As India’s interests and influence expand, it needs calibrated economic, symbolic, and military playbooks to deter distant adversaries
The ‘Power Gap’ is a conceptual framework that captures the difference between a country’s actual capabilities and influence and those expected of it, given its ability to mobilise comprehensive national resources—diplomatic, economic, military, and socio-cultural. This gap can be positive or negative, depending on whether a nation overperforms or underperforms relative to a ‘fair’ level. Although India’s Power Gap cannot be calculated definitively, the Lowy Institute’s 2025 Asia Power Index estimates that India has a widening and negative Power Gap. The report suggests that India needs to accelerate efforts in building “defence networks” and “[exercising] influence and leverage through economic interdependencies”. As these capabilities are particularly critical for engaging with distant adversaries, closing the Power Gap is essential for realising India’s strategic objectives and expanding its influence.
The challenge of developing appropriate playbooks for distant adversaries became particularly salient for India after the Pahalgam attack, when Türkiye sent C-130J military transport aircraft to Pakistan and had the TCG Büyükada anti-submarine corvette dock at Karachi port. Media reports also suggested the presence of Turkish military personnel in Pakistan to assist with drone attacks during the 4-day conflict.
This reflects a sustained unilateral policy of aggression from the Turkish government over the last decade, which has included assisting Pakistan with setting up a cyber team to spread disinformation against India as well as arms sales to Islamabad. Türkiye’s close partner, Azerbaijan, has also been drawn in as a junior partner via the ‘Three Brothers Alliance’. Consequently, Baku has stepped up economic engagement with Pakistan and has reportedly signed a deal to purchase JF-17C Block-III fighter jets from Islamabad.
The ‘Mandala Theory’, derived from Kautilya’s Arthashastra, can be applied to this context to inform the strategic choices India can deploy (Figure 1). From India’s perspective, Pakistan occupies the role of the Ari (adversary), Türkiye functions as the Ari-mitra (the adversary’s ally), and Azerbaijan as the Ari-mitra-mitra (the adversary’s ally’s ally), with each position necessitating a distinct set of policy responses.
Source: Author’s own, from ORF, VIF.
The Indian government is seemingly responding to these strategic challenges by ramping up engagement with potential partners in the Asia Minor and South Caucasus region, including Armenia, Cyprus, and Georgia, even though India’s official statements do not explicitly frame this engagement as a counterbalancing act. This engagement has taken the form of increased military sales to Armenia, the recent Prime Ministerial visit to Cyprus, and the felicitation of trade delegations from Cyprus and Georgia. Yet, as India becomes more globally consequential, it will need to develop playbooks to address challenges posed by distant countries that provide military support to its strategic adversaries during periods of conflict. This piece proposes four measures, from least to most escalatory; these range from ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ trade measures to symbolic actions and active military assistance.
As India becomes more globally consequential, it will need to develop playbooks to address challenges posed by distant countries that provide military support to its strategic adversaries during periods of conflict. This piece proposes four measures, from least to most escalatory.
Securing Corridors Through Strategic Connectivity
From American assistance in Europe’s post-war reconstruction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), superpowers have always used connectivity to enhance economic leverage and project power. India, too, has pursued this logic by developing the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with Russia and Iran, along with the West-supported India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) (see caveat[1]). However, the long-term viability of the current INSTC route is questionable, given that a critical section passes through Azerbaijan, which could unilaterally restrict access at any time. Consequently, current efforts to operationalise the INSTC Eastern Corridor through Central Asia are crucial.
These efforts can be paired with developmental assistance on the long-stalled North-South Railway Corridor in Armenia, given India’s experience in constructing railways in harsh mountainous regions. This offers another non-Azerbaijani route to functionalise the INSTC.
However, developmental assistance carries risks, especially given recent signs of rapprochement between Türkiye, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Türkiye’s policy of dvaidhibhava, meaning making peace with one adversary while creating conflict with another, creates significant risks as India could lose access to projects after investing significant capital. India should consider pairing assistance on key connectivity projects with perpetual guarantees of free access, failing which the assistance would convert into loans at non-concessional interest rates.
Trade Diversification as Strategic Leverage
There are two key aspects to trade flow management vis-à-vis Ari-mitra (for example, Türkiye) and Ari-mitra-mitra (for example, Azerbaijan) nations. First, targeted investments and trade facilitation measures can enhance India’s geoeconomic leverage with friendlier nations in their periphery, as well as in regions where these states seek to expand their strategic influence.
Türkiye’s policy of dvaidhibhava, meaning making peace with one adversary while creating conflict with another, creates significant risks as India could lose access to projects after investing significant capital. India should consider pairing assistance on key connectivity projects with perpetual guarantees of free access, failing which the assistance would convert into loans at non-concessional interest rates.
Presently, Türkiye aims to increase its influence in Central Asia through the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). India can avoid ceding strategic space by investing in rare earth production and inking binding long-term supply agreements in Central Asia, modelled on the US-Australia critical minerals agreement. Progress towards an India-EAEU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would also help facilitate trade. Although engagement with Central Asia has historically been constrained by Russian and Chinese zones of influence, stepped-up Indian involvement may align with Russian desires to support a “multipolar Asia” and not cede strategic space to China amidst the Ukraine war. Similarly, India can deepen cooperation on critical minerals and rare-earth mining in Armenia, while expanding imports of platinum, copper ore, and molybdenum from the country.
Second, India should reduce and de-risk exposure to Ari-mitra and Ari-mitra-mitra states. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry should identify trade flows that are most susceptible to weaponisation and systematically re-route them towards partner countries such as Armenia, Georgia, the Central Asian republics, Cyprus, Greece, and the Balkans. For instance, India is Azerbaijan’s fifth-largest export market, running a trade deficit of US$1.04 billion, driven almost entirely by crude oil purchases. India should therefore explore diversification to Central Asian suppliers such as Kazakhstan, a major crude oil exporter, while separately expanding engagement with Turkmenistan on natural gas imports. In addition, lower-priority goods, including India’s large purchases of agricultural products (for example, citrus, figs, and apples), can be diversified towards proximate alternative suppliers like Cyprus and Greece.
Investments and trade diversions should prioritise states and sectors where India can substantially influence economic outcomes in host countries. Implementing these changes would require a slew of policy measures: active facilitation of expanded trade with prospective strategic partners through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; sustained communication with domestic trade and producer bodies to emphasise the need for trade realignment in the national interest; and informal ‘nudges’, including slowing down or speeding up approvals at ports and airports, as appropriate.
India should reduce and de-risk exposure to Ari-mitra and Ari-mitra-mitra states. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry should identify trade flows that are most susceptible to weaponisation and systematically re-route them towards partner countries such as Armenia, Georgia, the Central Asian republics, Cyprus, Greece, and the Balkans.
Policy communication and coordination with relevant partners, such as Greece, Israel, and Russia, which share similar strategic concerns, could act as force multipliers for trade diversions and support joint investments in potential Mitra nations. Each of these countries is engaged in geopolitical contestation with Türkiye—Greece has a long history of military conflict and communal tensions with Ankara, while Russia and Israel are increasingly motivated not to cede strategic space and influence in the Middle East and South Caucasus to another power.
‘Hard’ trade and geoeconomic measures offer a further escalatory step—one with which India has prior experience. Even before the Galwan clash, New Delhi signalled a willingness to leverage economic tools through measures such as Press Note 3 (2020), issued in April 2020, which restricted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from countries sharing a land border with India. These were subsequently reinforced through product bans, visa restrictions, and tax investigations in the months following the clash. Although such extensive measures may not be warranted in the present case, India could institute a formal policy designation for nations that materially assist its adversaries during military conflicts. Such a designation would enable the systematic application of restrictions, particularly on domestic investments originating from these countries. Instead of ad hoc measures such as the abrupt cancellation of Çelebi Aviation’s contracts, these designated states could be barred from investments and contracts in specified sensitive sectors—and face stringent restrictions on broadly defined dual-use exports. The latter step is particularly important, given unconfirmed media reports suggesting that Indian equipment may have been used in Turkish military drones.
Although symbolic measures are often given short shrift in public discourse, they can have a significant impact when directed at core questions of national identity and conflict. In Asia Minor and the South Caucasus, India has so far refrained from officially recognising events such as the ethnic cleansing of Greeks (1915-23), the Sayfo (1914-15), and the Armenian genocide (1915-16), a position largely driven by diplomatic caution. However, in response to further aggression, formally discussing and recognising these events through the Indian Parliament could serve as an effective retaliatory signal. Policymakers should nonetheless remain mindful of the irreversibility of such actions.
India could institute a formal policy designation for nations that materially assist its adversaries during military conflicts. Such a designation would enable the systematic application of restrictions, particularly on domestic investments originating from these countries.
Finally, active military assistance represents the most escalatory step, enabling India to build defence relationships and project power far from its shores through the territory of Mitra and Mitra-Mitra nations. This approach goes beyond conventional defence exports, which typically involve downgraded platforms and are constrained by concerns over espionage and reverse engineering, as seen in Armenia. Instead, India could draw on the American model by stationing advanced military equipment in countries proximate to strategic adversaries while retaining strict safeguards, including direct Indian operational control. These deployments could include defensive or offensive equipment, such as air-defence systems or the Brahmos missile system, paired with surveillance equipment to gather data on the surrounding terrain, seabed, and airspace. This strategy would strengthen deterrence and power projection while minimising the risk of sensitive Indian technologies being accessed or compromised by adversaries.
As India’s global influence grows, it must expand its strategic calculus and develop structured playbooks to engage distant adversaries and proactively manage the escalation ladder. Each of the discussed measures carries distinct costs—for instance, symbolic measures are irreversible, while foreign deployments will place additional pressures on the defence budget. Furthermore, not all of these measures are warranted at present. Nevertheless, they merit serious deliberation and a planned implementation framework, so they can be deployed rapidly in a mission-ready manner when required.
Pulkit Athavle is an Economics undergraduate at the University of Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
[1]Despite India’s efforts, broader events in the Middle East, the need to collaborate between many different countries, and the capital- and time-intensive nature of infrastructure investments means that the progress on these projects will be gradual. This has particularly held back the IMEC, as its announcement was followed by the Gaza conflict, the Israel-Iran conflict, and UAE-Saudi tensions.
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Pulkit Athavle is an Economics undergraduate at the University of Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. ...
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