Myanmar’s elections are not a pathway back to democracy but a carefully managed mechanism to formalise military rule while suppressing dissent and meaningful political choice
Nearly five years after seizing power in the February 2021 coup, Myanmar's military regime has begun deploying what remains its primary claim to political legitimacy: a carefully managed national election. According to the junta, the polls are intended to "correct" the outcome of the November 2020 general election, which it continues to portray as fraudulent—an allegation widely rejected by domestic and international observers but used to justify the overthrow of the elected government.
By officially framing the current elections as a means to return to democracy, the junta is using the polls as a smokescreen to legitimise its continued rule. The elections have been widely criticised by domestic actors, civil society, and international agencies as deeply flawed. The polls are essentially designed to keep the military regime in power rather than reflect the will of the people, who elected Aung San Suu Kyi as their leader in both 2015 and 2020.
This staggered approach spaces out voters and polling centres to avoid a total boycott and to create pressure where required, while projecting the appearance of a smooth electoral process.
The junta has split the elections into three phases: voting in 102 townships on 28 December, 100 townships on 11 January, and 63 townships on 25 January. This staggered approach spaces out voters and polling centres to avoid a total boycott and to create pressure where required, while projecting the appearance of a smooth electoral process.
Even the mechanics of representation reinforce the military's advantage. While seats are being allocated through a mix of first-past-the-post, proportional representation, and mixed-member proportional systems—a departure from earlier plurality-based elections—the outcome remains preordained. Under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution, 25 percent of seats in both houses of parliament are automatically reserved for serving military officers appointed by the commander-in-chief. This constitutional arrangement ensures that, regardless of electoral outcomes, the armed forces retain decisive political leverage from the outset, effectively institutionalising military supremacy within Myanmar's political system.
Despite the scale of the process, there are few visible signs of an election underway, according to citizens in Myanmar. In downtown Yangon, the most prominent indicators are billboards promoting the military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), alongside a small number of permitted parties, including the People’s Party, People’s Pioneer Party, National Unity Party, and the Myanmar Farmers Development Party. Beyond these displays, there is little to suggest that a nationwide electoral exercise is underway, reinforcing the impression of a tightly controlled process.
The political context further undermines the credibility of the polls. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains incarcerated, her National League for Democracy—by far the most popular political force in the country—has been formally dissolved, and independent political mobilisation has been systematically suppressed. Democracy observers have therefore characterised the elections less as a transition toward civilian rule and more as an attempt to repackage prolonged military governance under an electoral façade.
The number of parties contesting the polls reinforces the extent to which the concept of “disciplined democracy” dominates the election. According to the Union Election Commission (UEC), six national and 51 regional parties are registered to contest. However, the political field has been sharply curtailed.
The number of parties contesting the polls reinforces the extent to which the concept of “disciplined democracy” dominates the election.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) was dissolved after refusing to re-register under the restrictive Political Parties Registration Law, while its leadership remains in detention. Several influential regional parties have also been excluded, including the Arakan National Party in Rakhine State and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy. As a result, military-backed parties, particularly the USDP, face little meaningful electoral competition.
Unsurprisingly, the USPD is slated to win a landslide victory. The party secured victories in 90 of the 102 Lower House constituencies in the first round of polling and 21 of the 31 Upper House seats announced. Ethnic and regional parties claimed the remaining seats. Results from the second round have yet to be released.
While the opposition parties have challenged the USDP's victories in the first round of polling—citing irregularities and a lack of transparency in the handling of advance ballots—and have since lodged formal complaints with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, no action appears to have been taken to address these concerns. The voting is thus being treated merely as a means to install the military’s proxy government.
On 15 September 2025, Myanmar's Union Election Commission announced that polls would not be held in 56 Lower House and nine Upper House constituencies. The only reason cited was that “these constituencies have been deemed not conducive to holding free and fair elections”, rendering 65 constituencies ineligible to vote—primarily because they are under the control of ethnic armed organisations and pro-democracy groups. As a result, large parts of the country remain excluded from voting, with resistance forces operating across conflict-affected regions having rejected and boycotted the electoral process altogether.
Large parts of the country remain excluded from voting, with resistance forces operating across conflict-affected regions having rejected and boycotted the electoral process altogether.
The second phase of the elections was also marred by violence, further calling into question the feasibility of holding polls in the current turbulent environment. Since the coup, more than 7,000 civilians have been killed and over 3.6 million displaced, with the numbers continuing to rise daily.
International reactions have been mixed but largely critical. Western governments and human rights organisations have condemned the elections as a sham designed to bestow legitimacy on junta rule. Calls have been made to reject the results and to press for a return to genuine democratic processes—an avenue for which no clear pathway exists.
Within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the elections continue to pose a dilemma. While the 5-point consensus has had very limited impact on the ground, ASEAN’s conflict-resolution framework for Myanmar emphasises dialogue and inclusiveness. The bloc has been criticised for its passive response, including its decision not to deploy election observers.
ASEAN is reportedly considering the appointment of a long-term special envoy during the Philippines' chairmanship in 2026, signalling a potential shift away from annual rotations. Such a move could reduce disruptions, strengthen institutional mechanisms, and support more consistent engagement with Myanmar’s various stakeholders. However, calls for more direct and decisive action have largely gone unheeded.
At the same time, countries such as China and Russia—with strategic interests in Myanmar—have been more supportive or neutral, providing diplomatic backing or technical assistance that undermines international pressure for democratic reform. India has also called for free, fair, and inclusive elections; however, such statements ring hollow in the absence of sustained political will among all concerned actors.
Countries such as China and Russia—with strategic interests in Myanmar—have been more supportive or neutral, providing diplomatic backing or technical assistance that undermines international pressure for democratic reform.
Myanmar's elections are best understood not as a corrective to past political failures, but as a mechanism to formalise military rule under the veneer of democratic process. Exclusion, coercion, and controlled participation have hollowed out the electoral exercise, ensuring outcomes that serve the junta rather than the electorate. In the absence of meaningful reform or regional pressure, the polls are poised to entrench instability rather than deliver political resolution.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
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