Rather than counterterrorism efforts, regional and international power struggles are likely to shape America’s approach to Syria and the broader region
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Syria’s new de-facto leader, Ahmed al-Shara (better known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militia, formerly aligned with both al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State, has said that the country is “tired of wars” and now wants to build a state and institutions away from conflict. This clarion call of exhaustion with a war running for over 13 years will resonate loudly in Washington D.C., where a similar mood has taken over after more than two decades of leading the ‘War on Terror’ charge that redefined the post 9/11 security order.
The ouster of Bashar al-Assad’s reign in Damascus is unearthing the many horrors of how the previous regime maintained its control over the decades.
However, the current reality of Syria represents a transition to a new global security order as the previous era is filed under a chapter of history with mixed results. The ouster of Bashar al-Assad’s reign in Damascus is unearthing the many horrors of how the previous regime maintained its control over the decades. While the Syrian people celebrate this change in leadership, the rebels in charge who represent the new reality that has replaced the old open up a whole new Pandora’s box both regionally and globally.
In 2021, the messy United States’ (US) withdrawal from Afghanistan left behind a new political reality run by the Taliban and its extremist ideology. While the Biden administration bore the impact of the chaos that ensued in Kabul after the withdrawal, it was the deal signed by President Donald Trump with the Taliban in Qatar during his first term that ultimately led to the withdrawal. The deal was led by an American public discourse of exhaustion, turbocharged by Trump’s insular brand of politics. The ‘America First’ adage reoriented the ‘War on Terror’ albeit in a hasty manner.
Jolani’s juggernaut in Syria has been met with more acceptance than caution. Even the Syrian embassy in Washington D.C. has reportedly changed the flag to that of the ‘revolution’. Dozens of countries have already made diplomatic contact with Jolani and his Syrian Salvation government, and many embassies in the country, including India’s, remain operational. The US has also moved forward to make diplomatic contact, a decision which cannot be under-emphasised. Having fought jihadists for a better part of the past 20 years, the US is now accepting the realities of the same jihadists running their states. Arab monarchies such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which have institutionally pushed back against radicalism and extremist ideologies such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are demanding caution, while the likes of Türkiye's intelligence chief, having supported sections of the rebels, landed in Damascus and prayed at the symbolic Umayyad Mosque within hours of Assad’s ousting.
The US’ power, or its intent to exercise the same on a global scale, is not yet on the decline either financially or by way of resources and military strength.
These rapid changes taking place are not directly tied to American power. The US’ power, or its intent to exercise the same on a global scale, is not yet on the decline either financially or by way of resources and military strength. It is the political will and the domestic demands and realities that have shifted. Geopolitics have also shifted with the re-emergence of a big power competition, which is in the driving seat of many of the ongoing changes. “There’s nothing China or Russia would rather have, would want more in this competition than the US to be bogged down another decade in Afghanistan,” now outgoing US President Joe Biden said in 2021.
If someone like Jolani can help push back Iran and Russia from Syria, which, by his admission, he intends to do, it works in the West’s favour in the short term. A potential withdrawal of Russia from its only two military bases in the Middle East on the coast of Syria would be welcomed. Iran’s surprise at the failure of its multi-layered interventions in Syria seems to have opened many domestic conversations about the country’s role in the region and the realities of its polity and economy. If an alternative to Assad in Syria can result in both Russia and Iran’s exit from the country, manage any potential refugee influx into Europe (which previously led to a re-ordering of the continent’s politics towards the right), and implement a degree of ideologically moderate stability, irrespective of being democratic or autocratic, then in the short-term at least, this alternative is palatable to the US. It represents the return of a troubled dichotomy from the past, the difficulty in differentiating between a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ terrorist.
In Afghanistan, many ideated and wished for a ‘Taliban 2.0’, that is, a pragmatic take on the Deobandi group away from its two-decade long war against the US. The similarities are not just uncanny but represent a blueprint of sorts—a status quo where the jihadist groups and their leadership are left to their own devices in exchange for security and political guarantees. Both Jolani and the Taliban’s powerful Interim Minister of Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani, carry US$ 10 million bounties to this day. Ironically, the bounty documents say the prize is available to anyone who knows their whereabouts or has information on them, even as both Jolani and Haqqani appear on television every day and meet politicians and diplomats, engaging with civil society.
Iran’s surprise at the failure of its multi-layered interventions in Syria seems to have opened many domestic conversations about the country’s role in the region and the realities of its polity and economy.
The US continues its anti-ISIS operations in Syria. At some point in the past decade, many of these rebel groups in Syria were allies in their fight against ISIS, keeping aside their differences. Even in Afghanistan, the Taliban is increasingly being seen on the frontlines in the fight against the Islamic State Khorasan (or ISIS-K), Daesh’s growing branch in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. This is even though the Taliban domestically continues a struggle amongst its ranks after the first few months of showcasing unity. The recent assassination of Khalil Haqqani, Sirajuddin’s uncle and brother of the Haqqani network’s founder Jalaluddin Haqqani, inside a secure government building highlights the opacity of militant groups trying to run states.
In 2019, Trump’s former Defence Secretary, Jim Mattis, made a pertinent observation that, in any war, the enemy gets a vote deciding if it is truly over or not. Between 2001 and 2021, the Taliban exercised that power till the US politically capitulated. The story of Syria under Jolani is too new, too optimistic, and too aligned with people’s current and prevailing sentiment of relief to draw long-term conclusions. However, it may well be geopolitics, regional and international power struggles, and not counterterrorism, that may shape Syria’s future once again.
Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...
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