Despite the effective execution of the Kursk incursion, it did not yield the results Ukraine foresaw
Image Source: Getty
On 24 February 2022, Russian forces crossed the Sumy and Chernihiv regions of Ukraine and entered Pripyat from Belarus. (see Figure 1). The initial assessment of the Russian commanders was that Russia would take control of Ukraine in 10 days. Despite the odds, Ukraine re-configured its forces and adopted the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) practices in its operations since the conflict in Donbas in 2014. Other factors, such as familiarity with the terrain and better intelligence networks, helped Ukrainians push Russian forces back from Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv. Russian forces achieved some gains in the early days by seizing southern Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. The Russian offensive was slowed down because of an initial shortage of manpower. Ukrainian forces outnumbered Russian forces, having implemented a general mobilisation across Ukraine on the day of the invasion. Further, Kyiv’s capabilities were bolstered by Western support in the form of weapons and intelligence. For instance, Space X’ universal internet service, Starlink, was provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), enabling troops to share real-time data anywhere combined with high-precision weapons such as the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers (see Table 1). This helped Ukraine gain the tactical edge early on in the conflict. Three months into the war, in May 2022, the US Congress also passed the Lend-Lease Act for Kyiv, which granted Ukraine access to American weapons.
Ukrainian forces outnumbered Russian forces, having implemented a general mobilisation across Ukraine on the day of the invasion.
As a result of Western assistance, Russia withdrew from Kherson city, fearing their supply lines being cut off due to Ukrainian bombings of the trans-Dnieper bridges, which was a major victory for Kyiv. The West increased military aid to Ukraine in the form of tanks. Additional units were created and troops were replenished. Kyiv could have inflicted maximum damage on Russian forces during this period, but it missed the opportunity to begin its offensive from Zaporizhzhia to the Sea of Azov to cut Russia’s access in Kherson or continue its offensive in Luhansk. The reason for not doing so was likely Washington's hesitation regarding Ukraine’s capabilities to undertake such an operation.
Figure:1 Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and main Russian manoeuvre axes as of 27 February 2022
Table 1: Major weapons supplied to Ukraine
| Weapon | Country that supplied/will supply | Year and Month Supplied |
| Bayraktar TB-2 drones | Türkiye | Supplying to Ukraine since 2019 |
| Switchblade drones | United States | Since May, 2022 |
| Stinger Missiles | United States | Since March 2022 |
| AT-4 Portable anti-tank weapons | United States | |
| NLAW-Light anti-tank weapon missiles | United Kingdom | Since March 2022 |
| MGM-140 ATACMS tactical missile system | United States | Since |
| F-16 fighter jets | Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, | |
| High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) | United States | Since June 2022 |
| Patriot Missile systems | United States | |
| FGM-148 anti-tank missile- Javelin | United States | Since March, 2022 |
| Storm shadow missile | United States | |
| MiG-29 | Poland, North Macedonia, and Slovakia | |
| DPICM cluster munition | United States |
Source: Authors own research
The Ukrainian forces delayed the launch of their offensive in early 2023 awaiting weapons deliveries from the West. On 8 June, Ukraine finally launched their offensive in the direction of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. Ukraine’s delay in launching its offensive resulted in Russia recovering and consolidating its gains further. Russian satellites could track and counter Ukrainian forces' movement. The Russian armed forces began building a network of field positions and fortifications and added more troops. Further, Russian forces were able to make some gains in Soledar and Bakhmut, and by July, after the Wagner mutiny, Moscow began their offensive towards Kupiansk.
A key reason for the difficulty in making territorial gains by both sides is due to technological advances. The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and First Person View (FPV) drones and surveillance of the frontline rendered traditional approaches ineffective, as amassing troops at a single point would expose them to drone attacks. Drones have been the game changer in this conflict. In some instances, drone operators reported more enemy fatalities than artillery. Drones are marginally cheaper and easily deployable, and they have come to aid both sides. Moscow was able to turn the tide with the help of drones; the Russian forces began to advance in 2023-2024, capturing Avdivika and then pushing towards Kupiyansk in Lugansk. Ukraine, in response, increased its drone attacks inside Russia, targeting energy infrastructure such as oil processing facilities and military facilities.
Russian satellites could track and counter Ukrainian forces' movement. The Russian armed forces began building a network of field positions and fortifications and added more troops.
Yet Russian forces were able to make gains with their ‘multiple cuts’ strategy deploying forces across the conflict line limiting Ukraine’s options. However, with the US$61 billion aid package announced in May 2024 and Ukraine securing permission from the US to use the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), Kyiv continued cross-border strikes and attacked two early warning nuclear radar stations in Krasnodar and Orsk.
On 6 August 2024, Ukrainian troops crossed into Kursk and later into the Belgorod region. Moscow declared a state of emergency in Kursk a day after the incursion and later in Belgorod as Russia began deploying troops to counter the Ukrainian forces. Kyiv’s advance broke the momentum of the Russian armed forces early this year. Ukrainian General Oleksandr Syrskyi’s tactful move has resulted in Russia repositioning itself to manage a two-front challenge in Eastern Ukraine and its territory. The Ukrainian advance was to consolidate as much territory as possible before entering peace talks.
As Russia advanced Westward, Ukrainian forces moved in from Sumy, where the Russian border is covered by vast forests, camouflaging armed formations near the border with Kursk. (See Fig 1.4). Ukrainian forces exploited the gaps and preserved the element of surprise till the very end. At the end of the first week of the incursion, Ukraine seized control of a Sudzha, which is a crucial hub for the transit of Russian natural gas to Europe and reportedly blew up three key bridges over the Seim River, cutting off Russia’s supply lines. The calculations of this incursion were likely to force Russia to the negotiating table, create a buffer zone, and shift the focus of the conflict from Eastern Ukraine to Western Russia to relieve the pressure of Ukrainian forces fighting in Eastern Ukraine. In response, Moscow announced the establishment of troop groups in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod Oblasts to defend settlements along the border with Ukraine. Russian forces began the construction of defensive lines and fortifications near Lgov and Kursk Oblast and were able to slow down the Ukrainian advance. In September, Russia launched a counter-attack regaining control of several settlements in the Kursk region.
Russian forces began the construction of defensive lines and fortifications near Lgov and Kursk Oblast and were able to slow down the Ukrainian advance.
However, contrary to the expectations of Ukrainian commanders, the Russian advance in Eastern Ukraine did not slow down nor were the Russian troops fighting in Donetsk re-directed to Kursk. Rather, Russian forces have made considerable gains reaching the gates of Pokrovsk city and successfully encircling the city of Vuhleder, both in Donetsk. The speed of the Russian advance and its quick recovery from the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk has limited options for Ukrainian forces.
Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and main Russian Manoeuvre axes as of 18 February 2024
Source: Institute for the Study of War: Russian Offensive Campaign assessment
Fig 1.3: Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and main Russian Manoeuvre axes as of August 07, 2024
Source: Institute for the Study of War
As NATO countries deliberate on giving consent to Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia, the Kursk incursion, despite effective execution, has not yielded the results Ukraine foresaw. The coming months are crucial, as the elections in the United States could be the biggest determinant of the conflict.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant with the Observer Research Foundation
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia's domestic politics and economy, Russia's grand strategy, and India-Russia ...
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Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. Kartik specialises in space military issues and his research is primarily centred on the ...
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