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India and China’s decision to explore the early harvest solution presents an opportunity for Bhutan to resolve the complex trijunction issue, though it is not without challenges.
In August 2025, weeks before PM Narendra Modi’s visit to Beijing for the SCO summit, India hosted the 24th round of Special Representative (SR) talks with China. The meeting discussed establishing an expert group under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China border affairs to explore an early harvest solution for border delimitation. This development comes amidst increasing high-level engagements between India and China and discussions of the potential resumption of direct flights and trade across border points. As India cautiously reopens to Beijing, its closest neighbour, Bhutan, has a new opportunity to end its border dispute with China, though this is not without its challenges.
Bhutan has a special relationship with India and a neutral relationship with China. Bhutan and China do not have diplomatic relations. The latter claims Bhutan’s territories in three sectors: the North, West, and East (see Table 1). Since 1984, Bhutan and China have had 25 rounds of border talks. The country’s strategic location and unique relations make these negotiations vulnerable to broader China-India ties. Specifically, China intends to expand its presence (in breadth and depth) in the Western sector near the strategic Chumbi Valley — that is, between Sikkim and Bhutan. See Map 1 for an illustration of the Chumbi valley and China's claims in the sector.
Table 1. China’s Claims over Bhutan’s Territories
Source: Authors’ Collation
Map 1. Chumbi Valley and China’s Claims in the Western Sector
Source: Author's Creation
While India is concerned about China’s claims in the Western sector, it is most alarmed about claims regarding the Doklam plateau and the border trijunction. India and Bhutan maintain Batang La as the beginning of the trijunction, while China claims Gipmochi to be the beginning of the trijunction (see Map 2). These claims give China a larger strategic advantage over India. At a height of 14,523 feet, control over Gipmochi of the Jampheri ridge would significantly increase Beijing’s offensive positioning and surveillance capabilities against India’s Siliguri Corridor. This is also a reason why Bhutan’s negotiations with China have made little progress. In the past, China offered Bhutan a package deal — renouncing its claims in the North in return for Bhutan ceding the Western disputed territories. However, this deal was ruled out by Bhutan, given its implications for India. But as negotiations have prolonged, Chinese aggression and intrusions along the disputed border have intensified.
While India is concerned about China’s claims in the Western sector, it is most alarmed about claims regarding the Doklam plateau and the border trijunction. India and Bhutan maintain Batang La as the beginning of the trijunction, while China claims Gipmochi to be the beginning of the trijunction
Map 2. Doklam Plateau and Contesting Claims over the Trijunction
Source: Foreign Policy; Author’s additions
Limited progress with negotiations nudged Bhutan and China to conduct joint field surveys of disputed areas and exchange maps in the 2010s. The surveys of the Northern and Western disputed sectors were completed in 2013 and 2015, respectively. The surveys were also complemented by annual border talks (from 2013 to 2016). Parallely, India and China also continued with their bilateral negotiations. In 2012, India and China agreed on their border in the Sikkim sector on “the basis of the alignment” and agreed to demarcate the sector at a later date. They also concurred that the trijunction boundary points be finalised in consultation with the concerned (third) countries, indicating the likely exclusion of the Doklam trijunction.
In 2017, China proposed the early harvest solution to commence demarcation in the least contentious sector — Sikkim. This was likely on the basis of the alignment reached in 2012. In the same year, China began building a road towards the Jampheri ridge via Doklam, largely motivated by the trijunction being left out of the 2012 discussions and the completion of its survey in disputed regions with Bhutan. India suspected this move would reduce the Doklam plateau to another permanent incursion point, and stopped China from building the road, leading to a tense standoff. Bhutan also criticised Chinese intrusions along the border and violations of their previous agreements despite ongoing negotiations.
In 2012, India and China agreed on their border in the Sikkim sector on “the basis of the alignment” and agreed to demarcate the sector at a later date. They also concurred that the trijunction boundary points be finalised in consultation with the concerned (third) countries, indicating the likely exclusion of the Doklam trijunction.
The standoff underscored India’s urgency to demarcate borders. In 2019, China formally submitted the early harvest proposal to India. India agreed to the solution, contingent on the Uttarakhand and Himachal border (Middle sector) being demarcated alongside Sikkim. The Galwan clashes of 2020 once again shelved these negotiations, but underscored the severity of the Chinese challenge to India. In an attempt to reduce potential flashpoints, India reportedly asked (or gave the green light for) Bhutan to resume negotiations and settle its border dispute with China (barring the trijunction), aiming to limit such incursions in the future and resolve the complex trijunction issue at a convenient time.
On its part, being pressured by increasing Chinese assertiveness, Bhutan expedited the negotiations with China. In 2020, a three-step roadmap was agreed upon, likely built upon the previously completed surveys. The three steps included: agreeing on borders on the table, visiting the sites, and then formally demarcating the border. Between 2021 and 2023, both countries held the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th expert group meetings (EGMs), signed an MoU on the roadmap, and held the 25th round of border talks. Reflecting on these negotiations, Bhutan’s then Prime Minister Lotay Tshering maintained that the “demarcation of territories will happen in another one or two meetings”. Later that year, during the 25th round of talks, both countries discussed the responsibilities and functions of the Joint Technical Team (JTT) on the Delimitation and Demarcation of the boundary.
However, these discussions excluded the Doklam trijunction. On multiple occasions, Bhutan expressed its desire to resolve the trijunction issue trilaterally under a friendly atmosphere. Tshering also remarked, “It is not up to Bhutan alone to solve the problem (of Doklam)...... We are ready. As soon as the other two parties are also ready, we can discuss.”
The recent developments and willingness to explore the early harvest solution have once again brought the Sikkim sector to the centre of the India-China border demarcation process. This offers an opportunity for Bhutan to resolve the complex trijunction issue.
The recent developments and willingness to explore the early harvest solution have once again brought the Sikkim sector to the centre of the India-China border demarcation process. This offers an opportunity for Bhutan to resolve the complex trijunction issue. The limited negotiations between India and China over the trijunction in 2012 that culminated in the 2017 standoff will continue to shape Bhutan’s willingness to resolve the dispute at the earliest. This is further being reinforced by the increasing frequency of Chinese incursions.
By simultaneously engaging with India and China and assuaging their respective concerns, Bhutan appears to be positioning itself to move toward a resolution of the border issue. The new government, since January 2024, has seemingly kept India abreast of the border negotiations. Several high-level engagements have taken place between both countries since January 2024 (see Table 2). Many of these discussions have often covered the “full spectrum of bilateral relations”, indicating consistent communication on the border issue alongside other areas of priority. India and Bhutan have also discussed the potential for leveraging technology and enhancing capacity building in survey and boundary-related work.
To keep Chinese intrusions under check, Bhutan has continued its defence cooperation with India. It is keen on incorporating new technology for mutual security, hinting at leveraging these along the Western sector. Bhutan’s Chief Operating Officer recently visited India’s Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) — a military intelligence unit responsible for managing satellite-based image acquisition. India has reaffirmed its support to Bhutan in defence preparedness, capacity enhancement, and augmentation. It is also helping the country’s military mobilisation via logistics and all-weather roads.
Table 2. High-Level Engagements Between India and Bhutan 
Source: Author’s Collation
That said, Bhutan is also engaging with China to sustain the momentum and to not antagonise the country. In August 2024, both countries held the 14th EGM and discussed the implementation of responsibilities and functions of the JTT. In February 2025, a high-level Chinese Foreign Ministry official also paid a courtesy call to the President of Bhutan’s Olympic Committee, who is also a member of the royal family. In March 2025, the governments of Bhutan and China co-hosted a Chinese New Year celebration in Thimphu, which was attended by members of the Bhutanese royal family and ministers. In the aftermath, Bhutan, for the first time, referred to Tibet as Xizang, likely addressing Beijing’s concerns.
By engaging with and assuaging India and China’s concerns, Bhutan has made reasonable progress in its border negotiations. With India cautiously re-engaging China and exploring an early harvest solution, Bhutan now has the opportunity to resolve its border dispute with China, especially in the trijunction region. However, major challenges remain. A lot would depend on New Delhi-Beijing ties and their ability to trust each other, especially as China continues to militarise the Chumbi valley. This will also, in turn, shape the fate of trilateral negotiations over Doklam.
A more complex challenge is China’s position on the trilateral issue. While China has engaged with Bhutan without discussing Doklam, it has not yet clarified its stance on the trilateral resolution. Even during the 2017 Doklam standoff, China made no reference to the 2012 understanding. Beijing asserted that the China-Bhutan boundary issue is a bilateral one and that India had no right to interfere and make claims on behalf of Bhutan. It remains to be seen if cautious re-engagement between India and China, and Bhutan’s ability to engage its neighbours, leads to any meaningful progress in the resolution of the trijunction question.
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme’s Neighbourhood Studies Initiative. He focuses on strategic and security-related developments in the South Asian ...
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