China is reshaping maritime competition through persistent surveillance, dual-use infrastructure, and grey-zone tactics that challenge India’s traditional deterrence posture
Indian policymakers have expressed concern over a potential Chinese naval base in Myanmar’s Coco Islands, which could threaten the security of India’s nuclear-powered submarine base in Rambilli, Andhra Pradesh. In October 2025, Myanmar denied any Chinese naval presence, while simultaneously refusing India’s request to allow the Indian Navy to visit, fuelling anxieties in New Delhi about possible Chinese surveillance activity. By late 2025, multiple Chinese survey and research vessels (Shi Yan-6, Shen Hai Yi Hao, and Lan Hai) were actively mapping the Indian Ocean’s undersea terrain, a deployment New Delhi views as part of Beijing’s strategic push to refine its oceanographic and submarine intelligence capabilities.
China’s naval strategy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is not primarily about power projection but about achieving persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) dominance through civilian and dual-use platforms.
China’s naval strategy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is not primarily about power projection but about achieving persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) dominance through civilian and dual-use platforms. Consequently, China has mastered the art of grey-zone naval warfare through the use of civilian vessels and coast guard forces, alongside dual-use platforms that serve both commercial and intelligence-gathering purposes. India, despite being the resident naval power in the IOR, lacks a commensurate response to these incursions. It remains rooted in conventional deterrence and visibility-based signalling, creating a structural mismatch that Beijing exploits below the threshold of conflict.
A key component of China's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy involves ships, shipyards, and maritime assets designed for “dual use,” intentionally blurring the lines between commercial and defence sectors. Around 80 percent of the 64 Chinese research and survey vessels active in the IOR are presumed to have organisational links to the PLA, and at least 13 of these vessels have undertaken comprehensive surveys of the Indian Ocean’s underwater terrain. China’s grey-zone activity in the Indian Ocean is less about episodic coercion and more about building a persistent, peacetime intelligence architecture that normalises Chinese presence through:
Dual-use Research and Survey Vessels: Chinese research and tracking vessels, such as Yuan Wang-class ships and Shi Yan-6, have long raised concerns in New Delhi and Washington over their suspected PLA links. These anxieties culminated in Sri Lanka imposing a year-long moratorium on all foreign research vessels in early 2024. Following the ban, one such Chinese survey ship, Xiang Yang Hong 03, diverted to the Maldives after operating near sensitive areas such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, underscoring how China’s dual-use fleet can rapidly shift across the Indian Ocean while retaining access to critical maritime and strategic nodes.
Underwater and Autonomous Systems: The collection of such sensitive information enables submarines to enhance navigation routes and improve their stealth effectiveness. These exploration vessels also carry out seabed surveys and search for valuable resources such as polymetallic nodules containing critical minerals essential for contemporary technologies. China frequently utilises Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), or underwater drones, for surveillance and data gathering. These platforms are particularly useful for surveillance missions, as their ability to operate quietly makes them well-suited for gathering intelligence while minimising risks to human operators.
Ports as ISR Enablers: Besides dual-use vessels, the PRC has also secured advantageous positions through its port infrastructure, which can potentially be converted into military facilities. Beijing refers to such dual-use ports as “strategic strongpoints,” with its 13th Five-Year Plan highlighting the need to develop more of these along the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). Official Chinese military strategy documents also call for constructing these ports in ways that “radiate into the periphery, and move us [China] in the direction of the [Pacific and Indian] Oceans” to serve as a forward support base for military deployment, and to “exert political and military influence in relevant regions”.
Opacity Through Dark Shipping: These dual-use ships are notorious for turning “dark,” meaning they switch off their transponders to avoid detection. Consequently, most estimates of Chinese presence in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) do not account for vessels operating with their Automatic Identification System (AIS) turned off. As a result, additional “dark” vessels may be loitering in the area while evading AIS monitoring. This opacity directly undermines maritime domain awareness (MDA), particularly in regions such as the IOR, where small fishing vessels dominate coastal waters.
In August 2024, a Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) was issued over the Bay of Bengal designating a "No Fly Zone" and a "naval subsurface firing" area. Three Chinese ships (Xiang Yang Hong 03, Zhong Shan Da Xue, and Yuan Wang 7) dedicated to marine resource surveys and satellite and ballistic missile tracking were reported operating close to the notified area. India must recognise that while China does not make territorial claims in these waters, it can nevertheless maintain a strategic foothold at sea through persistent presence and sustained intelligence collection.
In grey-zone competition, where advantage lies in acting first without provoking escalation, the speed of ISR exploitation is often more decisive than the mere possession of platforms.
In grey-zone competition, where advantage lies in acting first without provoking escalation, the speed of ISR exploitation is often more decisive than the mere possession of platforms. China’s post-2015 theatre-command model, characterised by joint, geographically defined commands with delegated operational authority, enables faster decision-making and real-time exploitation of ISR inputs. India must prioritise faster detection-to-decision cycles and greater information fusion. Accordingly, there is a need for tactical adjustments in India’s maritime security preparedness, including but not limited to:
As China advances without attacking, India faces a strategic choice: continue investing in visible deterrence that reassures audiences but deters little, or reorient towards quieter, information-centric capabilities that contest Beijing where it actually operates.
The maritime landscape is increasingly defined by subversive tactics and hybrid strategies, with power competition shifting away from territorial claims towards information dominance. India’s primary gap therefore lies not in intent but in technological depth and institutional integration. India must move away from spectacle towards subtlety; while partnerships remain necessary, it is ultimately homegrown resilience and streamlined decision-making that can provide New Delhi with the desired upper hand in the Indian Ocean theatre. Grey-zone operations succeed precisely because they do not trigger conventional deterrence thresholds, rendering missile tests and naval drills strategically orthogonal to the problem at hand. As China advances without attacking, India faces a strategic choice: continue investing in visible deterrence that reassures audiences but deters little, or reorient towards quieter, information-centric capabilities that contest Beijing where it actually operates.
Sweekriti Pathak, Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation.
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Sweekriti Pathak is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
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