In the Sahel, forests have become strategic infrastructure for insurgent governance, revenue extraction, and cross-border expansion
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Across insurgencies worldwide, forests have provided armed groups with cover, sanctuary, and operational advantage. From Hezbollah’s hidden bunkers in the forests of southern Lebanon to the deployment of pyro-terrorism in protracted conflicts, forests have long featured in asymmetric warfare. In the Sahel, however, terrorist groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)—formerly known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)—have elevated this tactic through the systematic use of forested terrain.
Forests are no longer mere hideouts; they are deliberately selected strongholds that allow armed groups to withstand military pressure while embedding themselves within local economic and social systems.
In recent years, forests across the Sahel and its southern periphery have evolved into core infrastructure for terrorist operations, enabling recruitment, financing, logistics, and even parallel governance. As a matter of fact, this spatial transformation is a key reason behind the rapid expansion of terrorist violence across the Sahel. Forests are no longer mere hideouts; they are deliberately selected strongholds that allow armed groups to withstand military pressure while embedding themselves within local economic and social systems. Therefore, contrary to popular opinion, this phenomenon reflects strategic choice rather than accidental exploitation of “ungoverned spaces.”
Source: Sahel-based terror groups expand to coastal West Africa, DW
Terrorist groups in the Sahel have learned that while holding cities is costly and difficult to sustain, controlling forests is relatively easier. Forests provide concealment from aerial surveillance and, due to limited road access, constrain mechanised military responses. They also create jurisdictional ambiguity, with overlapping authority between ranger forces and regular troops. Forests offer terrorist groups three decisive advantages:
First, many forest areas in the Sahel are guarded by lightly armed rangers whose mandate prioritises conservation rather than counterinsurgency. Owing to inadequate funding, patrol density is low, posts are isolated, and response times are slow. Armed groups have repeatedly overrun ranger positions, forcing withdrawals and creating enduring security vacuums.
Second, dense vegetation, poor infrastructure, and militants’ intimate knowledge of forest paths allow them to conduct ambushes, deploy improvised explosive devices, and disperse rapidly. Forest cover reduces the technological advantages of state forces, particularly airpower and armoured vehicles.
Third, many of these forests sit atop longstanding illicit and informal economies such as fuel smuggling, artisanal gold mining, cattle grazing, and poaching. Terrorist groups insert themselves into such systems, generating revenue without reliance on foreign donors.
JNIM and ISSP are two groups profoundly entrenched in the forests of the Sahel. Since its formation in 2017, JNIM has increasingly prioritised rural hinterlands, border zones, and conservation areas over urban centres. The W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) Complex, spanning Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has become central to this strategy. By embedding itself within the park system, JNIM has secured a cross-border sanctuary that allows its militants to evade security forces by moving seamlessly between jurisdictions.
The growing convergence between Sahelian and Nigerian militant groups marks a structural shift.
Throughout 2025, JNIM and ISSP further entrenched themselves in the Benin–Burkina Faso–Niger tri-border zone, transforming it into one of the most volatile theatres in the Sahel. Northern Benin experienced its deadliest year on record as JNIM launched sustained cross-border attacks from eastern Burkina Faso. In April alone, 54 Beninese soldiers were killed in Park W. By mid-year, militants had advanced further south into the Borgou department, near the Nigerian border, signalling a geographic expansion beyond previously affected northern districts.
JNIM’s distinguishing feature is its fusion of jihadist ideology with parallel governance. Inside forest sanctuaries, the group does not merely operate—it governs. In the WAP Complex, JNIM taxes artisanal miners, grants herders access to grazing land in exchange for zakat payments, and controls motorcycle-based smuggling routes linking coastal states to the Sahel.
Forests also enable calibrated coercion. Hostages, whether foreign nationals, state officials, or intelligence targets, can be concealed deep within park territory, beyond the effective reach of aerial reconnaissance. Reports indicate that in 2025, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) paid more than US$20 million to secure the release of an Emirati royal. Weapons seized during raids are stored in dispersed forest caches, while training camps operate far from conventional military access.
This system allows these groups to project legitimacy. Where governments ban mining or grazing in the name of security or conservation, militants portray themselves as facilitators of livelihoods by loosening such restrictions. Further, these forests serve as staging grounds for attacks on military bases. Even when security forces clear these areas, they rarely maintain a sustained presence, allowing militants to reconstitute elsewhere.
Forested zones also enable sustained recruitment. Young men facing unemployment, displacement, or criminalisation under state policies are drawn to armed groups that offer predictable income and protection. Forced recruitment and abductions complement voluntary enlistment, particularly in Burkina Faso, where abductions have surged following the emergence of civilian militias.
The growing convergence between Sahelian and Nigerian militant groups marks a structural shift. Previously distinct theatres—from Mali and Burkina Faso to north-east Nigeria—are gradually merging into a single conflict environment stretching from central Mali to western Nigeria. JNIM, ISSP, and ISWAP factions are increasingly operating in the same forested borderlands, producing fluid alliances, tactical rivalries, and evolving patterns of violence.
As pressure intensifies in the Sahel, militants are expanding southward through conservation corridors into Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire. Forests have become forward operating bases for such expansion, transforming conservation landscapes into launchpads for regional insecurity.
For military regimes in the Sahel, this expansion compounds internal fragility. In Mali and Burkina Faso, sustained militant offensives, sieges, and blockades have weakened state control and exposed deep institutional limits. In Burkina Faso, the overstretched army and the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) struggle to hold territory, raising the risk that regional capitals in the east could become targets. Sustained setbacks may intensify elite fragmentation and heighten the risk of further coup cycles.
Finally, forest-based terrorism threatens coastal stability. As pressure intensifies in the Sahel, militants are expanding southward through conservation corridors into Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire. Forests have become forward operating bases for such expansion, transforming conservation landscapes into launchpads for regional insecurity.
Terrorist groups in the Sahel are flourishing not despite forests, but by leveraging them. These spaces provide concealment, revenue, recruitment pools, and governance laboratories that often compensate for militants’ inability to hold major cities. As long as forests remain weakly governed, economically vital yet politically neglected, they will anchor insurgent power.
Breaking this model requires more than periodic military patrols. It demands restoring state legitimacy in and around protected areas, formalising local economies rather than banning them, and integrating conservation policy with security and livelihood strategies. Without such an approach, forests in the Sahel will remain not symbols of preservation but the backbone of insurgent entrenchment, shaping an increasingly unstable future for the region and its southern neighbours. Preventing terrorism in the Sahel will require treating these forests not as empty spaces, but as governed territories where security, livelihoods, and state authority intersect.
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
Shrestha Medhi is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing ...
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Shrestha Medhi is a Research Intern at the Strategic Studies Programme at ORF, working on security, political, and socio-cultural dynamics across the African continent. ...
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