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A decade after the JCPOA, Trump seeks a legacy-defining nuclear deal with Iran—amid shifting alliances, domestic hurdles, and rising global stakes
Image Source: Getty
Amidst a cycle of chaos initiated by the United States (US) President Donald Trump’s war on global trade, Washington and Tehran are once again resuming talks. In a show of strength and intent, the US has mobilised significant firepower in and around the Middle East, to pressure the Iranian leadership to return to the table 10 years after the first nuclear deal was signed between the P5+1 states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the US, plus Germany), and Tehran, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
During Trump’s first presidency, he unceremoniously exited the JCPOA in 2018, spilling water on years’ worth of negotiations which led to the signing of an agreement in Vienna, Austria. Trump had always criticised the deal, calling it ‘weak’ and ‘lopsided’ towards Tehran. Today, as he’s back at the White House, Trump is looking to negotiate another agreement—one he can take ownership of, instead of onboarding the legacy of his predecessors in former presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden. A core requirement is Trump's ‘seal of approval’ and ensuing headlines of peace and prosperity.
The Israeli leadership has long advocated for kinetic military action against Iran’s nuclear programme, favouring strikes over negotiations, or at the very least, using force to weaken Iran’s position at the negotiating table and provide an example of American and Israeli intent.
Today, the global order is significantly different to what it was in 2015. Trump, a self-styled collector of deals/dealmaker, announced ‘direct’ talks with the Iranian leadership, set to be hosted by Oman, around the same time Israel’s Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu was on an official visit to Washington. The Israeli leadership has long advocated for kinetic military action against Iran’s nuclear programme, favouring strikes over negotiations, or at the very least, using force to weaken Iran’s position at the negotiating table and provide an example of American and Israeli intent. However, Netanyahu’s stance did not receive US support.
There is no doubt that compared to 2015, the Iranian position across the region is weak. Its ‘Axis of Resistance’—an unofficial conglomerate of non-state militant groups targeted at degrading Israeli, American, and to a certain extent, Arab power, and influence across the region—is dwindling. Both Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon have been dealt with existential blows by Israel in the aftermath of the 7 October terror attacks, and the Houthis in Yemen—suddenly elevated to the role of core provocateurs of the Axis—are currently facing an onslaught of firepower from the US and its allies.
Over the past two months, the US has shown that any suggestion of being a power in decline in the Middle East is inaccurate. However, under Trump, the utilisation of American power comes with an invoice that its regional partners could be expected to foot the bill. This gives the US operations a tinge of being a ‘military for hire’ rather than projecting a world view of ‘Pax Americana’.
However, beyond the intricacies of the ongoing recalibration of American centrality in the global order, negotiating with Iran to box the Shia power into a corner on its nuclear programme will remain a challenge. All said and done, the Iranian leadership continue to be a much more cunning negotiator than many of those who sit across the table. To begin with, Iran’s nuclear programme is known to be in its advanced stages, with some predicting that, should Tehran want, it could sprint to becoming a nuclear weapons power in a matter of weeks.
The Iranian leadership continue to be a much more cunning negotiator than many of those who sit across the table.
Iran has hinted for a long time that it is prepared to re-engage with Trump. Iran’s President Massoud Pezeshkian, who won the election as the only moderate candidate in 2024, is in favour of these talks. In December 2024, former Iranian nuclear negotiator Javad Zarif, who delivered the JCPOA, wrote in the American press that Pezeshkian wants to collaborate with Arab neighbours and the US. However, it will remain undeterred in protecting its national interests concerning Israel. More interestingly, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, who previously served as the Chief Nuclear Negotiator, recently wrote an opinion piece in The Washington Post saying that as talks begin, the ball is in America’s court. However, in this write-up, Araghchi did not mention Israel once.
The nuclear debate will also have to tackle a host of peripheral issues. One of the main grievances of the 2015 deal was that it did not push Tehran to scale back its support for its web of militias, even though the negotiations were focused on the nuclear question. This time, similar hurdles should be expected, where the US may demand broader disengagement of Iran’s regional policies as part of the nuclear debate. This kerfuffle of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and nuclear deterrence forms a unique blueprint, and one as difficult to deliver as it sounds.
As much as Iran may want a deal, it will also have to perform contortions to manage its domestic politics. Ultimately, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei will take the call on the trajectory of these talks from Iran’s perspective. The conservatives in Iran, who surround Ayatollah’s ears, are vehemently anti-US and see the collapse of the JCPOA as proof of the risks and costs of trusting Washington. Yet, Tehran’s underlying causes to pursue this remain unchanged from the early 2010s, with sanctions gutting its local economy and its wish to prepare for a multi-polar order of the future now peppered with the severely limited strength of its Axis project.
The conservatives in Iran, who surround Ayatollah’s ears, are vehemently anti-US and see the collapse of the JCPOA as proof of the risks and costs of trusting Washington.
An unlikely but favourable condition on the nuclear question today for Iran is that, ironically, American recidivism and Trump’s trader-like approach to utilising the US military is forcing others to think about their nuclear deterrence. In Europe, analysts are calling more openly than ever before for nuclear protection as Trump recalibrates American military support for Ukraine and prioritises political outreach to Moscow. Similar murmurs in public discourse can be heard in parts of eastern Asia, where North Korea managed to become a nuclear power.
Finally, the Iran–US talks on the nuclear issue are a positive development. No one knows where the talks will go or what conclusions will be drawn. However, the favourable direction would be towards opening communication channels and prioritising amicable, non-military solutions. Both the US and Iran are resolute in protecting national and regional interests and recognise Iran as an official nuclear state. This means the Arab powers in the region will also dash to attain similar weaponisation. In a fragile global environment, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East today is a rather undesirable reality.
Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...
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