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As Bangladesh resets its foreign policy post-Hasina, India faces a rising challenge– a friend turning uncertain and Pakistan gaining ground.
Image Source: Getty
Bangladesh and India are connected in multiple ways, extending beyond just the bilateral relationship between their governments. They share an enduring bond through their common history, culture, land, transboundary rivers, and adjacent maritime zones. While this interdependency is unalterable despite changes in political regimes, it can certainly be capitalised for mutual progress through complementarities in governance. This had been a defining feature of the Indian government’s partnership with the former Awami League administration in Bangladesh, led by Sheikh Hasina. Not only was this exhibited by their expanding portfolio of areas of cooperation—ranging from connectivity, security, to collaboration in public health—but also by their ability to continue nurturing bilateral ties in several domains, despite lingering contentious issues such as the Teesta Water Sharing dispute.
A decade of this partnership had thus ushered in a near-permanent amicability in the India-Bangladesh relationship, providing a strong foundation for New Delhi’s aspirations to ‘Act East’ by putting its ‘Neighbourhood First’.
A decade of this partnership had thus ushered in a near-permanent amicability in the India-Bangladesh relationship, providing a strong foundation for New Delhi’s aspirations to ‘Act East’ by putting its ‘Neighbourhood First’. However, the mass revolution in Bangladesh in August 2024, followed by Hasina’s seeking refuge in India, and the establishment of the interim government in Dhaka, abruptly halted this partnership. As the eight-month-old fledgling interim government grapples with Bangladesh’s ongoing economic and political turmoil, its foreign policy reflects uncertainty about India amidst struggles to secure its own legitimacy.
The legal validity of the interim government, headed by Mohammad Yunus as Chief Adviser, a role equivalent to a Prime Minister (PM), has been repeatedly questioned due to a 2011 Constitutional Amendment Act that abolished the system of non-party caretaker governments in Bangladesh. Although the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court has recently ‘partially annulled the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution and reinstated the non-partisan, neutral caretaker government system’, legalising the Yunus administration, it remains a non-elected government in a country that is struggling to revive democracy. The regime’s primary source of popular support thus continues to be the Anti-discrimination Student Movement, which nominated it to power after Hasina’s ouster.
The movement owes its origins to the student protests against the reservation of jobs for descendants of ‘Muktijoddhas’ in Bangladesh, which turned anti-government when faced with the violent state crackdown against the demonstrations. As frustrations against the Awami League government simmered, protests spread rapidly across the country, driven by political parties and groups fanning public discontent further through anti-Awami League narratives to capitalise the situation in their favour. As India had been a close associate of the former Hasina government, supporting its consecutive returns to office, anti-Awami sentiments gave an anti-India tone to the uprising.
As frustrations against the Awami League government simmered, protests spread rapidly across the country, driven by political parties and groups fanning public discontent further through anti-Awami League narratives to capitalise the situation in their favour.
Accordingly, upon coming to power, the interim government has been distancing itself from the Awami League’s legacy and affiliations in its search for popular support. This has prompted it to cancel the National Mourning Day on 15 August (in observance of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s death), to replace his face on Bangladesh’s currency notes with graffiti of the student’s revolution, and blame Hasina’s ‘inflammatory’ speech for the vandalism at his 32 Dhanmondi residence and the defacing of national murals are just a few key examples. Reflecting the same approach in its foreign policy, a distance has also crept into India-Bangladesh relations, with several issues such as Hasina’s pending extradition from India and numerous reports of attacks on Hindu minorities in Bangladesh deepening the rift.
While Yunus has recently reassured that ‘there is no problem in our basic relationship (with India),’ his government has repeatedly blamed India for the domestic chaos in Dhaka to shift responsibility. With a Council of Advisors untrained in governance and student leaders occupying key ministerial positions, the interim government in Bangladesh lacks political maturity. This became abundantly clear over the lack of unanimity among the advisors regarding the sale of Hilsa to India last October.
Breaking the Awami League’s Hilsa diplomacy, Farida Akhter, adviser to the Bangladesh Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, prohibited the sale of Hilsa to India in the festive months leading up to one of its biggest Hindu celebrations—the Durga Puja—stating that there would not be enough for the domestic population. This decision appeased anti-India sentiments but lacked political foresight. It indirectly affected Hindu celebrations across the border, raising doubts over the interim government’s commitment to protecting the rights of its Hindu minorities, further undermining India’s goodwill. Domestically, it did not consider the substantial revenue loss that the Bangladeshi fishing value chain would incur if the sale to India were prohibited. Consequently, the decision was reversed, with Salehuddin Ahmed, adviser to the Ministry of Commerce, attributing it to the specific conditions on the occasion of the upcoming Durga Puja and assuring that the consignment allotted for India is equivalent to a single day’s catch in Chandpur (Bangladesh).
India is its second-largest trading partner, one of the top 15 sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and a foremost development partner with a development portfolio of US $8 billion.
While this showcases the interim government is yet to develop an India policy, Bangladesh’s national interests demand otherwise. The country relies substantially on foreign funds for its development and sustenance. India is its second-largest trading partner, one of the top 15 sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and a foremost development partner with a development portfolio of US $8 billion. However, under the current circumstances, trade has declined due to border closures, customs clearance issues, and increased security surveillance hindering the smooth flow of goods between the two countries. Apart from that, connectivity projects are essential for the development of both countries have also been put on hold, and public transportation has remained suspended since last June. Not only has this created a commercial setback, but it has also affected people-to-people connectivity, with the number of Bangladeshi medical tourists in India declining visibly in the past months.
There prevails a distinct lack of ‘mutual sensitivity’ in current India-Bangladesh ties, which is cardinal to a healthy bilateral relationship. While the interim government has repeatedly accused India of allowing ‘its territory to be used for destabilising purposes in Bangladesh’ by allowing ‘Sheikh Hasina to speak,’ it has itself focused on building a relationship with its historical adversary—Pakistan.
Marking a significant departure from the Awami League's traditional stance, within his brief tenure, Mohammad Yunus has met Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif twice to discuss the enhancement of bilateral ties. Accordingly, there are plans to resume direct flights, and Dhaka has lifted visa restrictions for Pakistani passengers, while Islamabad has responded by waiving visa fees for Bangladeshis. Furthermore, for the first time since 1971, two cargo ships arrived at Chittagong Port from Karachi Port via Dubai, carrying sugar and potatoes—fundamental commodities hitherto supplied by India. Bangladesh has also allowed Pakistani vessels to dock at its Mongla port, where India owns a terminal. Hasina had offered the use of Chattogong and Mongla ports to India to improve the connectivity of its landlocked Northeastern territories, but its developmental activities are stalled under current circumstances. By contrast, trade between Dhaka and Islamabad has increased by almost 27 percent, with both nations seeking to diversify trade. They signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 13 January to establish a joint business council.
Hasina had offered the use of Chattogong and Mongla ports to India to improve the connectivity of its landlocked Northeastern territories, but its developmental activities are stalled under current circumstances.
Defence cooperation has also boomed, with senior military officials from both nations convening in Rawalpindi to discuss regional security dynamics and opportunities for joint military exercises, training programmes, and arms trade. Once ‘foes’ during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, Pakistan’s military now describes the two nations as ‘brotherly countries’. Reportedly, Bangladesh is interested in acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from Pakistan, which were jointly developed by China, to forward its ‘Forces Goal 2030’ programme aimed at military modernisation.
While such developments are concerning for India, what is even more worrying is the agenda-driven re-imagination of Bangladesh’s history following the regime change. New history books have erased Mujib’s poems, speeches, and articles, instead emphasising the former Army chief Ziaur Rahman’s role in issuing the first public proclamation of Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. Images of Hasina have been removed, while the 2024 protests that toppled her government have been valorised. By reframing events that led up to the country’s liberation and de-emphasising Mujib’s legacy as the architect of a free Bangladesh, India’s role in perpetuating the ‘Muktijuddho’ is being severely undermined to future generations, eroding a fundamental pillar of the bilateral relationship.
Notwithstanding the recent strains, restoring functional bilateral ties between India and Bangladesh remains critical–a truth Yunus acknowledged in a recent BBC Bangla interview. He stated that the two nations remain ‘historically, politically, and economically’ connected and that their relationship is ‘fundamentally strong’. This insight needs to be backed by a more realistic foreign policy because even though Bangladesh can strengthen its ties with Pakistan, the latter cannot be a replacement for India. Bangladesh is virtually surrounded by India, barring its southern border along the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, India's Northeast region is largely enclosed by Bangladesh, except for a small border it shares with Myanmar. This unique geography makes cooperation between the two countries crucial for mutual benefit and regional stability. However, acknowledging this geographic reality is still a choice. As India’s Minister for External Affairs S. Jaishankar recently stated, “Bangladesh must decide what kind of ties it wants with India.”
Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata with the Strategic Studies Programme. Her area of research is India’s eastern maritime ...
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