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At the Dubai Air Show, the F-35 emerged as a symbol of Gulf anxieties as Arab states rethink deterrence amid a distracted US and widening regional threats
Image Source: Wikipedia
The 2025 Dubai Air Show, while a cornerstone event of the Middle East’s aviation sector, was once again a key venue showcasing how the region’s defence sector reflects a shifting strategic culture—one in which Gulf states are increasingly factoring a more distracted United States (US) into their calculations. Between Hamas’s terror strike against Israel in 2023, followed by a relentless war in Gaza and US strikes against Iran’s nuclear programme in June, the region’s security paradigm is in flux.
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), has recently visited Washington D.C. for the first time since 2018. On the agenda were a slew of deliverables, including seeking a renewed security arrangement with the US and onboarding top-of-the-line defence technologies. Since 1945, when the Kingdom’s King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud met then US President Franklin D. Roosevelt on board American warship USS Quincy in the Suez Canal—marking a new chapter of US security guarantees in the Middle East—the post-9/11 era led by the Iraq war has changed both demands and requirements of and from American geopolitics. However, arguably, the core security demands for Saudi Arabia, from King Abdulaziz to now heir apparent MbS, have remained the same over the past 80 years.
While Israel's decimation of both Hamas and Hezbollah plays well into Arab capitals’ own calculations, uncontested Israeli air power, which now spreads across the region, all the way to the Persian Gulf, is a new cause of concern.
One of the more notable outcomes of MbS’s trip was the Trump administration's intentions to sell its top-of-the-line F-35 stealth fighter jets to Riyadh. The months since October 2023 have delivered some pivotal moments that have forced Gulf capitals to revisit their military and strategic doctrines. While Israel's decimation of both Hamas and Hezbollah plays well into Arab capitals’ own calculations, uncontested Israeli air power, which now spreads across the region, all the way to the Persian Gulf, is a new cause of concern. The Israeli strike against Hamas in Doha, the capital of Qatar, which is now a major mediating power, just two months ago was a watershed moment. While the Qataris, rankled by Israeli action, rushed to Washington and secured a Trump executive order guaranteeing their security, other Gulf neighbours have been left with stark choices to make.
Israel is currently the only country in the region flying the F-35 and possibly also the first operator to use the jets in active war fronts. From its attacks against Iran to flying the F-35 over the funeral of slain Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon as a show of strength, the aircraft has quickly become synonymous with the unquestioned Israeli military advantage in the region. Now, Arab powers, including those that have normalised relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords, have seemingly realised that long-term, there are no guarantees on the table that Israeli action will not target them. In preparation, they are looking to rapidly advance their deterrence capabilities.
The F-35 has already had an illustrious political history in the Middle East. Following the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was keen to add it to its fleet as a frontline fighter to replace its older US-made F-16s. This placed Israel in a difficult situation, as maintaining its qualitative military edge in the region is non-negotiable, while it also did not want to slight its newfound normalcy with one of the Arab world’s most powerful states. Initially, Israel was open to the UAE having the aircraft if the technological suites in its own version, named “Adir” (meaning strong or majestic in Hebrew), remain superior to those of its neighbours. However, the UAE’s chase for the aircraft yielded no results, as Israel publicly supported Abu Dhabi’s wish, but behind the scenes worked to scuttle it. Fast forward a few years, and the Saudis are in a similar position; however, this time, Trump has said the Saudi versions may match those of Israel. Israel’s Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu has already brushed off such fears, saying that the US will ensure Israel’s military advantage as a core component of America’s institutional support for the Jewish state.
From its attacks against Iran to flying the F-35 over the funeral of slain Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon as a show of strength, the aircraft has quickly become synonymous with the unquestioned Israeli military advantage in the region.
The likelihood of Saudi Arabia getting similar technological supremacy on board their F-35s, should the deal succeed, is indeed limited. This is a reality that Arab capitals have inculcated in their long-term strategies where military capacities are concerned. For long, most calculations were based around Iran, and not Israel, with the former maintaining its place as the major threat. The strike against Qatar has now moved this needle as American influence and power are increasingly seen, in scholar Galip Dalay’s words, as “indispensable but unreliable”. The latter, that of being unreliable, will push Arab powers to rebuild their military depth. From the wish for the F-35 to the recent conclusion of a renewed Pakistan–Saudi security arrangement, with Islamabad being the only Islamic nation with nuclear weapons and a vastly experienced army, are symptoms of these new realities.
The F-35, once criticised by the first Trump administration as a money-guzzling project unable to achieve desirable results, is today becoming a symbol of American power in a region that Washington seems unable to become indifferent towards despite successive presidents. However, according to Dalay’s view of US power being indispensable but unreliable, Arab powers have indeed started to recalibrate long-term strategic reliance on the US as they move towards diversifying their military order books underpinned by concepts of strategic autonomy and multipolarity.
The UAE, for example, is looking at fifth-generation fighter aircraft projects to buy into, specifically those run by South Korea. Seoul is targeting a US$15 billion buy-in by Abu Dhabi in their KF-21 Boramae fighter aircraft programme. The KF-21 already had its maiden flight in 2022. A successful purchase into this programme will offer the UAE both diversification, while also remaining within the construct of Western military technologies. The Saudis, on the other hand, are looking to regional foe Türkiye’s successes with its home-grown defence technology, ranging from drones to combat aircraft. Ironically, Türkiye was part of the F-35 programme, shunted out due to its decision to purchase Russia’s top-of-the-line S-400 missile system. If the Saudi deal succeeds, Ankara, which has opted for Europe’s Eurofighter as a stopgap, may also be in line for the F-35 once again.
The F-35, once criticised by the first Trump administration as a money-guzzling project unable to achieve desirable results, is today becoming a symbol of American power in a region that Washington seems unable to become indifferent towards despite successive presidents.
A proposed US$6 billion agreement between Ankara and Riyadh will not only boost Saudi Arabia’s aim for an indigenous defence sector, but increased economic cooperation will also make it harder for both states to have any grand fallouts over regional matters. According to reports, Saudi Arabia has a target of 50 percent indigenisation by 2030, and as of 2024, the number stood at around 19 percent. Other weapons suppliers, such as China and Russia, are also well-positioned to make headway in this market despite their own friction points with the US. In response, some hope a widening competition in the arms market will push the US to loosen its terms and conditions on how and when operators can use the equipment it sells.
The F-35 may be more important to Israel than to the Arab states. The options for Israel to diversify are severely limited, unlike Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, amongst others. Till now, American attempts to stall such diversification has not yielded too many results. This is not necessarily due to widening rifts between the US and the Middle East, but structural changes in the approach to foreign policy by Arab states, who have marketed their stance as beneficial for all by trying to become a hub for international mediation, from Afghanistan earlier, to now, Gaza and Ukraine.
Finaly, in the interim, it is air power and air defence that is dictating both opportunities and fears. As appetite, experience, and capability for conventional wars in the region remain unfavourable, air power, specifically the use of unmanned technologies and missiles, is being seen as the main crisis point. The interests in the F-35 come from these immediate fears, as analysts continue to predict that another war-like situation in the region can never be sincerely placed off the table in the Middle East.
Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
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Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...
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