Author : Manoj Joshi

Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on May 16, 2025

US mediation jolted India-Pakistan ceasefire into place—Trump and Rubio stepped in as nuclear fears mounted and diplomatic lines reignited

From the Brink: US Mediates India-Pakistan De-escalation

Image Source: Getty

One of the more disconcerting things about the recent India-Pakistan crisis was the seeming absence of superpower interest, especially during its initial stages. Russia, which played a key role in ending the 1965 India-Pakistan war, was occupied by its own longstanding conflict with Ukraine. As for the United States (US), an administration that had essentially shrugged off global responsibilities, the country could only display a mild interest in the escalating developments between New Delhi and Islamabad.

It was, therefore, somewhat surprising when US involvement, through Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s telephone calls to Indian and Pakistani leaders since 27 April, intensified on Thursday and Friday, culminating in a ceasefire on Saturday evening announced by President Trump himself. Reports mention that after suggesting this was not America’s fight, Vice-President J.D. Vance, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, grew increasingly concerned that the conflict could go nuclear.

Russia, which played a key role in ending the 1965 India-Pakistan war, was occupied by its own longstanding conflict with Ukraine.

On 27 April 2025, the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, telephoned the Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar and the Pakistani Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif. Besides pledging the US commitment to counter-terrorism cooperation, he encouraged India to de-escalate tensions with Pakistan mutually. In his conversation with Sharif, however, Rubio was more blunt and emphasised the need for Pakistan “to condemn the terror attack.”

On 7 May 2025, when Operation Sindoor, the Indian attack on terror facilities in Pakistan, was launched, Rubio spoke to the national security advisors of both countries, urging them to keep the communication lines open. The Indian National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Doval, also called Rubio to brief him on the Operation Sindoor strikes.

In his conversation with Jaishankar on Thursday, 8 May, Rubio emphasised the need for immediate de-escalation, suggested that the US supported direct dialogue between India and Pakistan, and encouraged efforts to improve communications. The message was similar to what he had communicated to the Pakistani PM Sharif in a conversation earlier that day.

The US State Department emphasised in its briefings that it was in touch with both countries and urged a ‘responsible solution’ to the crisis. On 7 May, the Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce insisted that the US was “not watching from afar” but was engaged and looking for a resolution to the crisis.

In his conversation with Sharif, however, Rubio was more blunt and emphasised the need for Pakistan “to condemn the terror attack.”

According to the US press release, Rubio stepped up the game with a call to Pakistan’s Army Chief, Asim Munir, on 9 May and  “urged both parties to de-escalate”. He also “offered US assistance in starting constructive talks to avoid future conflicts”.

The next day, on 10 May, as Pakistan and India commenced their long-range missile strikes on each other’s military facilities, Rubio was on the line with EAM Jaishankar and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. The US readout of the conversations was identical—the Secretary had called on both parties to de-escalate and “re-establish direct communications”. He also proposed  “US support in facilitating productive discussions to avoid future disputes.”

It was clearly after this phone call that the Pakistan Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) called his Indian counterpart. Once direct communications were re-established, the two sides agreed on a ceasefire, presumably with the go-ahead of their respective governments.

On 10 May, Secretary Rubio announced around 17:30 IST that “Vice President Vance and I have engaged with senior Indian and Pakistani officials, including Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shehbaz Sharif, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir and National Security Advisors Ajit Doval and Asim Malik”. As a result, he noted the two countries had agreed to an immediate ceasefire “and to start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.”

The role of Trump

Notably, Rubio’s announcement was preceded by President Trump’s statement, who announced on  the social media platform, ‘Truth Social’, that “After a night of talks mediated by the United States, I am pleased to announce that India and Pakistan have agreed to a FULL AND IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.”

Washington’s stance in the conflict depended on President Trump’s position and lacked substantial clarity. On 22 April 2025, in a post on Truth Social, Trump spoke of the ‘deeply disturbing news out of Kashmir’ and said that the US ‘stands strong with India against terrorism’.

On 25 April, Trump played down the crisis inaccurately, saying that India and Pakistan have had “that fight for 1,000 years in Kashmir”. Referring to the terror attack, he said, “That was a bad one”.  He was speaking to reporters on Air Force One en route to Rome. He said he was close to both countries, but there had always been tension between the two countries.

On 7 May, after the Indian strikes, which he termed ‘a shame’,  Trump expressed his hope that the fight would end soon. He stated that he wanted both nations to work it out and offered assistance—“I know both very well, and I want to see them work it out”, stated Trump, adding, “And if I can do anything to help, I will. I will be there.”.

In, 1971, Washington openly favoured Islamabad to the extent of sending an armada into the Bay of Bengal to coerce India into a ceasefire.

History of US involvement in South Asian crises

The US approach to the India-Pakistan crisis has varied. In 1947, the US self-consciously allowed the United Kingdom (UK) to take the lead in dealing with the situation since it had little experience in the region. In 1965, whilst involved in the Vietnam War, the US gave the India-Pakistan issues a miss by simply putting embargoes on both of them. In 1971, Washington openly favoured Islamabad to the extent of sending an armada into the Bay of Bengal to coerce India into a ceasefire.

However, things changed in the 1999 Kargil War. When the former PM Nawaz Sharif rushed to Washington to seek mediation, he was told Pakistan would have to withdraw from the positions it had occupied across the Line of Control (LoC).

The US played a key role in promoting de-escalation in the wake of the so-called ‘Twin Peaks crisis’ in the wake of the terror attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, and following the Mumbai terror attack of 2008. In the first case, it was motivated by the need for Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan; in the second, its motivating factor was the growing strategic ties with India. The bottom line in both cases was the importance of ensuring that there is no all-out war between two nuclear-armed countries.

The first Trump administration was active following the Pulwama attack in February 2019. The US officials, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and NSA John Bolton, were active in communicating with both sides. The US, along with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, played a key role in obtaining the release of the Indian pilot whose aircraft was shot down. This intervention helped de-escalate the situation considerably.

On 28 February 2019, the day after an Indian Mig-21 was shot down, Trump said that the US was working to defuse tensions. Speaking at a press conference in Hanoi, he said that “we have some reasonably decent news” and that the US was “involved in trying to get them to stop.”

Indian policy has systematically eschewed the idea of the United Nations or any third nation playing a role in resolving the Kashmir issue.

The only time India accepted US mediation was in 1962, after the war with China. Under pressure from the US and UK to resolve the Kashmir issue, India and Pakistan held around six rounds of talks. At the end, the talks collapsed in 1963 when the Pakistani delegation, led by former Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, insisted on putting forward impossible demands. Subsequently, Pakistan announced a border agreement with China on the eve of the first round of talks, hoping to pressure India, but instead, it had the opposite effect.

Conclusion

It is difficult to avoid the implications of Trump’s Truth Social post on Sunday, 11 May. He confirmed the belief that the US was motivated by the spectre of a nuclear war, noting “it was time to stop the current aggression that could have led to the death and destruction of so many… millions of people could have died.”

Besides promising to increase trade with both, he said, “I will work with you both to see if, after a thousand years, a solution can be arrived at concerning Kashmir.”

On 13 May, New Delhi finally decided it needed to set the record straight. So the MEA spokesman Randhir Jaiswal publicly asserted at the official briefing that it was “force of Indian arms that compelled Pakistan to stop firing” and that the “specific date, time and wording of the understanding” was worked out by the Directors General of Military Operations of the two countries. He avoided a direct response to US claims as to whether India had taken up the issue of the alleged brokering of the ceasefire by the US.

India is disconcerted by the current turn of events. It would seem that the US has appeared in the India-Pakistan issue as a mediator of sorts. Further, New Delhi cannot be particularly happy about the fact that the US is now hyphenating India and Pakistan.

Indian policy has systematically eschewed the idea of the United Nations or any third nation playing a role in resolving the Kashmir issue. Its bottom line has been laid out in the Simla Agreement’s Clause II, which says that the two countries will settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations.

But all that was before the era of Donald Trump.


Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

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Author

Manoj Joshi

Manoj Joshi

Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF. He has been a journalist specialising on national and international politics and is a commentator and ...

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