Expert Speak India with Africa
Published on Feb 05, 2020
Exploring changing trajectories of France’s policies in Sub-Saharan Africa Successive Presidents of France under the Fifth Republic from General De Gaulle (1959-69) to Emmanuel Macron (2017) have consistently highlighted the significance of Africa to France in world politics. François Mitterrand, a former French President (1981-1995), had prophesised in 1957 that without Africa, France will have no history in the twenty first century while his successor President Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) opined in 2008 that without Africa, France will slide down into the rank of third (world) power. Association with Africa fulfilled France’s dream of ‘grandeur’ and allowed it to play a significant role in European as well as global politics. Similarly, owing to its predominant role in the then European Economic Community (EEC) and later the European Union (EU) France continued to play an important role in the post-colonial Africa. Besides,  immediately after their independence in the 1960s, France like a typical neo-colonial power had institutionalised its relationship with its former colonies by signing comprehensive economic, military, political, technological and cultural agreements with its ‘ex’ colonies, except Guinea. Such agreements were characterised by asymmetric forms of interdependence. The significance of Africa to France could be further underscored by the fact that even during the presidential election campaigns of 2017 the two rival candidates, namely Macron and Marine Le Pen, visited Algeria and Chad respectively to establish rapport with Africa. Macron went as far as condemning French colonialism as a crime against humanity. In contrast, the visit of Le Pen to France’s military base in Chad, established to fight terrorist activities, caused adverse reactions as she was construed as a racist and xenophobic leader. Macron, after assuming Presidential office, constituted Presidential Council for Africa in August 2017, an advisory group, to pursue France’s Africa policy to shape new vision of the Franco-African ensemble. Once again, during his visit to Côte d’Ivoire in December 2019, Macron conceded that colonialism was a ‘grave mistake’. He also promised to place Franco-African partnerships on more egalitarian lines. Irrespective of such lofty ideals however, it is difficult to ignore the fact that varying asymmetries that are embedded in the very neo-colonial structures of Franco-African rapports in the post-colonial period are not easy to dismantle. It is obvious that if Macron’s France aspires to promote a queer mélange of egalitarian cum neo-colonial association with African countries it has to be subtle and deft in steering the course of France’s dominance/partnerships in Africa by taking cognisance of changing realities. For instance, by 2019 out of 300 million people who speak French, 44 percent were located in Africa. In view of the rising population growth rate in Africa, by 2050 majority of people who speak French will be located in the continent. Similarly, roughly 2.3 million French citizens are of Arab or African origins. Ironically, although France in its domestic politics has always embraced republican traditions, it has simultaneously retained uncanny attraction for spreading the French culture and civilization overseas by being an imperial power. It is in this context that France’s continued presence in Africa requires a critical appraisal. After preparing the grounds for neo-colonialism, France had departed from its former colonies of west and equatorial Africa by installing pro-French regimes in different African countries, except in Guinea. Subsequently, in the realm of economy, the African currency, namely Communauté Financièrs Africaine Franc (CFA Franc) was linked to the French Frank. This facilitated France’s investments and trade within the Franc zone, brought stability to African economies, controlled inflation and also gave continuity to French dominance. The CFA Franc acted as enabler as well as a barrier to development of African countries. In fact, the French treasury had a de facto control over the money supply in 14 African states as the central banks of west and central Africa were mostly controlled by France. African states had to put roughly 65 percent amount in operation accounts and additional 20 percent to cover financial liabilities to function as members of the Franc Zone. The CFA Franc facilitated the operations of French multinationals such as Transportation/Construction Company like Bolloré, the giant Franco-Belgian oil firm Total, a telecom related firm Orange as well as nuclear energy related public firms like Compagnie Générale des Matière Nucléaires (COGEMA). As far as key strategic mineral are concerned, France obtained 100 percent uranium, 90 percent bauxite 76 percent manganese 59 percent cobalt from different African countries. The presence of oil firms like Total in the Gulf of Guinea enhanced France’s energy security. By 2016, in terms of investments, China emerged as the top most investor in Africa with roughly $38.46 billion while France came down to the sixth position with merely $ 7.7 billion. Furthermore, during the initial decades after independence France continued to be the principal trading partner of its erstwhile colonies in Africa. In 2016 the trade surplus of France in Sub Saharan Africa was $3.5 billion which was the highest. Over 1100 French business groups with their 2109 subsidiaries were active in Africa in 2019. By now a new set of countries such as the USA, China, India, South Korea, Japan and Turkey etc. are also making inroads into the erstwhile French sphere of influence in Africa. Considering the decline of the overall French presence, President Macron is in the process of reworking economic ties with Africa. In December 2019, Macron characterised CFA Franc as a relic of Franceafrique to be eventually replaced by Eco as 15 African states decided to sign agreement to that effect. The French military dominance in Africa could be perceived in several ways. By 1995, France had signed military agreements with 23 African countries. The Franco-African security architecture primarily was designed to protect French investments, French nationals and reinforce of African peace initiatives. France initially sold military equipment and trained military personnel in French military academies. Through military agreements with African states, it had also ensured that if an existing pro-French regime was in danger due to internal unrest or was toppled, the African rulers could seek French support to reinstall the same.  France also, at different times, has had military bases in countries such as Senegal, Côte d’ Ivoire, Gabon, Central African Republic, Cameroons, Comoros and Djibouti. It needs to be emphasised that there have been more than sixty French military interventions in Africa since the past sixty years. French troops have intervened to reinstall of pro-French regimes (Gabon1964, CAR 1979) and bring stability in the conditions of civil wars (Chad 1960-68). France has had a notorious distinction of selling sophisticated military equipment to apartheid South Africa in the1970s and 1980s, in its turn. France purchased uranium from the South Africa for its nuclear plants. Ostensibly France entered Rwanda to protect the interests of its nationals in Rwandan crisis of 1994. In the process, it got identified with the forces led by Hutus that, in turn, prompted the Rwanda government to accuse France of complicity in genocide. In 2013 in order to prevent its disintegration, France had to intervene in Mali to handle terrorist groups in the north inspired by Islamist ideologies associated with Al Qaeda. Mali is strategically located between the North and West Africa and in its adjacent countries prominent banks like Société Generale, BNP-Paribas and a large number of French companies including Bouygues, Bolloré, Orange SA, Effiage and Total are operating. In fact, France imports uranium from Niger that is essential to generate electricity through nuclear power. After the military intervention in Mali, France deployed roughly 4500 troops as a part of Operation Barkhane to fight terrorism in the Sahel region that encompasses the areas from southern Atlantic to the Red Sea. France is spending roughly 600 million Euros annually to fight terrorism in the region.  Apart from Africa the problems related to terrorism rocked France in Paris (2015) and Nice (2016) as Hollande’s presidential term was ending. The multi-racial French society is currently constrained to fight terrorism in France as well as Africa. While fighting terrorism in Africa, France is also expanding its presence through soft power. For instance, France’s Global Partnership for Education in Senegal involving 200 million Euros and disbursal of 8.5 million Euros through French Development Bank for digital start-ups in Africa are efforts in the same direction. Apart from Francophone Africa, Macron is trying to widen French influence in other parts as well. He visited Nigeria in 2018 to woo the West African oil giant and give a reminder that France is back. Similarly, his ‘charm offensive’ in the countries of the Horn of Africa such as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya also demonstrate France’s urge to surge ahead in the region.  Macron, accompanied representatives of by corporates such as Danone, GE Alstom and Total Group etc, signed $3.4 billion worth of deals with Kenya in March 2019. Briefly, despite the rhetoric of egalitarian partnerships with Francophone African states, Macron will not be able to tamper with intrinsically well led out neo colonial structures that have set the French presence in Africa on the rails. In fact, making such structures as the base France is grappling to expand in the Anglophone countries such as Nigeria and Kenya.
For more arguments, see Harshé, Rajen (2019) Africa in World Affairs Politics of Imperialism, the Cold War and Globalisation (Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge)
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Rajen Harshé

Rajen Harshé

Rajen Harshé is a founder and former Vice Chancellor of the Central University of Allahabad Prayagraj and former President of the G.B. Pant Social Science ...

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