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The Polish presidency strengthened Europe’s security posture, yet failed to break the deadlock on Ukraine’s EU accession and Russian energy dependence.
Image Source: Getty
On 1 July, Poland handed over the presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) to Denmark.
Poland’s EU presidency, which began on January 1, stood out due to its own credentials as a country at the forefront of supporting Ukraine, at a time when Europe’s centre of gravity is shifting eastward. In 2023, Poland was welcomed back into the EU mainstream after Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s win in the parliamentary elections, which ousted the far-right Law and Justice Party (PiS) from power. Coinciding with the start of the EU’s new institutional cycle right after Hungary’s controversial presidency, during which Prime Minister Viktor Orbán visited President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Poland seemed like the ideal country to champion EU priorities against the challenging backdrop of strained transatlantic ties and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
Poland was welcomed back into the EU mainstream after Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s win in the parliamentary elections, which ousted the far-right Law and Justice Party (PiS) from power.
Despite worries that the Polish presidential election in May would pose distractions, Warsaw’s presidency walked the talk by delivering concrete and meaningful results, in tandem with its motto of “Security, Europe!”. During the Polish presidency, the European Commission adopted key initiatives to upgrade European defence capabilities. These include: i) the ReArm Europe plan to leverage €800 billion in defence spending, including funding innovation and startups in the security sector; ii) the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) financial instrument to provide €150 billion for defence procurement; iii) the Eastern Shield system of defence infrastructure to fortify the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank; and iv) the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030, that offers a blueprint for defence action. Today, investing in security is at the heart of the EU’s agenda, with the Polish presidency having firmly anchored the same. In addition, the Commission has offered more flexible fiscal rules for defence spending, which will no longer be included in the EU’s excessive deficit procedure. These initiatives have laid the groundwork for action at the EU level and have lived up to Tusk’s words that the presidency would position the EU for a “political offensive” rather than “mere survival”.
The Polish presidency has also sent a clear signal to the United States (US) about European commitments to NATO and its willingness to shoulder more responsibility for its security. Meanwhile, as a pro-Atlanticist nation, Poland’s efforts to strengthen European defence, not in opposition to, but in complementarity with the US and NATO — may eventually foster a more equal transatlantic dynamic.
With a digital summit held in Gdansk, the Polish presidency also pushed forward the establishment of AI factories, aimed at achieving technological sovereignty and leveraging digital technologies to enhance productivity.
The presidency’s multi-dimensional approach to security also included food, energy, health, economic, and other forms of security. In line with Warsaw’s priority to enhance the bloc’s competitiveness and economic security, the Commission released Omnibus packages aimed at simplifying regulations, easing compliance, and reducing bureaucracy. Notwithstanding the emphasis on external security concerns, including challenges at the EU’s external borders and the weaponisation of migration, tackling the migration issue remains ongoing. The Danish presidency is expected to prioritise. With a digital summit held in Gdansk, the Polish presidency also pushed forward the establishment of AI factories, aimed at achieving technological sovereignty and leveraging digital technologies to enhance productivity.
Under the Polish presidency, the Commission extended its existing sanctions against Russia and also adopted new 16th and 17th packages targeting the Russian economy. However, the proposed 18th package, which included measures against Russian energy exports, did not go through due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia. Even though the Commission has seen successes in its bid to end Russian energy imports by the year 2027 through the RePower EU Roadmap — such as connecting the Baltic nations to the continental European grid — the EU still remains the fourth-largest buyer of Russian energy.
Despite being a major priority of the Polish presidency, the EU enlargement process was unable to move forward. Poland’s goal was to begin formal EU accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova during its term, after the decision on opening membership talks was taken in December 2023. However, this did not materialise due to Budapest’s vetoes.
The European Green Deal has already been diluted in favour of the Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal to increase the bloc’s competitiveness, especially in energy-intensive sectors such as steel and aluminium.
Regarding decarbonisation, there has been ambiguity about the EU’s emissions target for 2040 and its nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris climate agreement. The European Green Deal has already been diluted in favour of the Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal to increase the bloc’s competitiveness, especially in energy-intensive sectors such as steel and aluminium. Moreover, Warsaw has also spearheaded negotiations for a simplified Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which would exempt some companies from reporting obligations.
The NATO summit in The Hague last month, where countries pledged to spend 5 percent of GDP towards defence by 2035. Poland had already set a strong example with its own track record of spending over 4 percent of its GDP on defence. However, getting all EU member states on board—particularly those in Southern Europe with varying threat perceptions—to implement these new security commitments may prove challenging. Spain has already carved out an exemption for itself on defence spending commitments. Thinking creatively on how to engage such countries so that momentum continues across presidencies will be key.
Ultimately, any six-month EU presidency is not only about concrete outcomes but also about broader influence. The Polish presidency has made its mark by helping position the EU as a more serious strategic actor capable of securing and defending itself. It will be up to the Danish presidency to carry forward this momentum.
Shairee Malhotra is the Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shairee Malhotra is Deputy Director - Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. Her areas of work include Indian foreign policy with a focus on ...
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