Germany’s new national security strategy 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has created an unwanted and unanticipated situation in Europe. The biggest fallout is being experienced by Germany. Germany and Europe knew that Russia was threatening Ukraine but hoped that their cooperative matrix, relying on cheap Russian energy, would hold. The ensnaring of Russia by providing a market for its energy and seeking a security partnership now seemed like a Russian trap for Germany and Europe.

Germany’s policies

On 15 December 2021, SPD leader Olaf Scholz lead a new three-party coalition in Germany, bringing the Angela Merkel era to a close. He wanted to start a more modern reform process which will build Germany for the next generation. In this, stable energy supplies from Russia were an integral part. The coalition was to be Germany's transition from the Merkel era. The stable and economically successful Germany sought a better life for its people and aimed to contribute more to European confidence, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and prosperity. The Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a speedy reversal of some of Germany’s core policies. There is indeed a major change between the Chancellor’s 15 December 2021 acceptance speech and his policy statement to the Bundestag on 27 February 2022. The Chancellor made it clear that the rules-based order on which Europe was based was under threat,  admitting that the Russian action was now demolishing the European security order that had prevailed for almost half a century since the Helsinki Final Act. He spoke about joint efforts with France to draw attention to Russian aggression; noticeably, there was no mention of the UK or the US in this. Europe will continue to remain the framework for action. Talks with Russia will not be refused, and diplomacy would be on top to keep channels of communication open since peace in Europe is their major objective.

The stable and economically successful Germany sought a better life for its people and aimed to contribute more to European confidence, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and prosperity.

Though Scholz said Putin is jeopardising this security, he also said, ‘in the long term, security in Europe cannot be achieved in opposition to Russia’. Given this contradiction, he laid out five action points. First is to extend firm support to Ukraine to preserve its freedom and democracy. This includes supplying weapons to Ukraine, a major policy change for Germany. Second, to increase efforts to divert Russia from its warpath. This implies the unprecedented sanctions cutting Russia from the financial system, from new technology and targeting their oligarchs and investments in the EU. energy was not mentioned in this but Germany would hurt enough from the dislocation of SWIFT services. The third is preventing the war from spilling over into other countries in Europe. Interestingly, this is similar to what Chinese President Xi Jinping told the EU leaders in their summit in April. Scholz spoke about NATO holding together and how the Bundeswehr would be more potent in its support for Eastern allies including Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and the Baltics. He committed Germany to contribute to NATO efforts in a spirit of solidarity, marking a major change from his pre-election promise and the coalition compact. Building a reserve of coal and gas to reduce dependence on Russia for energy supplies is necessary. Germany, along with the EU, is looking for alternate sources. Two LNG terminals, which were earlier declined, would now be created in Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven. With the emphasis on renewables, the LNG terminals will be convertible to store green hydrogen.

National Security Strategy

The development of a National Security Strategy (NSS) is also revealed.  Germany is now taking steps to deviate from its existing policies much faster and at a greater curve than ever anticipated by the coalition. Three aspects can be clearly visualised in the proposed NSS. The first is that Germany’s defence capabilities will be enhanced, perhaps in line with its economic stature. A fund of 100 billion euros (about US $110 billion) for modernisation of Germany’s defence forces is announced. The second is the Chancellor’s promise to convert into law, German defence spending of 2 percent of GDP. NATO had been calling for this, but Germany resisted and did not include it in the coalition compact. The Ukraine events have rushed them into this decision. Both these, along with providing energy security, form the basis of a new NSS.

Funds for climate, development cooperation and domestic infrastructure, employment, and health services could be impacted by increased allocations to national security, and the increasing likelihood of higher energy prices particularly if supplies from Russia are actually disrupted.

Germany has for long been a functional civil society carrying the guilt of the Second World War. It kept defence preparedness low and sought wider issues like climate change and European values. It is the leading economy in Europe, but not an effective military partner to NATO. Germany’s NSS will now be based on collective defence efforts with NATO and increased complementarity between them. Germany believes that NATO's presence in Eastern Europe is inadequate, and it would have to do more to supplement that. The NSS would not only be defence preparedness, but include diplomatic initiatives, a larger development compact, and continuing support to the climate agenda. These will remain German objectives but with higher allocation now to defence spending. The challenge will be how to fund other objectives. Funds for climate, development cooperation and domestic infrastructure, employment, and health services could be impacted by increased allocations to national security, and the increasing likelihood of higher energy prices particularly if supplies from Russia are actually disrupted.

Enhanced defence

There are several issues regarding Germany’s ability to play a more important role in the Ukraine crisis. Its capabilities are largely limited. Ukraine needs upfront commitment of weapons and systems. Germany agreed to provide some weapons from its stocks lying in other NATO countries. Now it is finding it difficult to provide more material from the Bundeswehr for Ukraine's immediate needs. The German Defence Minister, Christine Lambrecht, is clear that Germany cannot part with its equipment and supplies to aid Ukraine at the risk of denuding its own defence. The defence production systems in Germany are not geared for an activist pose and will take time to prepare the new commitments of funding and planning what to order. The 100-billion-euros fund from the current year’s budget for defence, compares with the defence budget of47 billion euros in 2021. The rise of the budget to 2 percent of GDP will mean an increase from the 1.53 percent allocated in 2021. Germany was not the only European country not to abide by NATO’s 2 percent request. Of the 27 NATO countries, only nine in Europe actually attained the 2 percent target in 2021.The building of military capacity is not entirely about budgets or economic resilience. Undoubtedly, the new enhancements would give Germany the third largest defence budget in the world after the US and China; but it takes a fair amount of time to undertake expenditure, induce procurement systems, plan for what is required and have appropriate capacity building of the forces to utilise the new systems.

The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) jet programme that Germany is developing with Spain and France may suffer delays now. Other equipment expected to be ordered are heavy lift helicopters, air defence systems, submarines, frigates and minesweepers. Several of these, as in the case of Japan, will be ordered form the USA to assuage it.

Where would the enhanced budget of German defence go? Analysts believe that initially issues which were ignored over several years, like military preparedness, essential supplies of military ammunition, weapons, support and logistics will perhaps get a fillip in a quicker timeframe. This will depend on how prepared the Bundeswehr plans for this are, since over several years, they have got used to doing with much less than what they thought they required. Major procurements will take a longer time and need planning for induction of new weapon systems, replacement of older ones, and the development of new ones, either imported or as European alternatives. It is interesting that Germany which was always a votary of a European option, had bought Tornado fighters, and has now decided to buy 35 F-35’s from the US. Thus, the US will be the immediate beneficiary of Germany's enhanced expenditure. Germany was to order 15 Typhoons before the crises and had rejected the F-35 in 2018 and 2020. The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) jet programme that Germany is developing with Spain and France may suffer delays now. Other equipment expected to be ordered are heavy lift helicopters, air defence systems, submarines, frigates and minesweepers. Several of these, as in the case of Japan, will be ordered form the USA to assuage it. Ukraine at various levels keeps calling for Germany to do more straight away, but Germany is unable to do all that Ukraine demands. The popular mood has altered over time too. A month ago, a narrow majority of Germans opined that the government's reaction was appropriate, but now only 37 percent concur. In contrast, 45 percent now believe that the government is not doing enough. The ‘Ukrainisation’ of opinion is causing problems to the German coalition. Partnership with Russia has been a part of the German policy for decades. They need to create their NSS quickly and announce first steps more cogently. The quick response to the Ukraine crisis has led to the move to a new NSS. In this, managing energy supplies, accommodating divergent preferences of coalition partners and the capability of the Bundeswehr to now be a lead player in German polity and policy are important steps. Germany is not used to these and will now cope with the situation at home and in Europe.

• International Affairs
• Internal Security
• European Union
• India
• Russia and Eurasia
• USA and Canada
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• CFSP
• defence
• Europe
• FCAS
• GDP
• Germany
• national security
• NATO
• NSS
• Policies
• SWIFT services

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