have unintended effects. The twin shocks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic should have underscored for the IA’s senior leadership and the MoD the importance of limiting India’s exposure to external supply shocks. Supply chain constraints and bottlenecks have affected India’s upgrades and supply for some Russian and American-origin equipment, particularly for the Indian Navy (IN) and the Indian Air Force (IAF). The IA cannot afford additional challenges that could impact its operational readiness.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kartik is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. He is currently working on issues related to land warfare and armies, especially the India ...
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