India’s relationship with the global nuclear order has strengthened at a modest pace between 2014 and 2019, during the first term of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Progress in one of the Modi government’s key foreign policy objectives – joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – stagnated, due largely to China’s hard stance. However, cooperation with other key stakeholders of the order has been vibrant—in both the consolidation of the political understanding behind India’s integration with the order, and in further negotiations and implementation of accords of nuclear exchanges and supplies.
These developments between 2014 and 2019 are only part of the remarkable shift in India’s engagement with the global nuclear order in the last two decades. India’s integration with the global nuclear order can be credited less to any particular Indian government, and more as having been catalysed by external geopolitical and geo-economic factors including the end of Cold War and rise of a revisionist China, as well as the liberalisation of the Indian economy and its rapid growth, leading to the creation of a large market. This is not to take the credit away from the government formed by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) between 2004 and 2009 which led the majority of the difficult negotiations with the US government, while manoeuvring internal political pressures against civil nuclear cooperation with the US. The seeds for India’s integration with the global nuclear order, however, were sowed by then US President George W. Bush with his Indian counterpart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, eventually leading to the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership initiative of January 2004.
Following the conclusion of civil nuclear cooperation with the US and having acquired a waiver from NSG to the condition of implementing full- scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for engaging in global nuclear commerce, India negotiated a number of civil nuclear cooperation agreements. These included the deals with France in 2008; Russia, Canada and Argentina in 2010; and Kazakhstan and South Korea in 2011. The ground impact of these agreements, however, were hampered by concerns over suppliers’ liability under India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010. The Indian government, meanwhile, assumed conversation with the US over the next step of strengthening the country’s relationship with the global nuclear order – joining the NSG. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government since 2014 has pursued strengthening the said relationship with greater vigour.
Since 2014, India has actively pursued its goal of joining the NSG to establish itself as a norm-setter in the global nuclear order, instead of being a passive actor. Prime Minister Modi undertook numerous international visits to key stakeholders of the order to garner their political support to India’s inclusion in the group. Table 7 lists the visits by PM Modi which resulted in joint statements reflecting these countries’ political acceptance of India’s NSG membership.
The table includes only the joint statements and communiques issued during state visits by PM Modi himself. Apart from these, visits by President Pranab Mukherjee and Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, particularly around May 2016 when India submitted its formal membership application, also aimed at garnering support for India’s inclusion in the NSG. While most of
Table 7: PM Modi’s International Visits, 2014–17
Source: Data from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. the countries listed in the table had extended their support to India’s entry to the group, two new and important additions were Japan and Switzerland. Both these countries are known for their hard position on nuclear non- proliferation and had previously expressed disapproval of India’s nuclear weapons programme. Other additions to the list were Mexico and South Africa. Though the joint statement issued during PM Modi’s visit on 8 June 2016 did not refer to the NSG,<1> Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto was reported to have announced their support to India’s NSG membership.<2> Similarly, during his state visit to South Africa in July 2016, PM Modi was quoted as having thanked then South African President Jacob Zuma for supporting India’s membership to the NSG.<3>
While countries like New Zealand, Austria and Turkey are yet to support India’s entry to the group, the opposition has primarily been led by China. In the past five years, the Indian government has spent significant diplomatic capital in getting China on-board, but to no avail. However, while China explained its position on principled grounds given that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and possesses nuclear weapons, Beijing’s opposition appears to be more a function of China’s bilateral relations with India that have larger geopolitical underpinnings, the examination of which is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Other than garnering political support for its integration with the order, the Indian government has actively pursued civil nuclear cooperation with partner countries channelled via the waiver issued by the NSG in 2008, including implementation of the cooperation agreements in the form of supplies of nuclear material and technology.
The following six agreements have been negotiated by India since 2014:
Of these agreements, the one signed with Japan was of particularly significant consequence. This is because several key components of western nuclear reactors are Japanese-manufactured. Enabled by the agreement with Japan, US-based Westinghouse, after several turmoils including over India’s liability law and facing bankruptcy in 2017, has announced the construction of six nuclear reactors in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The announcement of March 2019 also captures India and international nuclear suppliers to be overcoming the impasse effected by India’s liability law.
Moreover, of importance is the agreement signed with Bangladesh as that underlines India’s long-term goal of establishing itself as a supplier. Enabled by the bilateral agreements, India signed a tripartite pact for civil nuclear cooperation with Russia and Bangladesh on 1 March 2018.191 As part of the agreement, the Nuclear Power Cooperation of India Limited (NPCIL) will supply equipment and material for the construction of Russian nuclear power stations in Bangladesh.
Other visits led by PM Modi concluded in joint statements that captured the inclinations to pursue nuclear cooperation with India of countries like China (15 May 2015),<10> Mongolia (17 May 2015),<11> Kazakhstan (8 July 2015),<12> United Arab Emirates (17 August 2015),<13> and Indonesia (30 May 2018).<14>
Meanwhile, the following were the key developments on the implementation of various civil nuclear cooperation agreements:
India’s relationship with the global nuclear order has strengthened steadily between 2014 and 2019, notwithstanding China’s virtual veto of India’s entry to the NSG. New civil nuclear cooperation agreements were negotiated, existing ones were implemented, and India garnered political support for its further integration with the order. For its part, Beijing has indicated its interest in pursuing civil nuclear cooperation in the few joint statements it has issued with India.
Meanwhile, the global nuclear order itself has been subject to various severe pressures—be it North Korea’s nuclear signalling, the Iran nuclear deal and the Trump administration’s decision to pull out, and the growing divide between nuclear haves and have-nots at the NPT on the issue of global nuclear disarmament. These have resulted in increased sensitivities within the order and amongst its stakeholders. Given this context, India has fared well in improving its relationship with the order.
This article originally appeared in special report Looking Back looking Ahead.
<1> “India-Mexico Joint Statement During the Visit of Prime Minister to Mexico”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 8 June 2016.
<2> Press Trust of India, “Mexico Supports India’s Membership For NSG”, The Wire, 9 June 2016.
<3> Shannon Ebrahim, “SA Backs India’s Bid for Full NSG Membership”, IOL, 8 July 2016.
<4> “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 8 April 2017, accessed 3 July 2019.
<5> “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 9 December 2016, accessed 3 July 2019.
<6> “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of Japan for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 11 November 2016, accessed 3 July 2019.
<7> “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 13 November 2015, accessed 3 July 2019.
<8> “Agreement between the Republic of India and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, February 2015, accessed 3 July 2019.
<9> “Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Australia on for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 5 September 2014, accessed 3 July 2019.
<10> Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, “India, Russia, Bangladesh Sign Tripartite Pact for Civil Nuclear Cooperation”, The Economic Times, 1 March 2018.
<11> “Joint Statement between the India and China During Prime Minister’s Visit to China”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 15 May 2015, accessed 3 July 2019.
<12> “Joint Statement for India-Mongolia Strategic Partnership (May 17, 2015)”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 May 2015, accessed 3 July 2019.
<13> “Tej Kadam: India - Kazakhstan Joint Statement”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 8 July 2015, accessed 3 July 2019.
<14> “Joint Statement Between the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of India”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 August 2015, accessed 3 July 2019.
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Mairi Dupar Senior Technical Advisor Climate and Development Knowledge Network ODI
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