Emerging technologies are transforming the Indo-Pacific’s security landscape, demanding stronger governance frameworks, resilient infrastructure, and multilateral cooperation across AI, cyber, space, and undersea domains.
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This article is part of the series—Jakarta Edit 2025
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the geopolitical epicentre of the 21st century, defined by shifting power dynamics and intensifying technological competition. The region is also witnessing active integration of emerging technologies into the defence strategies of key players, including China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific plays a pivotal role in global technology supply chains: South Korea and Taiwan lead in semiconductors, China and Australia dominate rare earth resources, and India contributes through its vast digital infrastructure and highly skilled workforce. This mix renders the region central not only to technological innovation but also to strategic competition over supply chain resilience and control.
As the relevance of the Indo-Pacific in the evolving world order intensifies, rapid development and deployment of emerging technologies—ranging from artificial intelligence (AI) and space technologies to growing cyber capabilities and undersea infrastructure—are fundamentally altering the region’s security landscape.
AI is revolutionising military and intelligence operations by enabling faster decision-making, autonomous weapons systems, and enhanced surveillance—capabilities that are either under development or that have already been deployed by China, the United States, India, and Japan. Cyber threats continue to escalate in both scale and sophistication, with state and non-state actors targeting critical infrastructure, government networks, and private sector assets. In particular, the Indo-Pacific has seen an uptick in cyber espionage campaigns, disinformation operations, and ransomware attacks that erode trust and increase the risk of conflict short of conventional war. Perhaps less visible, but equally vital, are the vulnerabilities tied to undersea cables, which carry over 95 percent of global internet traffic. These cables, many of which crisscross Indo-Pacific waters, are emerging as strategic targets for espionage and sabotage. As reliance on these digital arteries grows, so does their strategic value—along with the risks of interception, sabotage, and militarisation.
As the relevance of the Indo-Pacific in the evolving world order intensifies, rapid development and deployment of emerging technologies—ranging from artificial intelligence (AI) and space technologies to growing cyber capabilities and undersea infrastructure—are fundamentally altering the region’s security landscape.
Space technologies are also emerging as a new frontier of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. Satellites underpin a wide array of critical services—including navigation, communications, early warning systems, missile guidance, and Earth observation—that are essential for both civilian and military applications. Regional powers such as China, India, Japan, and Australia are expanding their space programmes, with increasing emphasis on dual-use and military-grade capabilities. China’s rapidly advancing anti-satellite (ASAT) systems and its launch of quantum communication satellites raise concerns about the weaponisation of space and the potential for space-based disruptions during international crises. Meanwhile, India’s growing space sector—including its Defence Space Agency and successful satellite launches—reflects a broader push to ensure secure and independent access to space-based assets. The intensifying competition for dominance in low-Earth orbit, combined with fragmented and unenforced frameworks governing military action in space, could turn outer space into a contested strategic domain, further complicating the Indo-Pacific’s security environment.
Considering these multidimensional challenges, the Indo-Pacific must adopt forward-looking policy frameworks that balance strategic competitiveness with regional stability and responsible technology governance.
First, countries in the region should prioritise the adoption of norms and confidence-building measures concerning the military use of emerging technologies—particularly AI, space, and cyber operations. Multilateral platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) can be leveraged to establish shared rules of engagement and crisis management protocols to reduce the risk of miscalculation and conflict escalation. Greater emphasis should be placed on technology standards, ethics, and export controls to prevent the misuse of dual-use technologies like AI, biotechnology, and quantum computing. Collaborative initiatives on cyber capacity-building, research and development (R&D), and intelligence-sharing, especially among trusted partners, can help bridge asymmetries in technological capabilities and threat awareness. For instance, the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group could offer a robust platform to coordinate on AI standards, cybersecurity, 5G diversification, and quantum technologies. Similarly, forums such as the ARF, EAS, and the Shangri-La Dialogue could be leveraged to initiate regional conversations on what constitutes responsible military use of AI and space technologies.
Countries in the region should prioritise the adoption of norms and confidence-building measures concerning the military use of emerging technologies—particularly AI, space, and cyber operations.
Second, enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure—such as semiconductor supply chains, undersea cables, and satellite networks—must become a strategic priority for the region. This includes reducing dependence on single suppliers by sourcing from multiple countries, building backup systems to prevent disruptions, and establishing regional partnerships to coordinate production, logistics, and emergency responses. For instance, instead of depending primarily on Taiwan for semiconductors, countries might also source from South Korea, India, and the US. Similarly, for rare earth minerals, countries could reduce their reliance on China by investing in and procuring from alternative suppliers such as Australia and Vietnam. Additionally, collaborative investments in secure undersea cable infrastructure—including through the Blue Dot Network and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience—can reduce dependence on opaque systems and mitigate vulnerabilities to sabotage and surveillance.
Third, fostering public-private partnerships will be essential, given that much of the infrastructure and innovation in these domains is either owned or driven by the private sector. Governments in the region must engage industry and civil society in the co-design of secure, ethical, and resilient technology ecosystems. This can be done by establishing national and regional tech-policy forums that bring together governments, industry leaders, startups, and academic institutions to develop shared standards, security protocols, and innovation roadmaps—particularly in areas such as AI safety, cyber hygiene, and critical infrastructure resilience.
Fostering public-private partnerships will be essential, given that much of the infrastructure and innovation in these domains is either owned or driven by the private sector.
In conclusion, the Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the strategic epicentre of global power shifts and technological transformation. Emerging technologies such as AI, cyber capabilities, space systems, and undersea infrastructure are reshaping the region’s security landscape in complex and far-reaching ways. These technologies not only intensify existing threats—such as cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns—but also introduce new vulnerabilities in domains like outer space. However, multilateral cooperation—through mechanisms such as the Quad, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), and ASEAN—offers concrete pathways to build resilience, foster responsible governance, and reduce strategic friction.
Shruti Sharma is an Associate Director and Research Fellow with the Technology and Society Programme at Carnegie India.
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Shruti Sharma is an Associate Director and Fellow with ORF’s Digital Societies Initiative. Her work focuses on understanding risks emerging from biotechnology research and ways to ...
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