G2 and a Multipolar Order in the Indo-Pacific

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On 30 October, US President Donald Trump met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, during their visit to South Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. The much-anticipated Trump-Xi meeting took place at a moment of shifting geopolitical churn across the world. The churn is characterised by the US’ recalibration of the extent of its engagement in various strategic theatres across the world, as well as Beijing’s calculated advances to pursue its strategy to expand its strategic influence in new geographies. In many ways, global trade has been at the heart of defining this new order. However, the new developments resulting from Washington’s purported retreat and Beijing’s steady advances will leave a deep imprint on the global security landscape. Following the meeting,  Trump announced that the ‘G2 will be convening shortly’. When two of the world’s leading economies and geopolitical poles seek to forge a singular strategic front, how will it shape the global and regional orders?

While conflicts and wars have been underway in various geographies over the last few years, the US and China have not been engaged in any conflict against each other. Importantly, the contest between Beijing and Washington has not escalated into a conflict. This contest has been characterised by competition for influence across various theatres. Notably, among all global flashpoints, the US-China competition has appeared to be the most intense in the Indo-Pacific region. This then prompts the question of how the Indo-Pacific region may be implicated when speculations of US-China cooperation gain legitimacy from Washington.

While the US, in many ways, has led efforts to maintain a rules-based order in a free and open Indo-Pacific, Beijing’s approach to the region has been one of seeking greater influence by coercion.

For long, the Indo-Pacific has been viewed as a theatre of US-China competition, buttressing the notion that the regional order is a bipolar one. While the US, in many ways, has led efforts to maintain a rules-based order in a free and open Indo-Pacific, Beijing’s approach to the region has been one of seeking greater influence by coercion. Chinese engagement in the Indo-Pacific has been marked by its growing sovereign claims in the region, in pursuit of which Beijing has been building artificial islands, deploying its navy, coastguard and maritime militia. This has even resulted in physical confrontation with the coastguard services of countries like the Philippines. On the other hand, the US has sought to lead efforts to ensure strategic and security partnerships across the Indo-Pacific, to uphold international law and freedom of navigation. Chinese reactions to the US’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific have been broadly viewed as a strategy to contain Beijing’s rise in the region.

While the G2 construct has been received with scepticism among strategic thinkers, the idea of US-China bonhomie must set in motion a rethink among other Indo-Pacific stakeholders about the future of the regional security order. While many have sought to define the Indo-Pacific strategic geography as a theatre of bipolar contest between Beijing and Washington, it has in fact emerged as a multipolar arena where various players are continuing to safeguard their interests and compulsions. Given that the Indo-Pacific regional order represents more than the US-China dyad, the potential of enhanced cooperation between Beijing and Washington must be seen as an opportunity for the other like-minded stakeholders to look for avenues to secure their interests in a manner that involves minimal reliance on the US.

While the G2 construct has been received with scepticism among strategic thinkers, the idea of US-China bonhomie must set in motion a rethink among other Indo-Pacific stakeholders about the future of the regional security order.

The fact remains that multiple actors in the Indo-Pacific are deeply enmeshed in the US-led securitisation efforts in the region. A vital aspect of  Trump’s foreign policy has been to underscore the over-involvement of the US in various flashpoints in terms of its military spending. The Indo-Pacific region, too, has come under scrutiny of the Trump administration. Earlier this year, the Trump administration had put the AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) under review. However, following the meeting between President Trump and Australian Prime Minister Albanese, the White House issued reassurances regarding the continuation of the AUKUS. The Squad, a minilateral grouping consisting of the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, too, has seen minimal progress since Trump assumed office earlier this year. Stalemate continues to loom over the Quad as well. Furthermore, the extent of the US’s commitment towards Taiwan continues to prompt anxieties about the security landscape in the Indo-Pacific.

In light of the looming uncertainties over the nature and extent of the US’s commitment towards the regional security order in the Indo-Pacific, and the emergence of the G2, it is vital for like-minded stakeholders in the region to diversify their security partnerships and minimise their dependence on the US. However, the road ahead may remain complex and challenging. The economic and military prowess of the US remains unmatched in the Indo-Pacific. Given that the growing threats posed by China are continuing to inform the security outlooks of various stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region, these countries need to forge new partnerships and bolster existing ones to strengthen the maritime security architecture in the region. This also appears to be a fitting opportunity to define the strategic character of the Indo-Pacific as a multipolar theatre, which is shaped by a vast milieu of diverse and multifaceted interests, and not just defined narrowly through the US-China contest.

Given that the growing threats posed by China are continuing to inform the security outlooks of various stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region, these countries need to forge new partnerships and bolster existing ones to strengthen the maritime security architecture in the region.

It is undeniable that the US and China are important pivots in the region, influencing much of the churn taking place in this geography. However, this churn will continue to evolve even if the nature and extent of the US’s involvement appear to be shifting. Given that the Indo-Pacific geography has increasingly evolved as a multipolar theatre with several actors pursuing their own interests and compulsions, new partnerships are essential for those advocating for a rules-based order in the region. The G2 construct is a vital reminder that the Indo-Pacific is multipolar, and a cohesive security order in the region cannot afford to be overly reliant on the US.

Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• Maritime Security
• Maritime Infrastructure
• China
• India
• The Pacific
• USA and Canada
• indo pacific region
• trump china policy
• trump xi meeting 2025
• trump xi meeting south korea
• us china rivalry in indo pacific
• us engagement in indo pacific
• us indo pacific policy

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