EU leaders at India’s Republic Day signal a strategic turn in New Delhi–Brussels ties
For the first time, the Republic Day celebrations may not host a single head of state. The invitation extends to Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and António Costa, President of the European Council, marking the culmination of a year of momentum in EU–India relations. It began with the unprecedented visit of the College of Commissioners to New Delhi in February 2025— the Commission’s first official visit outside of Europe.
The Commission’s visit provided an impetus to fast-track the signature of the EU–India Free Trade Agreement (FTA), whose negotiations resumed in 2022 after nearly a decade of stagnation. The deadline to conclude the deal by the end of 2025 was missed. The accelerated pace of the talks may result in a more limited agreement, shaped by political imperatives and the need to have it as a deliverable for the EU-India summit of 27th January. Some sensitive issues, particularly those related to agriculture, are likely to be overlooked. Even if the outcome appears to be more strategic than commercially ambitious, it nonetheless has the potential to place the two economic blocs on a closer partnership trajectory. The EU is India’s second-largest trading partner, while India ranks as the EU’s largest trading partner among the Global South.
The Commission’s visit provided an impetus to fast-track the signature of the EU–India Free Trade Agreement (FTA), whose negotiations resumed in 2022 after nearly a decade of stagnation.
Looking beyond trade, this new dynamism in the EU–India relationship is due to shifts in US foreign policy under the Trump administration, which have prioritised unilateral action and have adopted amore confrontational posture towards both its European allies and India. This underscores the desire for New Delhi and Brussels to coordinate more closely as the US and China are seen by both as systemic rivals. In a multipolar and multi-aligned world, this EU-India partnership could pave the way for new models of partnership, grounded in mutual, predictable, and stable relations.
Nonetheless, for that cooperation to bear fruit, both actors need to outline their core interests and priorities. India and the EU's diverging approach to Russia almost derailed the launch of the strategic agenda last September, coinciding with Exercise Zapad. However, ties were further strengthened less than two months later when the EU-India foreign policy and security consultations were held in Brussels, with both sides reaffirming their desire to secure lasting peace in Ukraine. Lastly, the visit of President Vladimir Putin to New Delhi earlier in December reassured Brussels, as no major deals and strategic agreements were concluded, highlighting the largely symbolic nature of the visit.
The fact that the two entities are looking towards a long-lasting partnership is evident in the focus of the New EU–India Strategic Agenda, unveiled on 17 September 2025. It lists key areas of cooperation in the years to come, arranged around five pillars: sustainability, technology and innovation, connectivity, security and defence, and enablers. This ambitious agenda is expected to be formally adopted during the EU–India leaders’summit coinciding with the Republic Day visit. With such a clearly defined set of objectives, the path ahead looks promising, albeit arduous.
In the technological field, the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) announced in 2022 will need to be strengthened and recalibrated if it isto succeed along the lines of the India-United States (US) Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET If elevated tothe leaders’ level, the TTC could accelatre key components of the strategic relations—particularly in areas such as Digital Public Infrastructures (DPI), critical minerals and supply chain, and green energy. This could helpboth the EU and India manage dependencies in energy and critical minerals, areas where major powers such as the US and China exert significant influence. Furthermore, there is considerable scopein security cooperation. Coordination in the maritime domain has already begun, notably through a joint exercise conducted in the Indian Ocean in June 2025 between EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the Indian Navy. These efforts could be enhanced and systematised to respond to the regional security challenges, including piracy, illegal fishing, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).
A formal bilateral defence and security partnership, modelled on EU–Türkiye and EU–South Korea, could ease access to EU and Indian defence industrial bases.
Looking ahead, a formal bilateral defence and security partnership, modelled on EU–Türkiye and EU–South Korea, could ease access to EU and Indian defence industrial bases. This, in turn, could enable co-production and co-development of key components in both territories, building on synergies already established with key defence players such as HAL, Safran, Airbus, and L&T. This would allow Indian access to SAFE funds[1] to support EU defence requirements, notably in ammunition meant for Ukraine. This could incentivise Indian defence manufacturers to set up plants in the EU, encouraging enhancedtechnology transfer between the EU’s defence firms and their Indian counterparts—a step that appears increasingly plausible in light of recent announcements.
In the diplomatic sphere, India and the EU may be well placed to bridge the divide between the Global South and the Global North and offer an alternative model of cooperation, eschewing the US–China antagonism. In that light, both blocs appear positioned as potential stabilising anchors in an era of growing rivalries and adversarial relations. This stability is further reinforcedby the democratic nature of both entities at a time of heightened global uncertainty.
The EU and India must find new avenues of engagement to enhance people-to-people exchanges. While strategic ties have been supported by a growing number of high-level Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues, more needs to be accomplished with regard to migration and mobility.
In the diplomatic sphere, India and the EU may be well placed to bridge the divide between the Global South and the Global North and offer an alternative model of cooperation, eschewing the US–China antagonism.
Although the two entities signed the Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility (CAMM) in 2016, the number of Indian nationals in the EU—sstanding today at less than a million—is lower than the corresponding figure for Australia, despite Australia’s significantly smaller population EU member states need to do more to attract students and skiled professionalsfrom India, including by easing visa rules and making their long-term stay more viable. In that regard, proposals emerging from the EU-India High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Mobility—such as the creation of an EU legal gateway office in India to facilitate ICT-related mobility—mark a constructive step forward.
As changes in US migration policy affect pathways for skilled mobility, much could be achieved through expanding the EU Blue Card programme, particularly in light of recent constraints affecting the US Green Card and H-1B initiatives.
Guillaume Gandelin is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
[1] Mandating a 65 percent share of components being made in the EU
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Guillaume Gandelin is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation. His research focuses on the India-EU and India-France security and defence ...
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