Early Signals from Takaichi’s First Week: Navigating ASEAN and the US

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s first full week in office opened with an ASEAN summit visit and was capped by a high-profile meeting with US President Donald Trump, an unusually front-loaded diplomatic debut. Both are significant for Tokyo’s bilateral anchor (the US) and for the networked, multilateral pillar of Japan’s foreign policy (ASEAN) simultaneously. The optics and early outcomes signal continuity in the security relationship with Washington, even as Takaichi attempts to stitch that alliance into a broader, Asia-wide agenda that foregrounds supply-chain resilience, maritime security, and a more proactive Japanese posture.

The ASEAN summit was Prime Minister Takaichi’s first diplomatic engagement after taking office. Japan’s approach has long been to combine hard security ties with deep economic and normative engagement across Southeast Asia. Takaichi’s outreach at the ASEAN summit — stressing maritime security, infrastructure, AI cooperation, and economic connectivity — is therefore not a rhetorical afterthought but a strategic necessity as the ASEAN anchors Tokyo’s vision of a stable, rules-based Indo-Pacific through inclusive and networked engagement. The country is deepening its engagement through a combination of capacity-building, defence equipment transfers, and institutional cooperation, notably via its recent Official Security Assistance (OSA) programme, which supplies ASEAN partners with coastal radars, maritime surveillance platforms, and non-lethal security aid.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s first full week in office opened with an ASEAN summit visit and was capped by a high-profile meeting with US President Donald Trump, an unusually front-loaded diplomatic debut.

However, there are limits and tensions. ASEAN is heterogeneous, with member states balancing economic ties with China against security ties with external powers, and many are wary of being compelled into binaries. Takaichi’s harder line on maritime coercion and emphasis on defence linkages may risk alienating ASEAN constituencies that prefer economic hedging and non-alignment. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that many ASEAN countries have become more vocal vis-à-vis China’s maritime assertions in the South China Sea. There are also complementary opportunities. The rare-earths agreement signed with the US during Trump’s visit intersects directly with ASEAN interests such as supply-chain diversification and industrial resilience, which are shared priorities across Southeast Asia, and Japan can offer investments and capacity-building that make networked security more attractive. Tokyo’s ability to translate high-level security pledges into concrete initiatives such as supply-chain projects, joint research and development (R&D), and port and maritime domain awareness investments will be critical. Equally significant will be its diplomatic outreach, which lowers the reputational cost for ASEAN states to cooperate with a ‘balancing’ actor. These elements together will determine whether Takaichi’s networked security rhetoric yields durable partnerships — a delicate balancing act.

In her meeting with Trump, the two leaders proclaimed a “new golden age” of the US-Japan alliance, underscoring mutual commitment to deepening both security and economic ties. For the alliance partners, the meeting accomplishes three objectives. First, it reaffirms the alliance’s centrality as Japan’s security anchor at a moment of regional uncertainty. The Tokyo meeting produced concrete cooperation on critical minerals and security pledges, signalling reciprocal willingness to deepen operational and economic ties. That matters because material cooperation (through further investments, rare-earths supply chains, liquefied natural gas, power generation, defence industrial links) cements political goodwill in a way that rhetoric alone does not. Second, it helps stabilise a potentially fractious early-term domestic landscape in Tokyo by projecting an image of international acceptance and support for the new premier, offering a short-term political boost that mitigates immediate coalition risks. Third, the encounter with a US president who prizes transactional leverage sets the tone for future engagement. Takaichi’s overtures — and reported pledges on purchases and defence spending — show that Tokyo is willing to operationalise burden-sharing and economic reciprocity. At the same time, they also expose Japan to the risks of a more transactional US posture, where abrupt policy shifts in Washington could compel Tokyo into a reactive stance.

In her meeting with Trump, the two leaders proclaimed a “new golden age” of the US-Japan alliance, underscoring mutual commitment to deepening both security and economic ties.

Perceptions of the alliance’s health within Japan are not uniform. Among governing elites, particularly the LDP hawks and coalition partners who backed Takaichi, the summit is a validation, as it strengthens her platform of accelerated defence-oriented development, closer defence industrial ties, and a proactive role in regional deterrence. These factions see a reinforced bilateral relationship as political capital for both domestic defence reform and a more muscular regional posture. Conversely, the public sentiment is more ambivalent. Early polling after rapid leadership changes traditionally shows a public that is sensitive to near-term economic and social issues. While an improved show of strength with the US can reassure voters about external threats, it may also alarm constituencies wary of heightened security commitments or of a diplomacy that appears to trade economic concessions for security guarantees. Takaichi’s conservative pedigree, combined with the symbolic weight of her being Japan’s first female prime minister and her hawkish policy agenda, is therefore likely to evoke both praise and scepticism across different voter blocs.

The immediate diplomatic choreography also reveals Tokyo’s strategic calculation: deepen the US alliance to preserve deterrence and interoperability, while simultaneously expanding multilateral economic and technological linkages across Asia. This is sensible but operationally demanding. It requires synchronising defence industrial policy with development finance, aligning export controls with capacity building in partner states, and calibrating messaging so that ASEAN partners do not feel coerced into choosing sides. While Takaichi’s first week shows willingness to pursue that integrated path, execution will be the test.

The immediate diplomatic choreography also reveals Tokyo’s strategic calculation: deepen the US alliance to preserve deterrence and interoperability, while simultaneously expanding multilateral economic and technological linkages across Asia.

Takaichi’s early gains are primarily political and symbolic — anchored in a successful summit and a major bilateral visit that yielded concrete agreements. These are valuable, especially for a new leader with a fragile coalition. Yet, Tokyo must manage the corresponding domestic expectations, particularly rallying support for higher defence spending and sharper China rhetoric, both of which require careful framing to maintain public backing. Tokyo must also continue to calibrate ties with Washington to extract strategic gains without becoming hostage to short-term US transactionalism.

Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• Neighbourhood
• East Asia
• female prime minister Japan
• japan asean relations
• Japan first female Prime Minister
• japan iron lady
• Sanae Takaichi

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