India’s US$ 8 billion deal for German Type-214 submarines secures AIP transfer, sustains Project 75I, and rebuilds conventional submarine capability
During his first state visit to India, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz officially sealed an estimated US$ 8 billion conventional diesel-electric submarine deal. The agreement is for the native construction of six German Type-214 Next-Generation (NG) submarines, under the Indian Navy’s (IN) Project 75I. They will be built under an agreement between Mazagaon Dockyard Limited (MDL) and Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), which is currently being finalised. New Delhi, however, must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past. The lack of an indigenous industrial capability to build conventional diesel-electric submarines is a key weakness. Paradoxically, India is capable of locally developing and producing Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear (SSBN) submarines as well as Submersible Ship Nuclear (SSN) nuclear-propulsion submarines. For the most part, India’s naval industry has had greater success in constructing conventional surface vessels.
The lack of an indigenous industrial capability to build conventional diesel-electric submarines is a key weakness.
A brief chronology of the events when India and Germany last consummated an agreement for the purchase and development of conventional submarines will reveal what is at stake for India. In the late 1970s, India concluded an agreement with Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW), which is now a subsidiary of TKMS, to supply and build a total of six Type-209 “Shishumar class” conventional diesel-electric submarines for the Indian Navy (IN). The first two were delivered in 1986, and the next two were built at MDL in 1992 and 1994. The final two were never built at MDL, falling prey to corruption and mismanagement of supplies from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), compelling the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to blacklist the company and source spares for the Type-209 submarines from third parties, driving up costs. Consequently, the final two subsurface vessels, whose construction was optional under the terms of the agreement with HDW, were never built, leading to the flight of trained manpower and expertise to Australia. This led to the closure of the entire production line. Loss of this native production capacity for conventional submarines has left India incapable of building diesel-electric attack or “SSK” submarines today. One of the primary failures of the IN and the MoD was their inability to stick with a single vendor to source the design and supply of the navy’s diesel-electric submarines, as South Korea did in the 1990s. Seoul was successful in indigenising the HDW’s SSK designs and building and improving on them to the point that it has a steady production line to meet domestic and export orders. This summation of events should serve as a permanent lesson for Indian naval planners, the MoD bureaucracy, and the government’s apex decision-makers.
Loss of this native production capacity for conventional submarines has left India incapable of building diesel-electric attack or “SSK” submarines today.
Currently, the expansion of the IN’s conventional subsurface is in deep crisis, predominantly, if not exclusively, due to the country’s failure to absorb the technology and the expertise over three decades ago. Now the Germans are back in India again with TKMS on the cusp of finalising an agreement with MDL. There is a real opportunity to cement an enduring relationship with the German OEM and establish a durable production line. The most important part of the TKMS-MDL deal will be the Transfer of Technology (ToT) related to the Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system for the Type-214 submarines. None of India’s existing fleet of submarines has an AIP capability. An AIP-equipped submarine using fuel cell technology allows the vessel to remain submerged for extended periods while maintaining speed and stealth. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is working on a native AIP capability in collaboration with Larsen and Toubro (L&T); however, its development is proving far more daunting and protracted than expected. Secondly, the French OEM — Naval Group — did not have an AIP capability to equip the in-service Scorpene Class submarines with the IN, notwithstanding absorption of some key technologies by L&T and the DRDO, nor did it have the ability to transfer intellectual property. There is an unavoidable trade-off between cost and the necessity and urgency for developing the foundation for sustained submarine development. This has fundamentally been India’s experience.
History is instructive here. Without continuous and consistent submarine construction, as the HDW setback revealed, the loss of skilled workers — ranging from design engineers to welders — cost the IN and India considerably. A cost-conscious India was not prepared to pay for the high price accruing from the decline of the Indian Rupee vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark in the 1980s and 1990s to develop the Type-209 submarines.
There is an unavoidable trade-off between cost and the necessity and urgency for developing the foundation for sustained submarine development.
A more serious lapse was New Delhi’s failure to secure an agreement with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and thereafter its successor, the Russian Federation, for the construction of six Kilo-class submarines at Indian shipyards. The Kilo deal with Moscow was concluded in parallel with the HDW deal. Indeed, all six Kilos for the IN were developed by Rubin Design Bureau at Russia’s Admiralty shipyard in St. Petersburg and upgraded and modernised at the Sevmash shipyard. Had the Kilos been built at an Indian shipyard, the retained expertise would have helped India’s native conventional submarine programme. India has managed to keep its shipyards busy and active with the continuous construction of surface vessels, but the same is not true for subsurface vessels.
Today, India faces similar cost-related challenges involving the TKMS-MDL deal. If it is derailed, India will face delays in fielding a more advanced and larger fleet of conventional submarines relative to Pakistan’s Hangor-class AIP-equipped subsurface vessels. With the deal worth $10 billion now finalised, it would at most serve to catalyse the improvement of existing submarine development capabilities, derived from India’s experience in constructing the Scorpene-class submarines. There is readily available experience in constructing the Scorpenes, and investment by the DRDO and L&T would deliver an AIP capability as well as other key subsystems related to combat systems, propulsion, stealth, and modularity. Yet persisting with this developmental approach would come at the cost of time, whereas the TKMS-MDL deal is expected to reduce it. Time is essential because the older submarines in India’s fleet, such as the Kilos and Type-209s, are due for decommissioning by the early 2030s. Thus, spending more now to save time is what is driving the India-Germany submarine deal.
Time is essential because the older submarines in India’s fleet, such as the Kilos and Type-209s, are due for decommissioning by the early 2030s.
Although the final details of the TKMS-MDL deal are still being worked out, they revolve around the cost of the technologies and the Transfer of Technology (ToT). The Type-214 has a proven AIP system, which is among the chief reasons for proceeding with the acquisition of the German submarines. More importantly, Indian naval planners and the government need to improve their performance in meeting projected and planned targets.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kartik is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. He is currently working on issues related to land warfare and armies, especially the India ...
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