Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Mar 30, 2026

The US move to classify fentanyl as a WMD has sparked controversy, raising concerns around legality, human rights, and global norms

Escalating Maritime Tensions: When Fentanyl Becomes a “Chemical Weapon”

In December 2025, the United States (US) government issued a new directive labelling fentanyl and its precursors as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), a status accorded only to nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare agents. This Executive Order requires that proper counter-terrorism responses be used to restrict fentanyl trafficking, such as tougher prosecutions, financial sanctions and broader intelligence efforts targeting fentanyl trafficking groups.

Following this order, the US military has conducted a series of deadly strikes against vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean suspected of carrying drugs, which can be traced, in part, to a classified legal memo issued by the Office of Legal Counsel within the United States Department of Justice. This memo reportedly puts the trafficking groups, as well as the boats, within the parameters of legal justification for a military strike.

The US military has conducted a series of deadly strikes against vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean suspected of carrying drugs, which can be traced.

This sequence of policy changes, from the rhetorical sanctification of fentanyl to “chemical weapon” status through to naval strikes with deadly effects, portends a fundamental shift in the manner in which the US perceives the narcotics issue and its impact on national security.

Maritime Strikes Under a Contested Legal Framework

Since the directive, the US has faced criticism for unilaterally classifying fentanyl as a chemical weapon, without global agreement, thus restricting punitive responses only to the US for fentanyl trafficking. This limits action from other countries or parties, thus posing a threat to global non-proliferation. The WMD arsenal, before this, included materials that pose mass injury in theatres of war or terror attacks, such as Sarin or anthrax, and not those trafficked to drug addicts. Fentanyl accounts for over 60 percent of overdose deaths in the US. Officials, between 2021–2024, have captured nearly 130,000 pounds of illicit fentanyl, 327,000 pounds of fentanyl precursor chemicals and 9,900 pieces of equipment required to produce the drug. The lethal potency of fentanyl, is indisputable in scientific terms, even at minimal concentrations. This mixes various spheres of public health, crime, and national security in terms of legal attribution.

The WMD arsenal, before this, included materials that pose mass injury in theatres of war or terror attacks, such as Sarin or anthrax, and not those trafficked to drug addicts.

Since September 2025, the US military has conducted at least nine lethal strikes against vessels in the Caribbean Sea, Pacific Ocean, and other international waters, claiming they were against drug trafficking, particularly with links to cartel operations. The Associated Press has reported and mapped dozens of deaths during these attacks. While US authorities have tried to placate the public by linking these activities to a greater campaign against “narco-terrorists” and maintain that normal law-enforcement interdiction has failed to stop the lethal synthetic drugs from flowing, reports have been made by US authorities themselves that have also countered such claims, with record-breaking cocaine seizures, without attributing the drug to a WMD-level threat.

There have been accusations made on a secret legal memo from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel that gives the basis for the rationale, including the idea that US forces are justified in lethal strikes against vessels associated with trafficking because of the harm illegal drugs cause and the designation of certain cartels as terrorist organisations. The full text of such a memorandum has not been publicly released, and civil liberties organisations have sued to force its disclosure.

Legal Ambiguity and International Law Concerns

Human Rights Watch has stated that the predatorily targeted lethal strike at sea against suspected smugglers cannot be justified under international law or the law of armed conflict when there is no real threat, and merely engaging in narcotics trafficking is not considered an armed conflict. This has also been reiterated by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who has urged a halt to such attacks, stating they violate international principles regarding the use of force and protection of civilians. Additionally, such critics have highlighted that nation-states are, in general, barred from using force against ships on the high seas except in self-defence or with the specific authorisation of the Security Council, neither of which is applicable in cases of drug smuggling. In this respect, widening the definition of “armed conflict” to cover drug cartels or drug smugglers would establish an unhealthy precedent of conflating the enforcement of criminal law with the use of military force.

Redefinition of Drug Policy: A Threat or a Requirement

In making fentanyl a WMD and advocating lethal naval strikes on alleged traffickers, the government has reframed what was a public health and law enforcement issue into a security and terrorism one. This new definition has important implications, ranging from appropriations to global collaboration on drug enforcement and public health. In moving beyond the current role of using military power in areas under the domain of law enforcement and maritime partnership, profoundly complex issues arise regarding what constitutes a legal standard. This, regarding a state unleashing lethal power against suspected traffickers without imminent danger, being used in the future to support using military power against civilian ships for dubious reasons, can pose a calamitous threat.

The lack of transparency regarding the legal basis for boat strikes, as well as the administration's failure to share the memo, has led to a legal battle by civil liberties groups asserting the need for the public to know the process underlying the use of deadly force.

The lack of transparency regarding the legal basis for boat strikes, as well as the administration's failure to share the memo, has led to a legal battle by civil liberties groups asserting the need for the public to know the process underlying the use of deadly force. The lack of this process has left the prisoners, as well as the survivors, in limbo, since they do not know whether they are suspects in war, terrorists, or defendants. The conflict around such practices has also raised concerns among allies and regional governments. It has been observed that such practices of viewing drug trafficking in narcotics as a reason for the use of military force internationally have challenged the long-term partnership frameworks in Central and South America that are formulated through interdiction, prosecution, and a health-focused strategy.

Conclusion

The recent move by the US is a controversial one, which seems only to justify sea-based strikes against the suspected drug-smuggling ships rather than actually target drug smuggling. The legal implications have been strongly disputed, and international human rights organisations have strongly denounced the strikes for the aspect of unauthorised execution.

The militarisation of fentanyl and the exercise of this force have obscured the distinction between the enforcement of criminal law, health policies, and the use of military power. It has produced profound and abiding implications for a wide range of constituencies and multiple regimes of international law. Whether this pattern sees wider, and perhaps successful, imitation among other governments, and challenges to judicial and institutional vindication of constraint and delimitation, will help decide how future challenges and threats from drugs, through to the new and unconventional, will be met.


Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.

Author

Shravishtha Ajaykumar

Shravishtha Ajaykumar

Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology. Her research areas include Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) strategy ...

Read More +