Amidst the rising tensions in the Middle East, India has upheld a degree of strategic ambiguity while considering its security interests in the area
The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Chief of Hamas’s Politburo in Tehran, hours after he attended the swearing-in ceremony of the newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian was a dramatic event. Haniyeh, the political lead for various levels of negotiation and talks since the 7th October terror strike against Israel had become a critical figure in the mainstreaming of the group’s narratives. Living amidst the gleaming towers of Doha in Qatar and raking up air miles as he shuttled between Egypt and Iran, Haniyeh was the face of Hamas, which now positions itself as the core of the Palestinian resistance.
Living amidst the gleaming towers of Doha in Qatar and raking up air miles as he shuttled between Egypt and Iran, Haniyeh was the face of Hamas, which now positions itself as the core of the Palestinian resistance.
Since his killing, the Middle East has been pushed further towards a proverbial edge which could lead to an endless freefall. Killing Haniyeh, in the heart of Iran, is expected to mobilise a strong response from Tehran at the risk of the Shia power looking weak in front of its main regional foe. The Iranian-backed ‘Axis of Resistance’, a knit-together group of militias now orbiting around the ongoing war in Gaza, are also pushing Iran to respond militarily, directly, and decisively. The leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah, in his second speech in as many weeks, said that the retaliation will be “strong and effective”. As Nasrallah was delivering the speech, Israeli combat jets conducted ‘sonic booms’ above the Lebanese capital city of Beirut as a show of power. Meanwhile, Hamas also announced its new leader, Yahya Sinwar—the group’s most-wanted chief in Gaza and a key planner of 7 October.
Amidst this regional spiral, which the international community is attempting to arrest, India has maintained a level of strategic ambiguity. No direct statements have been provided as of today on the events around Haniyeh’s killing. Even the Saudis have done so in favour of Iranian sovereignty. This, in large part, would be India not giving sympathy to the elimination of a terror group’s leader. While India has not proscribed Hamas in its terror group listing, maintaining ambiguity feeds into the current government’s hard policies against the scourge of international terrorism at a time when countering terrorism as a global aim is losing steam. From a Palestinian perspective, New Delhi has historically politically backed the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) since 1974.
In the aftermath of 7 October, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi was quick to denounce the terror attack, consistent with India’s strong-headed push against terrorism over the years. Modi’s message on ‘X’ (previously known as Twitter) was erroneously misread by many as a shift in Indian policy on the region. The fact remains that New Delhi has consistently maintained its push for a two-state solution, has diplomatic relations with Palestine, is home to a Palestinian embassy, and officially recognised the Palestinian state in 1988.
In the aftermath of 7 October, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi was quick to denounce the terror attack, consistent with India’s strong-headed push against terrorism over the years.
However, geopolitically, much has changed since and so have the country’s interests. India prioritised its relations with both Arab states and their interests along with Iran up until 1992, when the first Indian embassy opened in Tel Aviv. Israel had chased full diplomatic relations with India for long, including building its repertoire as a key ally against Pakistan. However, more recently, with the increase of the centrality of geoeconomics in Indian foreign policy thinking, the Arab states, specifically the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, hold critical sway as large trade and investment partners. This economic design, which includes being part of newer groupings such as the I2U2 and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) is at the core of how and what India wants to do in the region. This view is not of New Delhi alone. The relative level of ambiguity maintained by capitals such as Abu Dhabi and Riyadh highlights their own balancing act. This is, first, to protect the giant economic leaps both continue to make, including the success of global hubs such as Dubai and aspirational ones such as Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. Second, and equally important, is to maintain peace within their domestic populations who have strong solidarity with the Palestinian people. On both these fronts, the Arab states in question, have had relative success over the past months.
Iran, as well, is critical from an Indian security thinking point of view. New Delhi approaches, at least theoretically, its relations with Iran from the perspective of a neighbourhood state, which it was till 1947. More directly, Iran is seen as a critical component of Indian strategic thinking on two major fronts: Central Asia, again for geoeconomics, and Afghanistan, which has direct security implications regionally as it tops the table in the 2024 Global Terrorism Index once again.
Maintaining strategic balance in this trifecta of interests is increasingly challenging. India’s non-alignment in the region’s political fissures is usually seen in a positive light. Maintenance of this is smart, and any attempt to change the same under any argument, be that of mediation or India’s increasing clout in the global order, would be a mistake. However, the geopolitics and sectarian politics of the Middle East are not exclusive to Indian foreign policy choices and questions. Unlike other regions, these also feed into the country’s domestic discourse.
A core security concern for India, on whatever happens in the Middle East, is the potential domestic impact. The spillover of the Gaza war was soon visible when the former chief of Hamas, Khaled Mashal, was hosted via video conferencing to talk to a pro-Palestine rally by the Solidarity Youth Movement in Malappuram, Kerala, a state which has a significant population working across the Arab world.
During the Islamic holy month of Muharram, many groups across the sectarian divide, Shias and Sunnis, invoked Palestinian solidarity and in some cases anti-Israel sentiments during processions. I
During the Islamic holy month of Muharram, many groups across the sectarian divide, Shias and Sunnis, invoked Palestinian solidarity and in some cases anti-Israel sentiments during processions. In the sensitive region of Kashmir, Shia mourners were booked under Indian anti-terror law for raising the Palestinian flag during a rally in Srinagar. Previously, in 2020, the Shia community in the state had also taken out rallies to protest the assassination of Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani which has since remained an on-and-off cause of discontent in some parts of the restive geography. This is important because it has little to do with inter-state dynamic, or even cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, but sectarianism in Indian Muslim polity is ideologically prevalent but politically docile. Maintaining this status quo is critical as is mitigating the risk of any global resurgence of ‘Political Islam’ to the politics of Islam. The question of Palestine internally is also divisional, going beyond Muslims, and spilling over into ideological contestations between the right and the left. These narratives are also not India-specific, but global in nature. Also it is not just the successful narration building of Hamas which can cause internal difficulties, but the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, increasing ideological prominence of Islamic State Khorasan mixed with a very fluid global digital information flow system presents a broad stroke challenge of security management.
Finally, to add to the geopolitical manoeuvres in the Middle East along with domestic considerations, India’s neighbourhood challenges are also significantly exacerbated today. With China and Pakistan as traditionally troublesome neighbours, the ongoing crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh along with diplomatic tests in Sri Lanka and Maldives has New Delhi’s capacities locked in. Invoking an unnecessary position in the Middle East is simply avoidable.
Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on Indias relations with West Asia specifically looking at the domestic political dynamics ...
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