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Geopolitical shifts and trade disruptions have strained India–Belarus ties, even as both sides seek renewal through multilateral engagement and economic diversification.
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“I am not satisfied with the current state of Belarus-India relations. Frankly speaking, our relations with India have degraded, so India is not an easy destination… but [it] is a very important foreign economic partner of ours. India is a huge market, and we have been present there since Soviet times. We must build the foundation of our relations in the main areas.” This was how the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, outlined the major priorities for the newly appointed Ambassador to India, Mikhail Krasko, in January 2024. The perception of disarray in relations is arguably related to the scaling down of trade. Minsk’s intentions are clear: in the light of Western sanctions, Belarus is seeking to diversify its economic partnerships and find new markets for its commodities. One of the primary goals is to revamp exports to India, which have declined sharply since FY2022-23.
When Belarus was hit with sanctions by the United States (US) in December 2021 and subsequently faced European restrictions, Minsk was blocked from utilising the Baltic ports. This has created serious hurdles for the exports of major commodities, such as fertilisers. Prior to 2022, about 10-12 million tonnes of potassium fertilisers from Belaruskali, a major producer of this commodity, were transhipped through the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda each year. Following the loss of access to this route, Belarus was forced to establish new supply chains, rendering it entirely reliant on Russia’s transport infrastructure. Since Russian terminals have limited capacity for fertiliser transhipment, the transportation volumes have not met the expectations of Belarusian exporters. Although Moscow and Minsk have signed an agreement for the construction of a port in the Murmansk region of Russia, dedicated to the transhipment of Belarusian fertilisers and oil products, the project is in the design and survey stage, and will be completed only by 2028.
A particularly painful setback for Minsk, as well as for bilateral trade turnover, was the decline in India’s imports of fertilisers.
When it comes to India-Belarus trade, logistical challenges and payment issues have severely impacted Minsk’s exports to India, almost bringing them to a standstill (see Figure 1). A particularly painful setback for Minsk, as well as for bilateral trade turnover, was the decline in India’s imports of fertilisers, which used to account for over 80 percent of total trade. While Indian imports of fertilisers from Belarus increased from US$224 million in FY2020-21 to US$364 million in FY2021-22, they dropped to just US$50,000 and US$11 million in the most recent periods (FY2023-24 and FY2024-25, respectively). Although India remains an important supplier of pharmaceuticals, organic chemicals, machinery and electronics, its exports to Belarus have fluctuated around the modest figures of US$60-70 million. A dramatic fall in Belarus’ fertiliser supplies and a lack of movement in India’s exports have left the two countries far from the US$1 billion trade target set by the Inter-Governmental Commission (IGC) a decade ago.
Figure 1. India’s Imports from and Exports to Belarus (2020-2025, in million USD)
Source: Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India
A number of bilateral deals have been struck over the last several years. In October 2019, Belarusian automobile major BelAZ signed a contract with Coal India Ltd for the supply of 77 130-tonne mining dump trucks, followed two years later by an agreement with South Eastern Coalfields Ltd for 96 mining trucks with a capacity of 240 tonnes. Since 2021, Minsk Tractor Works (MTW), a Belarusian agricultural machinery manufacturer, has been present in the Indian market via an agreement with Erisha Agritech Private Ltd. Beyond localising and assembling agricultural equipment in India, this has enabled the company to expand its presence in South Asia, particularly by supplying tractors to Sri Lanka. In February 2025, the Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ) opened its office in New Delhi “to build business ties with Indian manufacturers of components, raw materials and machine tools.”
India’s investment in the Belarusian economy has been rather limited and is estimated at around US$5 million. Much of this investment has revolved around the pharmaceutical sector, with three joint ventures established in Belarus in 2016. India has also provided Belarus with several credit lines. In 2012, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) delivered and supervised the installation of a gas turbine as part of a US$55.5 million project to upgrade the Grodno Power Plant, which was financed by India’s EXIM Bank. In the same year, a digital learning centre, set up with an Indian credit line of Rs. 50 million, was inaugurated at the High Technology Park in Minsk. In 2015, the Government of India announced a US$100 million credit line for joint projects with Belarus; since then, however, no further updates on its implementation have emerged.
Recent interactions between New Delhi and Minsk underscore the value of multilateral platforms for bilateral engagement.
In 2023, the Belarusian state-owned energy company Grodnoenergo held talks with BHEL about cooperation in gas turbine supplies, servicing and maintenance. However, these did not yield any results. Also in 2023, Indian companies were reportedly planning to invest up to US$600 million to expand nitrogenous fertiliser production at Grodno Azot, a Belarusian state-run enterprise, in order to ramp up supplies to India. However, these plans, too, have yet to materialise.
India was one of the first countries to support Belarus’ membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its partner status in BRICS. Recent interactions between New Delhi and Minsk underscore the value of multilateral platforms for bilateral engagement. Many official meetings now occur at the SCO, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), the United Nations (UN), and the BRICS summits.
The last meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Alexander Lukashenko, which was brief and referred to as a ‘pull-aside’, took place in 2019 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on the sidelines of the SCO meeting. The previous bilateral summit was held in 2017, when Lukashenko visited New Delhi to celebrate the 25th anniversary of India-Belarus diplomatic relations. Recent years have seen an uptick in communication between the two countries’ foreign ministers. In 2024, External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar met his Belarusian counterparts four times: with then Foreign Minister Sergei Aleinik in January and March, and with current Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhenkov in July and September. As the Belarusian Foreign Minister is also the special representative for India and co-chair of the IGC, these meetings have covered a wide range of issues, including global and regional concerns, trade, industrial and technological cooperation, and educational and people-to-people ties. After a three-year hiatus, the two sides are preparing to convene a new IGC session, alongside a business summit, “in the near future”.
People-to-people ties have recently gained new momentum, with the first bilateral consular dialogue taking place in June 2024. The consultations focused on visa policy, issues relating to the protection of individuals’ and legal entities’ rights, and labour migration opportunities. Since August 2023, Belavia has operated direct flights between Minsk and New Delhi, expected to enhance business ties and encourage tourism. About 1,000 Indian students are currently studying at Belarusian universities, the vast majority of whom are pursuing medical studies.
Further political engagement requires mutual attention to each other’s sensitivities. As Belarus shifts its economic and political focus to the Global South, it has strengthened its ties with Pakistan, as evidenced by the reciprocal visits between President Lukashenko and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in November 2024 and April 2025. Given current Indo–Pakistani tensions, Belarus’ regional diplomacy is likely to be scrutinised. While Minsk maintains a neutral stance, its public alignment with Pakistan’s diplomatic language—such as the “need to settle all international disputes by peaceful means and in accordance with the UN Charter and UN Security Council resolutions,”—as referenced in the Belarusian readout of the Sharif-Lukashenko interactions in Islamabad, may raise concern in India.
The absence of in-depth expertise in Minsk regarding New Delhi’s strategic and economic goals, as well as the practicalities of doing business with India, as highlighted by Belarusian experts, could be another factor limiting deeper engagement. Belarusian leadership has previously mischaracterised Indian foreign policy, with President Lukashenko stating that “the US, England, India and Australia (perhaps, alongside Japan and South Korea) want to create a Pacific NATO.” To fully realise the potential of bilateral economic ties, Minsk must demonstrate greater understanding of, and sensitivity to, New Delhi’s strategic objectives and the nuances of Indian policymaking.
To fully realise the potential of bilateral economic ties, Minsk must demonstrate greater understanding of, and sensitivity to, New Delhi’s strategic objectives and the nuances of Indian policymaking.
To advance its relationship with Belarus, New Delhi will need to devote greater attention to its foreign policy in Eurasia. India has clearly stepped up its engagement in the post-Soviet space, with Eastern Europe assuming renewed importance in New Delhi’s calculations. However, the current decade has seen an absence of high-level visits and economic initiatives in India’s policy towards Belarus.
Whether India and Belarus can elevate their partnership to a strategic level, as Minsk has called for, will depend on their ability to overcome obstacles to deepening economic engagement, establish more regular and substantive political dialogue, and better accommodate each other’s foreign policy imperatives.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
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