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Facing mounting economic and strategic constraints, President Muizzu has moved from populist defiance to pragmatic diplomacy with India.
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9 June 2025 marked one year since Maldives’ President Dr Mohamed Muizzu made his first visit to India since taking office, to attend Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third inaugural ceremony. The visit, though ceremonial on the surface, signalled a thaw in relations after months of turbulence rooted in the now-notorious “India-Out” campaign. What began as a nationalistic political campaign evolved into a full-blown diplomatic spat in 2024, placing the Maldives in a precarious position economically and strategically. As the dust settled, the trajectory of India–Maldives ties under Muizzu revealed a shift from populist defiance to pragmatic recalibration. The efforts to restore ties over the past year point to the broader reality that foreign policy, particularly for small states like the Maldives, is ultimately shaped less by populist slogans and more by economic dependence and regional strategic imperatives.
The efforts to restore ties over the past year point to the broader reality that foreign policy, particularly for small states like the Maldives, is ultimately shaped less by populist slogans and more by economic dependence and regional strategic imperatives.
Tensions came to a head in early 2024 following a series of inflammatory social media posts by Maldivian government officials targeting Prime Minister Modi. The comments, made in response to Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep, mocked and insulted him personally. These posts, though made in a personal capacity, came from top officials affiliated with the Muizzu administration. The resulting backlash in India was swift and severe, culminating in the public’s calls for a boycott of Maldivian tourism. In response, the Maldivian government sought to de-escalate the situation by urging restraint in public commentary that could strain diplomatic relations.
Muizzu, however, initially appeared unapologetic. Upon returning from a state visit to China in January 2024, he framed the situation as an issue of sovereignty and implied India was acting as a “bully”. Muizzu’s words aligned with the broader theme of his “India-Out” campaign, which was a cornerstone of his 2023 election strategy.
However, unlike previous episodes of anti-India rhetoric in the Maldives, this round had immediate and tangible consequences—mostly economic. While Muizzu’s administration made moves to demonstrate its independence, such as asking New Delhi to withdraw Indian military personnel operating aviation platforms, it became evident that distancing too far from India came at a significant cost.
Despite courting alternative partnerships with China and Gulf nations, the Maldivian government quickly found itself in difficult financial terrain. Foreign assistance to the Maldives has not materialised at the expected scale or pace. Aid from China has been slow, owing to the Maldives’ existing debt burden and restructuring requests, which constrain the country’s ability to secure new loans. Meanwhile, responses from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have been lukewarm, attributed in part to poorly executed aid negotiations and diplomatic protocol lapses. Faced with a looming economic crisis, the Muizzu administration had little choice but to re-engage with India, the Maldives’ largest development and trade partner in the region.
Despite the earlier diplomatic spat, India remained the only country willing to provide immediate and substantive assistance to the Maldives. In May 2024, New Delhi rolled over repayment of a USD 50 million treasury bill, and subsequently granted a second-year extension in May 2025. A one-year extension was granted for a second treasury bill in September 2024 as well, helping the Maldives stabilise its fiscal situation at a time when few others were willing to intervene.
The Muizzu administration had little choice but to re-engage with India, the Maldives’ largest development and trade partner in the region.
Even as the Maldives moved to scale down certain areas of cooperation with India, such as terminating the hydrography agreement, it also opted for calibrated adjustments in some areas rather than severance. For instance, instead of discontinuing Indian-operated aviation platforms, a consensus was reached to replace Indian military personnel with civilian technicians from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to continue operations.
Muizzu’s attendance at Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in in June 2024 marked a turning point. While the visit was ceremonial, both leaders engaged in warm exchanges. Muizzu would return to India on a state visit in October, further mending the strain in ties.
Both sides announced a comprehensive vision for bilateral cooperation focused on economic development and maritime security, marking a shift away from the combative tone of the early months of Muizzu’s administration and towards a working relationship built on mutual trust. This renewed engagement was reinforced by frequent high-level visits, particularly from the Maldives’ foreign minister and defence minister.
In a further sign of recalibration, a previously proposed China-funded agriculture project in Uthuru Thilafalhu—the lagoon that is also home to an India-assisted coast guard harbour—was relocated to a different site. While the government did not publicly cite the reasons, the move appeared to be a rollback of the earlier policy of antagonising New Delhi.
Domestically, Muizzu’s administration also took symbolic action to address the earlier insulting remarks targeting Modi. The officials responsible were dismissed, though they were swiftly appointed to senior roles in state-owned enterprises and allowed continued involvement in the political activities of the People’s National Congress (PNC), Muizzu’s political party. Though more symbolic than disciplinary, this gesture served to de-escalate tensions.
In an interview with Indian media, former Sri Lankan President Ranil Wickremesinghe claimed that Muizzu admitted the “India-Out” campaign was primarily a tool for electoral mobilisation. This aligns with observed trends.
From India’s perspective, Malé’s inconsistency may raise questions, but the response has remained measured. New Delhi appears to have assessed that maintaining regional stability is preferable to engaging in public recriminations.
Muizzu and senior figures in his government have been making efforts to distance themselves from the “India-Out” campaign’s provocative episodes. Much of the blame was redirected towards former President Abdulla Yameen, Muizzu’s former boss, who is now politically estranged from him. However, this disavowal has not gone unnoticed in Maldivian domestic politics. Many of the individuals who were vocal participants in the campaign are now tasked with managing the very foreign policy reset that contradicts those positions.
From India’s perspective, Malé’s inconsistency may raise questions, but the response has remained measured. New Delhi appears to have assessed that maintaining regional stability is preferable to engaging in public recriminations. As a result, bilateral engagement has resumed with minimal attention to the past year’s heated rhetoric. India has extended a generous lifeline to the Maldives in the form of two currency swaps, equivalent to US$ 757 million. Large-scale infrastructure development work under a US$ 800 million line of credit from India continues on schedule—such as a brand-new international airport in northern Maldives, a bridge and road project in southern Maldives, a large housing development project in the capital Malé, and a new bridge connecting the island of Malé with its western suburban islands.
Recently, thirteen agreements were signed between both governments under Phase Three of the High Impact Community Development Projects, through which a grant worth MVR 100 million (USD 6.4 million) will be disbursed to enhance the nationwide ferry network.
While relations with India are now on a more stable footing, the Muizzu administration has not entirely abandoned its effort to diversify strategic partnerships. In keeping with campaign pledges to develop the Maldives’ independent military capacity, the government acquired defence equipment in the form of Turkish-made drones to replace Indian helicopters for surveillance and search-and-rescue. Aircraft belonging to the Maldivian flag carrier are assigned as air ambulances. Despite initial hesitation, the Muizzu government also resumed the usage of the Indian aviation platforms in the Maldives. The Maldives is also set to receive a Dogan-class vessel from Türkiye soon, and a Guardian-class patrol boat from Australia next year.
The military acquisitions are framed as part of a broader effort to assert sovereignty and reduce external military dependence.
The military acquisitions are framed as part of a broader effort to assert sovereignty and reduce external military dependence. However, they are also a form of strategic hedging, allowing the Maldives to recalibrate its foreign relations without wholly alienating Indian interests.
India, for its part, appears tolerant of these moves, interpreting them as part of a sovereign nation’s right to diversify partnerships rather than as outright antagonism. The broader trajectory suggests that both countries are working—and can work—to balance national interests and regional stability without violating sensitivities that may result in instability for either side.
The India–Maldives relations of Muizzu’s first year in office illustrate how domestic campaign rhetoric, though appearing as harmless words, can yield to geopolitical and economic realities. The “India-Out” slogan may have proven effective on the campaign trail, but governance requires pragmatism. Economic dependence, strategic geography, and mutual interests necessitated a recalibration that both governments—albeit cautiously—have now embraced.
Despite early provocations, India opted for strategic patience. By continuing economic and diplomatic engagement without public confrontation, New Delhi preserved its regional influence and interests while also allowing the Maldives the space to pivot without suffering a loss of face.
As for the Muizzu administration, the past year underscores a hard lesson: that posturing against a regional power may be domestically popular but carries significant costs. The first Modi–Muizzu meeting a year ago marked a turning point in both countries’ commitment to mend and strengthen cooperation. Given that Indian media reports suggest Modi may undertake a state visit to the Maldives very soon, this would be a moment of utmost diplomatic significance: a chance to visibly reset ties and reaffirm mutual respect and the shared regional responsibility of both sides.
Ibrahim Maahil Mohamed is a journalist and writer from the Maldives. His interests include Maldivian history, politics, and governance, as well as Indian Ocean geopolitics and South Asian history.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Ibrahim Maahil Mohamed is a journalist and writer from the Maldives. His interests include Maldivian history, politics, and governance, as well as Indian Ocean geopolitics ...
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