The Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict has escalated towards a near-war despite a fragile mediated truce, driven by TTP tensions and deepening mistrust that increasingly impede resolution
On 18 March 2026, Pakistan and Afghanistan called a temporary truce in their month-long hostilities, suspending operations following mediation by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Türkiye on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr. In announcing the pause, both sides added a caveat, stating that they would respond to any violation of their sovereignty during the interim period. While Kabul did not specify the duration of the pause in hostilities, Pakistan stated that it would be in effect from midnight on 18 March until midnight on 23 March. Despite this agreement, reports emerged of Pakistan violating the ceasefire along the border on 19 March 2026, according to the Islamic Emirate’s Ministry of Defence. The Taliban did not respond to the alleged attacks, thereby keeping the truce in place, while Pakistan denied the accusations. This underscores the fragility of any surface-level understanding between the two countries and the tenuous nature of their relationship.
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 and the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate, bilateral relations with Pakistan have deteriorated sharply. The initial optimism in 2021 about a cooperative and strategically aligned relationship has now eroded into a ‘near-war’ situation. The current phase of fighting shows both sides refusing to back down or offer concessions, with hardened positions making the underlying conflict increasingly difficult to resolve.
The initial optimism in 2021 about a cooperative and strategically aligned relationship has now eroded into a ‘near-war’ situation.
Since the launch of Operation Ghazab Lil-Haq by Pakistan and the Emirate’s ‘Radd al-Zulm’ response, the two sides have been exchanging artillery fire, ground-level attacks, air strikes and drone strikes, targeting critical military infrastructure. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), 76 civilians have been killed and 213 injured between February 16 and March 17. The attack on Omid Hospital in Kabul significantly increased the number of casualties. With an estimated 800–850 people present at the facility on the day of the attack, sources report varying figures—from over 400 deaths, according to the Taliban’s public health authorities, to around 200 killed, based on an investigation by Amu TV. The attack has drawn widespread condemnation, with India also criticising Pakistan for violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty.
Officials in Islamabad have maintained their initial position that the strikes were precision attacks on military infrastructure. According to the Pakistani Information Ministry, the site of the attack was a former US military base, Camp Phoenix. The timing of the temporary truce raises critical questions as to whether external mediators succeeded in persuading Pakistan to step back, even if temporarily, in response to the backlash over civilian casualties, or whether Afghanistan was compelled to reassess the costs of a prolonged conflict with no clear end in sight. Irrespective of the answers, the conflict has now expanded from one involving the TTP and Pakistan to a confrontation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, raising regional risks and marking a potential turning point in their bilateral relationship.
Since the launch of Operation Ghazab Lil-Haq by Pakistan and the Emirate’s ‘Radd al-Zulm’ response, the two sides have been exchanging artillery fire, ground-level attacks, air strikes and drone strikes, targeting critical military infrastructure.
For the Taliban, the conflict has created a ‘rally around the flag’ effect and allowed it to entrench its power further. Since the latest attack, the Emirate’s foreign minister has urged envoys to present its case to the international community. Pakistan’s escalatory rhetoric is also seen as a response to the Taliban’s miscalculation regarding the extent to which it expected Islamabad to act against this security threat, particularly in light of Afghanistan’s growing ties with India and the continuing attacks within Pakistan. While rhetoric in Afghanistan likens Islamabad’s actions to those of Israel in Gaza, framing them as driven by regime-change objectives, Pakistan’s policy on the ground appears more limited, focusing on signalling strength to the Taliban and curbing its ability to project cross-border capabilities.
In 2021, the Pakistani establishment was optimistic about the Taliban’s return in Afghanistan, viewing it as aligned with two key objectives: securing strategic depth to counter India’s influence and securing the Taliban’s support in constraining the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which had resurged after Pakistan’s 2014 military operations had nearly decimated the group. The reality now is markedly different from Islamabad’s expectations. The Taliban have diversified their external engagements by leveraging the security interests of multiple countries, reducing their dependence on Pakistan. This declining importance is also reflected in the Emirate’s rhetoric, including statements on its official website, which suggest that Pakistan’s actions are pushing it closer to Russia, China and India. The country’s defence minister reiterated this in a recent interview. The Taliban have also accused Pakistan of playing a double game by harbouring Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) members within its borders, who then carry out attacks in Afghanistan.
The conflict has now expanded from one involving the TTP and Pakistan to a confrontation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, raising regional risks and marking a potential turning point in their bilateral relationship.
On the other hand, while the TTP was regarded as a “force multiplier” for the Taliban during its insurgency years, its transition to government and the TTP’s increasing strength, vis-à-vis Pakistan’s growing internal challenges, have allowed the Taliban to adopt a hands-off approach towards the group’s activities. Since 2021, the Taliban have maintained a consistent position, stating that the TTP issue is Pakistan’s internal matter and that Afghanistan has no stake in it — a stance they have upheld to date. This is due to the Taliban’s long-standing ideological and strategic ties with the TTP, which have led them to refrain from taking definitive action against the group. Since Pakistan’s first air strikes in April 2022 and the subsequent brokering of a short-lived ceasefire with Taliban mediation in June that same year, the two countries have engaged in multiple strikes and counter-strikes. While the Taliban have, on various occasions, urged their fighters to refrain from waging jihad outside Afghanistan — including through a fatwa issued in December last year reiterating the ban — the extent to which the group is willing and able to influence the TTP’s activities remains uncertain.
The crisis in West Asia has also created attendant risks for this conflict theatre. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan share a border with Iran. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, the number of returnees from Iran to Afghanistan has risen to around 1,700 people per day. Pakistan, on the other hand, has had to implement a series of austerity measures to address disruptions caused by the country’s energy crisis. It has also witnessed deadly protests in the aftermath of the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader. Already grappling with internal insurgencies, particularly in Balochistan, Pakistan finds itself in an increasingly precarious position.
While the current pause in fighting and the absence of any TTP retaliation against Pakistan for its strikes in Afghanistan have brought some relief on both sides, albeit temporary, the risk of renewed escalation remains.
Trade between the two sides has remained at a standstill since October 2025, following which both began exploring routes through Iran as a viable alternative. However, with conflict simmering in West Asia, this route too remains fragile, raising the risk of economic strain in both countries and increasing domestic pressures.
Expectations that external actors would succeed in halting hostilities remained low. In October last year, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye hosted multiple rounds of negotiations between the two sides in an effort to reach a consensus. Other regional actors, including China, Iran and Russia, have also offered to mediate on several occasions. US policy towards the region has become more complex under the second Trump administration, with Washington acknowledging Pakistan’s right to defend itself against the Taliban and designating the latter as a state sponsor of wrongful detention. The Taliban also blame a US-fuelled military mindset in Pakistan for attacks on Afghanistan, arguing that Washington is furthering its own agenda through Islamabad. The Emir’s Eid message reiterated this sentiment, urging external actors not to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, without directly referencing the attack.
While the current pause in fighting and the absence of any TTP retaliation against Pakistan for its strikes in Afghanistan have brought some relief on both sides, albeit temporary, the risk of renewed escalation remains.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her research focuses primarily on India’s neighbourhood- particularly tracking the security, political and economic ...
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