Amid the Iran war, France navigates a delicate balance between defence commitments, diplomacy, and alliance politics, exposing both its strategic resolve and constrained influence
Responses among European Union (EU) member states to the US–Israel conflict with Iran have been uneven. In the early phase, France, alongside Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), issued a joint statement that stopped short of condemning the strikes, instead highlighting concerns over Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. Spain, by contrast, adopted a far more critical stance, calling the strikes a clear violation of international law, with Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez condemning them as “unjustifiable” and opposing the war.
As the conflict persisted—undermining expectations of a swift regime collapse and revealing a mounting civilian toll—the tone across Western European capitals began to shift. President Emmanuel Macron later characterised the strikes as a violation of international law and called for a ceasefire. France also intensified its diplomatic engagement, with Macron speaking to Iranian President Pezeshkian to press for de-escalation and an end to attacks on Gulf states. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France subsequently supported a resolution calling for an end to attacks on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
France is treading a delicate line in the current conflict. Among European countries, France has some of the highest stakes, given its security and defence commitments to key Gulf partners such as the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, as well as to Levantine countries including Jordan and Lebanon, alongside its strong ties with Israel. This raises important questions about what these stakes mean for France’s defence posture in the region.
Among European countries, France has some of the highest stakes, given its security and defence commitments to key Gulf partners such as the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, as well as to Levantine countries including Jordan and Lebanon, alongside its strong ties with Israel.
This network of commitments is anchored in bilateral defence arrangements across the Gulf. The agreements on defence cooperation with Qatar were signed in the 1990s, committing France to come to the country’s defence in the event of an external threat. The two operate shared platforms such as the Rafale—of which Doha was the second export client after Egypt—and have fought alongside each other, including during the 2011 Libya campaign that led to the fall of Muammar Gaddafi.
In Kuwait, defence ties date back to 1991 with France’s participation in the Gulf War (Opération Daguet) and were formalised through a bilateral defence agreement in 1992. Since then, cooperation has deepened, with French troops stationed at the Joint Operations Command headquarters at Camp Arifjan as part of the coalition against ISIS.
France’s most significant regional partner, however, is the United Arab Emirates. A 1995 defence agreement—strengthened in 2009 with the establishment of a permanent base—includes a commitment to defend the UAE against external threats. France maintains a standing permanent presence of nearly 900 personnel across all three services, including Rafale aircraft, an army tank regiment, and a naval facility supporting French maritime operations.
Operational cooperation with the UAE is extensive. The two air forces regularly train on shared platforms such as the Mirage 2000, at times alongside the Indian Air Force in exercises such as Desert Knight. France’s joint headquarters in Abu Dhabi oversees operations across much of the western Indian Ocean, with naval assets routinely operating alongside partners, including the Indian Navy. It also leads France’s contribution to the EU’s Aspides mission, which has maintained a continuous presence in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea since 2024 to safeguard freedom of navigation against piracy and regional threats, including Houthi attacks.
Further west, this footprint extends into the Levant. In Jordan, fighter jets have been deployed at Prince Sultan Air Base as part of Operation Chammal against ISIS, alongside a formal defence cooperation agreement in place since 2015. More recently, aircraft based there contributed to the country’s defence when Iranian missiles crossed its airspace during the 12-day war, as well as during earlier Iranian strikes on Israel in 2024 following the attack on the consulate in Damascus.
Finally, the French military presence in Iraq serves a similar purpose—monitoring and targeting ISIS remnants. It is this presence that came under attack in Erbil, in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, where a French soldier was killed and several others wounded amid the escalation linked to the war in Iran. These mark the first confirmed French casualties of the conflict and could be read as a direct signal from Iran and its proxies against NATO members involved in the theatre. This escalation has extended beyond Iraq. Days earlier, an Iranian drone struck the French naval base in Abu Dhabi, indicating a willingness to target French assets across the region. Similar strikes have also hit NATO ally Turkey, which has faced repeated Iranian missile attacks since the conflict began.
Alongside Jordan and Iraq, France’s posture is further shaped by its longstanding political and historical ties to Lebanon. As Israeli airstrikes intensified following Hezbollah’s entry into the conflict and renewed attacks on Tel Aviv, Lebanon has faced a severe humanitarian crisis. Paris has dispatched humanitarian aid to the country, where nearly one million people—over a fifth of the population—have been internally displaced due to Israeli evacuation orders. President Macron has called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, while Lebanon’s leadership has formally sought France’s assistance in managing the crisis.
Against this backdrop, France could not remain passive as the Middle East descended once again into conflict. Taken together, these agreements and deployments form a defence network that anchors France’s role in the Gulf and sets it apart from other EU member states. Paris has shown both willingness and resolve in supporting its partners’ security, reinforcing its presence even as countries such as Germany have withdrawn their troops from the Middle East.
France has, in fact, stepped up its defence of its Gulf and Levantine partners since the start of the conflict, deploying additional fighter jets.
France has, in fact, stepped up its defence of its Gulf and Levantine partners since the start of the conflict, deploying additional fighter jets. Twenty-four Rafale aircraft are now deployed in the UAE and Jordan, up from about 10 typically, conducting defensive sorties against Iranian drone attacks.
Meanwhile, the French carrier strike group (CSG), centred on the Charles de Gaulle and accompanied by around a dozen vessels, has redeployed from the Baltic Sea to the eastern Mediterranean. Now positioned near Cyprus, it stands ready to intervene and support defensive operations. President Macron underscored this commitment during a brief meeting with his Cypriot counterpart, offering reassurances as the island has come under Iranian strikes. France’s posture is not isolated. Other European countries—including Greece, Italy, and Spain—have also increased their naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Over time, as the intensity of the conflict eases, these European deployments could be redirected towards safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, a role Macron has alluded to in recent remarks, alongside like-minded partners such as India.
At the same time, France is aligning aspects of its defence posture with the United States. It has granted US aircraft access to bases in metropolitan France for refuelling, following their reported expulsion from Rota in Spain. Sources have also pointed to the possibility of US access to French facilities in the Middle East, including in Djibouti—where France has maintained a longstanding presence—and in Jordan. However, this has been denied by a French military spokesperson.
On the domestic front, the war has reignited debate over France’s role in the region. Opposition parties have criticised both the country’s dense network of partnerships—warning of the risk of being drawn into the conflict—and, conversely, what they see as an insufficiently robust response, with some calling for support for the US–Israel strikes. At the same time, Paris faces the logistical challenge of repatriating its nationals, with over 400,000 French citizens residing in the Gulf and nearly 18,000 tourists stranded amid the escalation.
France, like other global actors, has little interest in a prolonged conflict, given rising energy costs and the disruptions stemming from the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
France, like other global actors, has little interest in a prolonged conflict, given rising energy costs and the disruptions stemming from the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. While France, alongside other G7 countries, could seek to stabilise prices by releasing strategic oil reserves, such measures offer only limited relief over the longer term. The French energy major TotalEnergies is already expected to lose around 15 percent of its production due to war-related disruptions. Although Paris is not heavily dependent on Gulf States for its oil requirements, the spillover effects on global markets are likely to impose additional strain on an already fragile French economy.
While France’s engagements have underscored its reliability as a security partner in the region, its ability to shape the conflict’s trajectory or accelerate its resolution remains uncertain. President Macron has reaffirmed that France’s approach is purely defensive, underscoring its commitment to supporting Gulf states’ air defence while declining President Trump’s call for naval action in the Strait of Hormuz. Even so, President Macron’s room for manoeuvre remains constrained. Paris has limited leverage over Washington, Tel Aviv, or Tehran in shaping a viable off-ramp to the conflict, though diplomatic backchannels may still offer some scope for de-escalation. Over the longer term, however, the conflict could reshape regional perceptions. As Gulf states reassess the reliability of US security guarantees while bearing the brunt of attacks they have sought to avoid, France’s more restrained yet consistent posture may emerge as a quiet strategic asset in its engagement with the region.
Guillaume Gandelin is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
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Guillaume Gandelin is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation. His research focuses on the India-EU and India-France security and defence ...
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