Somalia risks becoming the next battleground as tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over the GERD escalate, intertwining local conflict with a wider geopolitical rivalry.
For several years, multiple external actors—including the United States (US)—have engaged in kinetic counterterrorism activities in Somalia to improve its security situation. Yet, both the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Shabaab have been expanding their footprint in various parts of the country. As if that was not enough, Somalia now appears to be intertwined/embroiled in the geopolitical rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia, two regional powers entrenched in a protracted dispute over the control of the Nile River waters.
Egypt’s decision to contribute troops to the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) should ideally help Somalia fight these terrorist groups better. However, what may actually transpire on the ground is the intensification of external involvement in Somalia’s internal affairs, potentially transforming localised conflicts into regional proxy confrontations.
The intensification of external involvement in Somalia’s internal affairs, potentially transforming localised conflicts into regional proxy confrontations.
The military deployment in Somalia is part of Egypt’s contributions to the AU mission and bilateral commitment to support the Somali Federal Government (SFG) in combating al-Shabaab insurgency. Following months of discussions and talks with Somali officials, the AU Peace and Security Council formally approved the Egyptian troops as part of AUSSOM. The approval followed bilateral military cooperation between Egypt and the SFG, including defence agreements that paved the way for deploying nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops, half assigned to AUSSOM and the other half as bilateral.
The current arrangement stipulates that the AUSSOM will deploy 11,900 personnel in Somalia, comprising soldiers, police, and civilian staff. Uganda will contribute 4,500 troops, Ethiopia 2,500, Djibouti 1,520, Kenya 1,410, and Egypt will be allowed only 1,091.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has been a point of contention in Egypt-Ethiopia relations for over a decade. Egypt views the dam as an existential threat to its Nile water supply, which supports 90 percent of its population’s agricultural, drinking, and electricity needs. Ethiopia, by contrast, considers the dam essential for its economic development and energy security. Diplomatic negotiations over the dam have repeatedly failed, with Egypt accusing Ethiopia of unilaterally filling and operating the dam. Tensions escalated in August 2025 following Egypt’s declaration that the negotiation process had collapsed, bringing a close to 12 years of negotiations. Subsequently, Egypt vowed to take decisive measures to safeguard its water security, leaving nothing for interpretation. Despite the row, Ethiopia inaugurated the dam on 9 September, raising the fear of another regional imbroglio. While Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed called it “the greatest achievement in the history of the black race”, for Egypt, the dam represents a threat to its existential interest,
Against this backdrop, Egypt’s military presence in Somalia is strategically significant, particularly in regions bordering Ethiopia. Egyptian troops are expected to deploy in areas such as Gedo, Hiraan, and Lower Shabelle, where Ethiopian forces already maintain a strong presence, through AU mandates or bilateral arrangements with Somali authorities. Although in theory, Egypt would replace Djiboutian or Kenyan troops, the presence of both Egyptian and Ethiopian forces in Gedo and Hiraan raises the risk of confrontation. Ethiopia is wary of Egyptian deployments near its border and has warned against Egypt’s military presence in Somalia.
Figure: Different Regions of Somalia (Map)
Source: https://proyectoviajero.com/mapas-de-somalia/
In fact, Somalia’s ties with Ethiopia have also been strained since early 2024. Furthermore, Egypt-Somalia relations have benefited significantly from their shared animosity toward Ethiopia. In January 2024, landlocked Ethiopia signed a contentious agreement with Somaliland, a semi-autonomous region of Somalia, to gain access to the Red Sea.
In exchange, Ethiopia agreed to recognise Somaliland’s independence. Mogadishu condemned the deal as violating its sovereignty, dismissed Ethiopia from the AU mission, and expanded defence ties with Egypt and Türkiye. Although a brief détente was achieved by the end of 2024 as Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Türkiye-brokered Ankara Declaration, underlying tensions persist, akin to a tinderbox.
Furthermore, the SFG is also leveraging its alliance with Egypt to reassert control over another semi-autonomous region, Jubaland. Clashes between the SFG and Jubaland forces renewed in July 2025, centred on Beled Hawo in Gedo, a strategic border area previously contested by both sides.
The controversial re-election of Ahmed Mohamed Islam, popularly known as Madobe, in 2024’s contentious indirect polls in Jubaland has intensified tensions between the two countries. In response, Mogadishu imposed a severe economic and air blockade on Jubaland, intensifying political unrest and isolation. There is a growing speculation that the SFG could enlist Egyptian support to unseat the existing Jubaland administration, potentially replacing it with a more loyal and cooperative leadership.
The country faces alarming prospects of becoming a collateral casualty of regional power struggles, as the Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry spills over its border.
Complicating matters further, Ethiopia maintains strong ties with key regional actors—particularly in Jubaland and South West State—which raises the spectre of a proxy conflict. Ethiopia is keen to maintain stability in Jubaland. Additionally, Ethiopian troops in Jubaland have helped contain al-Shabaab. However, if local forces aligned with Addis Ababa come into confrontation with the SFG troops, as most armed groups in these areas remain loyal to clan-based structures rather than federal authority, that would create more instability in the region.
These developments highlight the rising geopolitical stakes in the region, underscoring the growing likelihood that Somalia could become a proxy battleground in the intensifying rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia. The intertwinning of internal fragmentation and external interference presents a serious threat to Somalia. Instead of reaping the benefits of enhanced international support, the country faces alarming prospects of becoming a collateral casualty of regional power struggles, as the Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry spills over its border.
Ultimately, the stability of the Horn of Africa hinges on the restraint and strategic foresight of its key actors. For Egypt and Ethiopia, it is essential to move beyond zero-sum calculations and embrace cooperative mechanisms. Failure to do so will likely prolong volatility in Somalia, reverberating beyond the Horn and perpetuating cycles of insecurity with regional and potentially global implications.
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing ...
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