In light of India’s new patrolling agreement with China, the country needs to increase its military spending and bolster its armed forces against future threats
Image Source: Getty
With India and China reaching a limited agreement on the disengagement from and patrolling of the Depsang Bulge and Demchok areas in eastern Ladakh, there is widespread jubilation in some quarters. The celebration of this breakthrough announced on 21 October 2024, should be tempered by the reality that there is still a significant amount of disengagement, de-escalation, and de-induction of forces to be completed by New Delhi and Beijing. Pending further negotiations, under the latest agreement, the following friction points were left out—Galwan Valley (PP 14), Pangong Tso (North and South Banks), Gogra (PP 17A) and Hotsprings (PP 15). These four areas are currently under buffer zones that prohibit patrolling, meaning the status quo ante, has not been restored completely. Meanwhile, with Depsang and Demchok, India and China have agreed to “coordinated patrolling,” which one analyst described as an “innovation.” This is misleading and deceptive because it is not an innovation, but a restriction on patrolling. There are three patrolling restrictions under the latest agreement.
Firstly, each patrol team cannot exceed 14 troops. Secondly, the other side must be notified before embarking on a patrol. Thirdly, the number of patrols that Indian and Chinese forces can conduct cannot exceed two or three every month, to all the points they deem part of their territory in Depsang and Demchok. Indeed, though India can patrol areas in Demchok, it is not permitted to patrol Charding La—a key pass. In addition, there is a quid pro quo. Just as India has gained patrolling access to Demchok and Depsang up to Patrolling Points (PP) 10, 11, 11A, 12, and 13, which it last secured access to in January 2020, China has gained a reciprocal concession by way of an “escorted patrol” in the Yangste area of Arunachal Pradesh, as well as another location. These patrolling restrictions did not apply under the terms of the 1993 and 1996 agreements. Further, these “innovations” are ultimately a concession to the Chinese because most of the territory that the Chinese occupied in April-May 2020 was primarily India-dominated, if not India-controlled, territory.
Beijing has numerous opportunities to rake up trouble along the entire stretch of the 3,500 kilometres of contested boundary between India and China.
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) maintains that “…verification patrolling has commenced on mutually agreed terms in Demchok and Depsang.” Nevertheless, restrictive conditions have been built into this agreement, in a quest to avoid clashes between Chinese and Indian forces. Only time will tell whether this arrangement will deliver the stabilising impact that the Modi government claims it is intended to achieve. Theoretically, clashes could still occur even under the new patrolling arrangement. Beijing has numerous opportunities to rake up trouble along the entire stretch of the 3,500 kilometres of contested boundary between India and China. India has had to accept these restrictive conditions as the price for resuming a limited patrolling agreement at Demchok and the Depsang Plains. The Chinese have compelled India to accept a shift in the terms of prior patrolling arrangements, and India’s consent implies a tacit acceptance of China’s case that earlier patrolling arrangements—as a result of agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005, and 2012—were unworkable or ineffective. Where does that leave India’s quest to restore the status ante of April 2020? Despite the Modi government’s impressive infrastructure build-up along the Sino-Indian boundary, which was one of the key reasons for the Chinese precipitating the ongoing boundary crisis, has New Delhi conceded to Beijing’s demands that it will limit further infrastructure development, especially the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) road? The government will have to come clean and clarify these matters. To its credit, the Modi government has invested heavily in border infrastructure and introduced vital changes in the military command structure. Under the interim budget in February 2024, the government has allocated more capital to the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) to beef up infrastructure in critical parts along the Sino-Indian border, such as the Nyoma Airfield in Ladakh, Shinku La Tunnel in Himachal Pradesh, the Nechiphu Tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh and several others. Supplementing this infrastructure build-up, visible change is underway in the Indian Army’s conversion of its Headquarters Uttar Bharat (HQ-UB) into a new comprehensively operational Corp. This change is geared toward shifting the focus from the peacetime duties of the HQ-UB, which is now a Corps, to a Line of Actual Control (LaC) in the Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand sectors. These are very indispensable and laudable measures. Although the government is performing commendably on these two metrics, it is insufficient.
Engagement with Beijing without militarily equipping the Indian armed forces with additional capabilities conveys weakness.
Although the Modi government’s work on India’s border infrastructure paved the way for India’s military mobilisation against China’s annexation of Indian territory in April-May 2020, it has to do more to accumulate military strength through additional capital expenditure. Since 2017, well before the eruption of the current boundary crisis between India and China, there has not been significant growth in the defence budget, especially in capital acquisitions. Growth has been primarily in revenue expenditure which covers pensions, allowances, salaries and so on. This high growth of revenue spending is also driven by “One Rank, One Pension” (OROP). Even with the introduction of the Agnipath recruitment scheme, cost savings that are intended to help pay for capital acquisitions in the armed services, will not reap benefits until many years later. Engagement with Beijing without militarily equipping the Indian armed forces with additional capabilities conveys weakness. It will run the risk of inviting more crises and possibly a serious military conflagration with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. Kartik specialises in space military issues and his research is primarily centred on the ...
Read More +
PREV
