Moscow’s restrained response to events in Venezuela reflects its limited capacity to project power abroad and its reluctance to jeopardise negotiations with Washington over Ukraine
The recent American strikes on Venezuela and the capture of the Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro, have dealt a setback to Russian interests in the region. Washington’s rationale may be understood as a reassertion of US entrenchment in Latin America, aimed at securing influence over Venezuela’s oil resources, while constraining the roles of Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing, core backers of Caracas, have condemned the act and called for the release of Maduro. It remains unlikely that either state will be able to alter the situation in Venezuela. Given Moscow’s talks with the US over Ukraine, it is unlikely that Russia will jeopardise the outcome of the negotiations. Maduro’s capture does not point towards a Russian retrenchment from the region, given that Maduro’s regime has remained intact. Nevertheless, the subsequent events, including the seizure of Russian-flagged vessels transporting Venezuelan oil by the US Navy, highlight Moscow’s limited capacity to project power in the region and are likely to raise doubts about Russia's ability to protect the interests of its partners abroad.
The subsequent events, including the seizure of Russian-flagged vessels transporting Venezuelan oil by the US Navy, highlight Moscow’s limited capacity to project power in the region and are likely to raise doubts about Russia's ability to protect the interests of its partners abroad.
Russia’s response so far reflects a restrained posture. In the immediate aftermath of Maduro’s capture, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov condemned the operation and called for the President's immediate release. Lavrov subsequently held a phone call with the Venezuelan Vice President, Delcy Rodriguez, reiterating Moscow’s support for the Bolivarian Republic. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not offered an extended public comment on Venezuela, beyond a mention of the situation in a telephone conversation with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva. Given the close personal relationship between Maduro and Putin, Russia’s disengagement from the crisis, though not unsurprising, constitutes a blow to Russia's interests in the region. Russia’s repeated condemnations have not deterred the US Navy from seizing Russian-flagged oil tankers transporting Venezuelan oil. Russian experts have attributed Washington’s actions to two primary factors. First, domestic political considerations to secure electoral support from the Cuban and Venezuelan diaspora in the US for the midterm elections. Second, to assert control over a hostile hydrocarbon-rich country, as part of a broader effort to reinforce US primacy in the Western Hemisphere.
These assessments indicate that Venezuela is perceived as a secondary theatre for Russia, where Trump’s efforts to reassert Washington’s dominance in the Americas appear to have been met with a degree of tacit acceptance from Moscow, driven in part by Russia’s reluctance to jeopardise far more consequential negotiations with the United States over securing a favourable settlement on Ukraine.
On the question of assistance, Russian experts highlighted the limitations imposed by geography and regional geopolitical realities, suggesting that Moscow’s support is likely to remain largely political in nature, confined to diplomatic signalling and voicing concerns on international platforms. Taken together, these assessments indicate that Venezuela is perceived as a secondary theatre for Russia, where Trump’s efforts to reassert Washington’s dominance in the Americas appear to have been met with a degree of tacit acceptance from Moscow, driven in part by Russia’s reluctance to jeopardise far more consequential negotiations with the United States over securing a favourable settlement on Ukraine.
Venezuela occupies an important place in Russia’s strategy in Latin America. Putin and Maduro signed a strategic partnership and cooperation agreement in Moscow on 7 May 2025. The agreement envisaged further strengthening of ties in the realms of energy, defence, mining, economy, and coordination on key issues such as countering sanctions and strengthening counter-sanctions mechanisms. Since the 2000s, Moscow has emerged as a principal military provider for Venezuela, exporting a range of advanced platforms, including Su-30MKI fighter jets, Mi-35 and Mi-17 helicopters, self-propelled artillery, and air defence systems such as the S-300VM.
The energy dimension of the partnership solidified following Caracas’s strengthening state control over its oil industry, which resulted in the exit of American energy firms ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. Caracas required massive investments to redevelop its oil industry. Venezuela has more than 300 billion barrels of oil. Much of this crude is heavy, sulphur-rich, and highly viscous, requiring specialised refining technologies before it can be exported. As a result, Venezuela turned to Moscow to rehabilitate its oil sector, which had fallen into disrepair. Experts have argued that Moscow’s entry followed a stronger economic rationale than a geopolitical one, as Russian energy companies intended to expand their overseas asset base. Consequently, a consortium of five major Russian oil firms entered into joint ventures with Venezuela’s state-owned PDVSA, investing in projects in the Orinoco oil belt and providing long-term loans for the development of oil infrastructure in the country.
In Moscow’s calculus, Venezuela provided a second conduit for Russia, apart from Cuba, for power projection. As a result of the growing convergence, in 2009, Caracas recognised the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, following the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008.
As Russia’s political and economic footprint increased in Venezuela, bilateral ties deepened. Russia’s growing contestation with the West, driven in part by its opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion, found strategic resonance with Hugo Chávez’s opposition to the United States. In Moscow’s calculus, Venezuela provided a second conduit for Russia, apart from Cuba, for power projection. As a result of the growing convergence, in 2009, Caracas recognised the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, following the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008.
The relationship further deepened in the following decade, amid declining commodity prices and the arrival of the new Chavista President, Nicolás Maduro, marking a new phase of the partnership. On the one hand, the returns from Russian investments fell short of initial expectations; on the other, Venezuela’s strategic importance in the Kremlin’s calculus increased as Moscow’s relations with the West deteriorated following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent imposition of Western sanctions. In Moscow’s calculus, sustaining non-Western regimes that openly challenged US influence became a strategic priority, even at the cost of extending inefficient loans. During this phase, cooperation in the energy and military segments intensified, with Moscow offering new lines of credit and, notably, sending Wagner mercenaries to Caracas during the public unrest in Venezuela in 2019, following the elections. Over the last decade, Moscow has played a key role in helping Caracas circumvent sanctions.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s capacity to function as a credible offshore balancer has atrophied. Geographical constraints, coupled with internal deficiencies within the Maduro regime, including corruption and chronic mismanagement, have fuelled public unrest in Venezuela and further limited Russia’s ability to shape outcomes on the ground. In light of the recent talks between Russia and the US on Ukraine, Moscow’s pursuit of greater influence in the European security matrix has ostensibly come at a cost, with Russia making several concessions. This trade-off appears to include a tacit acceptance of American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, a view increasingly reflected within Russian expert discourse, which draws upon the logic of the United States’ updated National Security Strategy and the renewed salience of “spheres of influence.” These developments will set a precedent for Russia’s continuing aggression in Ukraine, where Moscow is unlikely to renege on its core demands.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s capacity to function as a credible offshore balancer has atrophied. Geographical constraints, coupled with internal deficiencies within the Maduro regime, including corruption and chronic mismanagement, have fuelled public unrest in Venezuela and further limited Russia’s ability to shape outcomes on the ground.
In the short term, Russia’s material losses in Venezuela remain limited. Beyond the seizure of Russian-flagged oil tankers, the Russian oil firm Roszarubezhneft has not ceased operations in the Orinoco oil belt. Amid the uncertainty, the firm issued a statement reiterating its commitment to sustaining operations in the country, underscoring Russia’s intent to remain relevant in Venezuela. Nevertheless, the broader trajectory signals a decline in Russia’s strategic reach. Moscow increasingly relies on like-minded partners to generate legitimacy and sustain its image as a great power. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, alongside Moscow’s inability to deter American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and influence the situation in Venezuela, has eroded Russia’s strategic influence across key regions. Collectively, these developments underscore a contraction in Moscow’s ability to project power abroad effectively. The reversal of this trajectory and the reconstruction of strategic influence will remain contingent on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, which will significantly condition Russia’s future strategic bandwidth and its ability to reassert itself on the global stage.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia’s foreign policy and economy, and India-Russia relations. Siddharth is a ...
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