US policy shifts threaten free SSA data access. This serves as a wake-up call for India and demands an indigenous response: the Bharat Space Objects Catalogue.
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For over two decades, the United States (US) has distributed free Space Situational Awareness data—including a catalogue of tracked space objects and conjunction alert messages for space traffic management (STM)—to global satellite operators and researchers, among others. However, recent US policy changes threaten this access.
On 18 December 2025, US President Donald J. Trump passed an Executive Order titled “Ensuring American Space Superiority”, which revises a previous space policy directive by replacing “free of direct user fees” with “for commercial and other relevant use” in key subsections. This paves the way for Department of Defense catalogues, and SSA data and STM services to become paid features.
Considering the volatility of the Trump administration, the US could possibly overturn bilateral agreements for SSA data sharing at its own discretion and cut off vital data services for national security and debris mitigation.
India’s policymakers, armed forces personnel and non-governmental entities have long expressed their concerns regarding the continued dependence on free SSA data.
India’s policymakers, armed forces personnel and non-governmental entities have long expressed their concerns regarding the continued dependence on free SSA data. This order, thus, serves as a wake-up call for India and demands an indigenous response: the Bharat Space Objects Catalogue.
Knowledge of the space environment forms the foundation of civilian and military space operations. Dependence on foreign SSA data exposes a nation with limited or no SSA capabilities to acute risks. A partner state may deliberately mask the orbital positions of its satellites to conceal capabilities or withhold data concerning adversary satellites to protect its classified intelligence collection assets. During a crisis, a partner state could cut off SSA data feeds entirely to reduce the risk of being embroiled in a third-party conflict.
Aside from these risks, open available data also comes with technical limitations. The US Space Command distributes its SSA data in the Two-Line Elements (TLE) format, which provides the approximate orbital position of space objects expressed in Keplerian elements. While TLEs are handy for data visualisation and analysis, they carry a position uncertainty of approximately 1 km, making them unsuitable for precision operations. The Russian Vimpel catalogue delivers SSA data once every seven days and in a format unique to its country, creating hurdles in integrating it with other datasets.
While TLEs are handy for data visualisation and analysis, they carry a position uncertainty of approximately 1 km, making them unsuitable for precision operations.
These political and technical shortcomings of foreign SSA data warrant the need for an indigenous SSA network and catalogue. Making the Bharat Space Object Catalogue available to the public would also serve as an instrument for verifying spacefaring nations’ compliance with international space law, and potentially, induce responsible behaviours.
Operationalising an SSA network and a catalogue maintenance system—even one that provides limited regional coverage—is no easy task; it requires the synergy of sensors and software. Radars, passive-RF sensors, and telescopes must be capable of detecting debris a size 10 cm or less, differentiate between closely-spaced objects and track incremental manoeuvres. Data from these sensors feed algorithms that accurately model the forces acting upon a space object and utilise advanced statistical methods to reduce the uncertainties involved in orbit determination.
India currently relies on astronomical telescopes at the Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences (ARIES) in Nainital, converted to perform space surveillance for geostationary orbits. A refurbished Multi-Object Tracking Radar at Sriharikota, Andhra Pradesh, observes Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) objects. Data from these sensors is fed to the Indian Space Research Organisation’s (ISRO) NEtwork for space objects TRacking and Analysis (NETRA) Control Centre in Bengaluru, where ISRO’s scientists and engineers use a combination of in-house and foreign commercial software to perform launch window, collision and fragmentation event analysis.
The drastic increase in the number of satellites launched each year creates an ever-growing catalogue of objects to track.
Unfortunately, today’s capabilities are woefully ineffective for meeting the near-term military objectives of space domain awareness. The drastic increase in the number of satellites launched each year creates an ever-growing catalogue of objects to track. China’s growing military satellite capabilities, which include its recent experimental rendezvous and proximity missions, demand constant monitoring of threats to India’s 53 operational satellites. To this end, India’s policymakers must take the following steps to ensure its SSA preparedness:
Implementing these plans will first require decision-makers to explicitly acknowledge the existing shortcomings of India’s SSA capabilities. Otherwise, India risks being left behind in a highly contested domain.
Pranav R Satyanath is an independent space and defence policy researcher with eight years of industry and academic expertise.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Pranav R. Satyanath is a researcher focusing on arms control, nuclear strategy, and space policy. His research interests lie at the intersection of technology and ...
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