The pandemic has opened opportunities to reinvent our connections on new bases, as we have been doing over several centuries.
This article is part of the Global Policy-ORF publication — A 2030 Vision for India’s Economic Diplomacy.
India’s relations with the peoples of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula go back several millennia when Indian sailors, merchants, intellectuals and men of faith traversed the waters of the Indian Ocean, exchanging navigation skills, goods, ideas and belief systems. They thus enriched each other materially and spiritually and created a shared ethos that endures to this day.
Over the last decade, the Gulf has been in ferment — the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011 deprived Saudi Arabia of its security partner and created in the kingdom a deep sense of strategic vulnerability. It saw in Iran a hegemonic player in regional affairs and opted to challenge the expansion of Iran’s presence on a sectarian basis in the region that it considered its zone of exclusive influence. This set up proxy conflicts between the two Islamic neighbours in Syria, Yemen and Iraq.
The four-year term of former US President Donald Trump exacerbated regional tensions — he extended full support to Saudi Arabia and Israel, expressed visceral animosity for Iran, and actively promoted Israel’s ties with the Gulf countries. As his term ended, sharp battlelines were drawn in the region — with the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia (and selected Gulf allies, the UAE and Bahrain) on one side, and Iran, backed by Syria and its Shia militia in Lebanon and Iraq on the other<1>.
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has effected remarkable changes in the economic, social and cultural lives of people the world over. Over a year since the first appearance of the virus, with vaccines now available to combat the disease, there is a dawning sense that the international community can gather its resources to explore areas where crises could be transformed into opportunities.
Given the central importance of the Gulf for India’s abiding interests — political, economic and strategic — how can the substantial traditional ties be reshaped to suit the contemporary needs and interests of India and the region?
The significant presence of the Indian community in the Gulf countries over the last 40 years and the role of Indian enterprises in the development of the region have taken place in the framework of important changes in bilateral political and economic relations. Between 2005-07, the head of state or government of every Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country visited India. The GCC countries also became India’s principal trade and investment partners.
Then Saudi ruler King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz was chief guest at India’s Republic Day in 2006, the first visit to India of a Saudi monarch since 1955. He signed with former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the ‘Delhi Declaration’ that committed the two countries to a strategic energy partnership, recognising India’s status as a major global oil importer, with over 50 percent of its needs being met by the GCC countries<2>.
Later, the Pakistan-sponsored attack on Mumbai in November 2008 also affirmed the shared threat that the GCC and India were exposed to from extremist elements nurtured by Pakistan. This provided the rationale to elevate India-GCC ties to a strategic partnership that was given formal shape by the ‘Riyadh Declaration’ of February 2010<3>. This enjoined the two sides to pursue the expansion of ties in political, security, defence, economic and cultural areas.
Given the importance of India’s relations with the Gulf, Prime Minister Narendra Modi focused on the region from the beginning of his term with a series of visits to all the major regional capitals in 2015-16 and encouraging return visits. These visits have included Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman<4>.
These interactions have built on the solid foundations prepared earlier but have imparted to the ties an unprecedented momentum through the frequency of high-level engagement and the institutionalisation of interactions through joint ministerial councils, joint commissions, bilateral strategic dialogues and task forces to address specific issues.
The joint statements issued at the end of each high-level interaction share several common features. Each of them celebrates India’s age-old civilisational ties with the region, applauds India’s democratic order, and recognises the relationship as a “strategic partnership.” On this basis, each document sets out the shared interests and concerns of the two sides relating to extremism and terrorism and emphasises the need for cooperation between them for to promote regional peace and security.
The joint statements recognise the value of the traditional pillars of ties with India — energy, trade, investments in infrastructure and industry, and the presence of the community. Then, in line with the age-old practice of revitalising relations with fresh content, they identify new areas for bilateral cooperation. These include food security; renewable and nuclear energy; education and skill development; the defence industry; biotechnology; space; electronics; and digitisation, including cyber security, innovation and support for start-ups.
These ideas provide a valuable blueprint for the shaping of new relations over the next decade.
Economic recovery after the pandemic and the building of ties on fresh bases will need to take into account that the pandemic has accelerated many of the trends in the world economy that were at nascent stage earlier. These are a shift in favour of clean energy, digitisation and the attendant need for skilled manpower, and the paramount importance of connectivity, both physical, to explore new trade links, and digital, to shape new regional value chains.
The economies of the GCC states are expected to contract by 5.2 percent in 2020. This downturn is accompanied by low oil prices that are expected to remain at US$ 55 to US$ 60 per barrel in 2021. Trade has declined by 40 percent across the region, causing a total loss of about US$ 116 billion<5>. In a recent estimate, the International Monetary Fund expects the Gulf economies to contract by 6.6 percent, as against the world average of 4.4 percent, largely on account of their dependence on oil revenues — for instance, oil accounts for 45 percent of the Saudi GDP and 75 percent of Oman’s revenues<6>.
On the positive side, the states concerned are asset-rich — they have US$ 43.7 trillion in liquid and quasi-liquid assets, including US$ 3.3 trillion in sovereign wealth funds. Besides this, they also have proven oil and gas reserves valued at US$ 40.4 trillion<7>.
The ideas for cooperation set out in the various joint statements, the changes wrought by the pandemic in the global and Gulf economies and the attempts of Gulf leaders to cope with the challenges posed by the pandemic provide the template to shape India-Gulf economic relations in the post-pandemic era.
The collapse of oil prices in the wake of the pandemic has adversely affected the oil revenues and the GDP of GCC countries. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s GDP growth was 5.4 percent in 2012, plunged to -0.7 percent in 2017, recovered to 2.3 percent in 2018, and then collapsed to -6.8 percent in 2020 due to the pandemic<8>. This parlous economic scenario has led Gulf producers to pursue the use of renewable energy sources to meet the burgeoning domestic demand for energy — for electricity, desalination projects, domestic use and industry — and keep their hydrocarbon production for the export market.
This approach meets India’s needs perfectly. The Draft National Energy Policy (NEP) document prepared by India’s premier economic advisory body, NITI Aayog, in June 2017 provides that the share of “renewables” in the country’s energy mix will go from 3.7 percent in 2012 to 6.6 percent in 2022 and will peak at 13.7 percent<9>. At the same time, in all scenarios, India will remain heavily import-dependent for its hydrocarbon needs — (a) its import-dependence for oil will go from 77 percent in 2012 to 90 percent (business as usual) or 86 percent (ambitious); and (b) its import-dependence for gas will go from 12 percent in 2012 to 27 percent (business as usual) or 20 percent (ambitious).
These projections make it clear that India will be dependent on the Gulf countries for its oil and gas needs for the foreseeable future, thus retaining the principal pillar of its ties with the region. At the same time, it is important to note that “renewables” offer a new and important area for bilateral cooperation. This is because both India and the GCC countries are committed to developing renewables, as is borne out by the following<10>:
• Between 2014-18, the total renewable electricity installed in the GCC states increased by over 300 percent.
• The UAE has a total installed renewable energy capacity of 589 megawatts; the country has expanded its renewable energy projects by 330 percent between 2014-18; it has committed itself to obtaining 44 percent of its energy production from renewables by 2050, and has already achieved 5 percent. Again, in 2016, Saudi Arabia set a target to source 9.5 GW of its electricity from renewables by 2023.
• India too has made major strides in pursuing ambitious renewable energy goals. Globally, the country is ranked fourth in wind power, fifth in solar power, and fifth again in renewable power installed capacity. The government is expecting to reach 225 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2022, well over its target of 175 GW under the Paris Climate Accord. Given its installed capacity of 89 GW in August 2020, these are certainly ambitious targets<11>.
Renewable energy development provides for an extraordinary synergy between India and the GCC. This partnership meshes well with similar plans that are animating both sides. This development has been encouraged by the significant decline in the cost of renewable energy technologies. Thus, the global average levelised cost of electricity from solar panels has decreased 73 percent between 2010 and 2017, while from onshore wind power it has fallen 22 percent<12>.
This provides great scope for mutual corporate investments and transfer of technology, and experience between the two sides. Over the last six years, investments in India’s renewable energy sector have amounted to US$ 42 billion, with US$ 11.1 being invested in 2018 alone<13>. Foreign investment in India’s clean energy is picking up momentum — in just 2016-18, it amounted to about US$ 2 billion.
Besides funding, India is also building infrastructure. Solar parks are being set up across the country, with the world’s largest solar power plant, the Bhadla Solar Park, currently under construction in Rajasthan. To add corporate heft to these ambitious plans, the Adani Group has announced plans to become the world’s largest solar power company by 2025, and the world’s largest renewable energy company by 2030<14>.
Water conservation is a new area for cooperation between India and the GCC countries to sustain a better quality of life over the long-term, given that both regions are facing water stress. The World Resources Institute reported in August 2019 that 18 of the 22 Arab states were suffering severe water shortages, with 10 experiencing “extremely high” water stress<15>, including all six GCC countries and Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Libya.
The report noted some scope to take remedial action. It pointed out that 82 percent of the region’s wastewater is not reused, though some initiatives in water treatment and reuse were already emerging — Oman treats 100 percent of its collected wastewater and reuses 78 percent of it; about 84 percent of all wastewater collected in the GCC countries is treated to safe levels, but only 44 percent goes on to be reused.
The report also included India in this list at number 13 out of 18 countries in terms of water stress. This category includes countries that are withdrawing 80 percent of their available fresh water every year for agriculture, industry and urban needs. The report quoted a NITI Aayog statement from 2018 that said saying that the country is “suffering from the worst water crisis in its history, and millions of lives and livelihoods are under threat.” India is currently at the bottom of 122 countries in the Water Quality Index — at 120 — with nearly 70 percent of its water sources contaminated<16>.
At the beginning of the decade, the GCC was home to around 50 million people. By 2050, that number is expected to increase by around 14 million. By 2050, it is predicted that annual freshwater consumption rates for the GCC will hit 33.7 billion cubic meters, outstripping projected future storage levels by almost 8 billion cubic meters. Given the region’s high dependence on desalinated water, boosting desalination capacity is the principal initiative of the GCC states to increase water supply <17>.
Around 57 percent of the world’s desalination plants can be found in the GCC, allowing it to create 18.18 million cubic metres of potable desalinated water every day. To keep up with demand, planned projects in the pipeline are estimated to add around 40 percent additional capacity by 2025, boosting that total to over 25 million cubic metres per day.
However, the GCC countries are anxious to pursue obtaining new water supplies with minimum ecological impact. India shares the same interest and has been turning to innovative approaches to meet its needs for sufficient and safe water. Thus, to meet the challenge of diarrhoeal illnesses and deaths, Indian scientists are attempting to purify water by using nanotechnology. The technology removes microbes, bacteria and other matter from water by using composite nanoparticles that emit silver ions that destroy the contaminants<18>.
Similarly, in desalination, which is so important in the GCC countries, new technologies are being researched to reduce the huge amount of energy that desalination plants consume — about 4 kwh of energy for every cubic metre of water. Again, smart technologies are being investigated to monitor water leakages that wastage of 60 percent of water globally and managing water use with computer algorithms and modelling. Above all, using technology to process wastewater for industrial and personal use<19>.
Working together on water conservation, processing of wastewater and making water safe for drinking will be in the joint interest of the highly water-stressed India and GCC states, and will complement the related new area for cooperation, food security.
Food security is a priority concern for all GCC nations, with the countries being particularly anxious about supply disruptions due to market or political volatilities. They had, for instance, found themselves in a parlous situation in 2007-08, when the global food crisis had caused rice prices to go up 217 percent, the problem being exacerbated by major suppliers — India, Russia, Vietnam and Argentina — putting restrictions on their food exports.
Given these and other concerns associated with the possible impact of climate change on agriculture, the GCC countries have undertaken several new initiatives. The UAE has moved to investing in agricultural companies in relatively developed countries, such as Serbia, Poland and Ukraine. Being surplus in food production, these countries do not generate local concerns relating to foreign ownership of arable land.
The GCC states have also invested in corporations dedicated to agriculture. The UAE has a 50 percent stake in the region’s largest agribusiness, Al Dahra, that operates in 20 countries and specialises in production of rice, flour, fruits and vegetables, as also animal feed. Another UAE-owned company is involved with agritech at a facility set up in the UAE with an American partner. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund is securing food supplies by investing in an Indian group, Daawat Foods, that guarantees rice supplies to the kingdom.
This background throws up interesting opportunities for the GCC states and India to cooperate in the sensitive area of food security for mutual benefit. A start has been made with the pioneering ‘farm-to-port’ project, which envisages a special corporatised farming zone where crops are grown for the UAE market, with dedicated logistics infrastructure to the port<20>. This farm will also house agro-industries facilities.
Given India’s huge fruit and vegetable produce and vast quantities that are wasted due to poor storage, the food processing sector has the greatest potential for GCC-India cooperation, especially investments. India loses about 21 million tonnes of wheat annually, the equivalent of Australia’s entire produce, valued at US$ 8.3 billion, due to inadequate storage and distribution facilities<21>. According to the national auditor, India lacks appropriate warehouses to store 33 million tonnes of food grains procured from farmers<22>. Similarly, India loses about 21 million tonnes of vegetables and 12 million tonnes of fruits annually due to the absence of requisite cold storage amenities<23>.
These realities in both countries open several opportunities for UAE investment in India’s farm-related logistics sector. This technological cooperation could yield extraordinary quantities of cereals and processed food that will boost domestic stocks and partly meet the needs of the UAE as well.
Another area of cooperation between India and the GCC is that of agricultural research, particularly in food technology. The UAE has announced it plans to become a regional hub for food knowledge, the goal being to increase food production by 30 percent by 2021 and further develop the local food processing industry<24>. India can be a worthy partner in this endeavour.
India has one of the largest agricultural research systems in the world, with the greatest number of scientific personnel of any developing country engaged in research and education relating to agriculture and allied areas. This includes approximately 30,000 scientists and more than 100,000 supporting staff engaged in research related to agriculture<25>. The apex body for research is the Indian Council for Agricultural Research, which directly administers 47 research institutes in the areas of crop, animal and fishery sciences. India also has 42 research institutes dealing with crop sciences, horticulture and resource management (mainly soil-related) and technology<26>. These significant capacities, developed over a century and a half, are a valuable resource that could play a major role in augmenting food security in the GCC countries, with the partnership simultaneously upgrading food transport and storage in India as well.
In his recent book on the lessons of the pandemic, Fareed Zakaria simply says: “Today, life can be lived digitally”<27>. Technological change has moved in waves — commencing with the personal computer, it advanced to the internet, the World Wide Web, and then to the mobile revolution. In the process, digital technology has brought us digital photography, streaming services, digital retail, and software for Uber that has revolutionised transport.
The pandemic has accelerated the role of technology in daily life — working from home; online school and college education, online consultations with doctors and health-workers; and use of software for medical diagnosis, surgery, treatment and therapy, with devices attached to the person to monitor vital functions and transmit data to the cloud to be analysed by specialists<28>.
The pandemic has already speeded up the increased use of digital technology in GCC countries. Impelled by worker safety, major regional oil companies are monitoring complex operations from a digital command centre located at headquarters. The region’s largest food and beverage company, Al Marai, has also become the world’s largest vertically-integrated dairy manufacturing company, with 100 filling and packaging lines. Digital technology has meant greater efficiency and reduced water consumption<29>.
In the GCC countries, digital technology is playing a central role in shaping the countries’ post-oil future. In Dubai, for instance, it is promoting food security by handling research, production methods, infrastructure improvement and water-saving processes. The other sector is finance, where Dubai is aspiring for global status.
India is a credible partner with GCC countries in developing digital capabilities for diverse operations. In June 2018, the NITI Aayog identified the following as priority sectors for use of digital technology — healthcare, agriculture, education, smart cities and infrastructure, and smart mobility and transportation<30>. This was followed by the World Economic Forum launching the ‘Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution’ in India in October 2018. It will initially focus on — artificial intelligence and machine learning, and blockchain and distributed ledger technology<31>.
Linked with expanding digitisation, both India and the GCC nations will face the need for skill development. This challenge is being addressed in India through the skill development programme under the electronics system design and manufacturing scheme that aims to train 328,000 people, with the government providing 75 percent to 100 percent of training cost for industry-specific skills for skilled and semi-skilled workers. The scheme also provides opportunities for skill development for the private sector through telecom and electronics sector skills councils<32>.
Gulf countries are also paying attention to digital education through local institutions, such as the UAE University, the Mohammed bin Zayed University for Artificial Intelligence and the New Media Academy. Besides these institutions, most major Gulf universities have departments devoted to teaching and training in the digital technology sector and welcome foreign companies running regular as well as special courses and joint internship programmes to develop knowledge and skill in areas such as artificial intelligence, cloud training and information and communications technology.
Thus, India, with its well-established IT companies in the region and its high-quality teaching institutions, can confidently look at a future when it will not only provide human resources to meet the needs of GCC countries, but will also be able to provide training facilities for GCC youth in diverse applications of digital technology.
The pandemic commenced in China’s Wuhan province in December 2019 and by February 2020, it had spread to 18 other provinces. These provinces are home to 90 percent of active businesses in China. Almost all major global corporations have important suppliers in the impacted area. The pandemic disrupted major global value chains that are centred on China and compelled a worldwide debate on reshaping value chains.
The role of global value chains in world trade had started decreasing even before the pandemic, after reaching a peak of 52 percent of world trade in 2008. This was due to labour-saving technologies available in several countries, including automation and 3D printing, as also trade conflicts between major countries, such as the US and China, due to allegations of protectionism.
So far, India has been a reluctant and marginal presence in the global value chains. This may have been due to its lacklustre domestic reforms, limited infrastructure facilities and poor logistical connectivity. This could now change. India is well-placed to participate in global value chains in sectors of its strength — buyer-driven networks of high-quality in labour intensive areas such as garments, textiles, footwear and toys. But achieving international standards would need major changes at home — improved logistics and infrastructure, improved ease of doing business procedures, and upgraded skills of the workforce<33>.
As the GCC countries and India rebuild their economies and are open to fresh ideas, in an innovative move, new value chains for manufacturing could be linked to new supply chains as part of more resilient trade structures. The principal concern in the Gulf is to both shorten and diversify supply lines and avoid risky transactions<34>. Two initiatives that are already in place in the Gulf offer attractive opportunities for Indian companies:
• Free zones: Gulf states today have 50 free zones, with many of them focusing on e-commerce and other technological ventures. However, beyond the physical free zones, GCC innovators are looking at digital free zones — virtual commercial zones that can host several thousand enterprises. The one in Dubai is modelled on a pioneering initiative in Malaysia that handles goods valued at US$ 65 billion and has created over 60,000 jobs worldwide.
• Digital supply chain platforms: Dubai-based DP World is a leading shipping and logistics operator. It has now established digital supply chain platforms that link it with similar operators across Asia, thus obtaining an exponential expansion in global connectivity and business<35>.
India fits the bill perfectly in regard to shaping new value and supply chains with the Gulf in the post-pandemic era, largely due to its geographical proximity, the comprehensive strategic partnerships India has set up with all the GCC countries, the substantial economic ties that have linked the two sides over several millennia.
There will be a clear synergy in India and the GCC countries consolidating their traditional areas of cooperation — energy, trade and investment — and pursuing the frontier areas in that GCC investment and partnerships will upgrade infrastructure and manufacturing facilities in India, while Indian entrepreneurs will create manufacturing bases and skills development facilities in the Gulf region. This will need adopting of an integrated and cohesive approach, backed by institutional support, to develop ties in the diverse areas set out above — renewables, water conservation, food security, digital technology and skills development.
In a broad historical perspective, the pandemic is a watershed event. From the debris of the ravages that it has wreaked on earlier relationships and arrangements, it is also offering opportunities to take the human saga forward into new realms that need new instruments, new operations and new mindsets. Given the five millennia-old narrative of engagement that has defined India’s links with the Gulf, the pandemic has opened opportunities to reinvent our connections on new bases, as we have been doing over several centuries.
<1> Talmiz Ahmad, “Trump’s Toxic Legacy in West Asia,” Outlook Online, 27 November 2020.
<2> Ministry of External Affairs, Delhi Declaration, Signed by King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh of India, New Delhi, Government of India, 27 January 2006.
<3> Ministry of External Affairs, Riyadh Declaration: A New Era of Strategic Partnership, Riyadh, Government of India, 1 March 2010.
<4> PR Kumaraswamy and Meena Singh Roy, eds, Persian Gulf 2016-17: India’s Relations with the Region (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2018), pp. 7-10.
<5> Justin George Varghese, “Gulf economies: How does post-pandemic recovery look like?” Gulf News, 7 November 2020.
<6> “The Oil Price Crash Has Made Diversification Vital For Gulf Nations,” OilPrice.com, 19 November 2020.
<7> Oliver Wyman, The Arabian Gulf Economies: Asset Rich, Transforming, and Full of Opportunities, Marsh and McLennan Companies, June 2019.
<8> Nokolay Kozhanov, “The GCC and the Evolving Notion of Gulf Energy Security,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, 6 August 2020, pp. 8.
<9> NITI Aayog, Draft National Energy Policy, New Delhi, Government of India, 27 June 2017.
<10> Aisha Al-Sarihi, “Renewable Energy in the Gulf Arab States,” Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 18 November 2019.
<11> “Renewable Energy Industry in India,” Brand India, 21 October 2020.
<12> Al-Sarihi, “Renewable Energy in the Gulf Arab States”
<13> “Renewable Energy Industry in India”
<14> Gautam Adani, “Our vision is to become the world’s largest solar power company by 2025 and the largest renewable power company by 2030,” LinkedIn, 22 January 2020.
<15> Rutger Willem Hofste, Paul Reig and Leah Schleifer, “17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World's Population, Face Extremely High Water Stress,” World Resources Institute, 6 August 2019.
<16> Ashok Gulati, “Harvesting water: Technology vs policy,” Financial Express, 8 July 2019.
<17> “Tapped out – The New Normal of Rising Water Demand in the GCC,” World Future Energy Summit, 7 July 2020.
<18> Will Henley, “The new water technologies that could save the planet,” The Guardian, 22 July 2013.
<19> Henley, “The new water technologies that could save the planet”
<20> Indrani Bagchi, “To feed UAE, India plans special farms, infrastructure for export,” Times of India, 6 March 2017.
<21> Asit K. Biswas, “India must tackle food waste,” World Economic Forum, 12 August 2014.
<22> Biswas, “India must tackle food waste”
<23> Manipadma Jena, “India’s food security rots in storage,” Global Issues, 21 June 2013.
<24> Ismail Sebugwaawo , “Food waste and loss remain a major challenge: UAE Minister,” Khaleej Times, 19 November 2020.
<25> T Balaguru, “National Agricultural Research System in India,” All India Agricultural Students Association, July 2015, pp. 8-9.
<26> Balaguru, “National Agricultural Research System in India”
<27> Fareed Zakaria, Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World, (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Random House, 2020), pp. 98.
<28> Zakaria, Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World, pp. 106
<29> Jean-Pascal Tricoire, “Digitisation is what a future is built on,” Gulf News, 5 September 2020.
<30> NITI Aayog, National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence, Government of India, June 2018, pp. 7.
<31> “Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution,” Drishti, 12 October 2018.
<32> Deloitte and Assocham, Digital India: Unlocking the Trillion Dollar Opportunity, Deloitte, November 2016, pp. 25.
<33> Rajesh Chadha, “Fractured Global Value Chains post-COVID-19: Can India gain its missed glory?,” Brookings, 11 May 2020.
<34> “Post-Covid-19 supply chains,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, 11 September 2020.
<35> Robert Mogielnicki, Enabling the New Frontiers of Gulf-Asia Economic Ties, Dubai, EDA Insight, Emirates Diplomatic Academy, December 2020, pp. 6.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Talmiz Ahmad joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1974. Early in his career he was posted in a number of West Asian countries (such as ...
Read More +
PREV
