Lax enforcement and state-led underreporting weaken the CWC’s core promise—chemical weapons control now needs tougher, smarter verification.
Image Source: Getty
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—which entered into force in 1997—marked a pivotal international effort in banning the development, use, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In addition to enforcing the treaty, the CWC established the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The CWC demonstrates a global dedication to banning chemical weapon use in warfare and neutralising existing stockpiles. However, discrepancies persist, especially because of its heavy reliance on individual nation states to enforce the treaty domestically and self-report their compliance to the convention. The lack of reliable reporting and aggressive oversight has made the vision of a world sans chemical weapons much harder to accomplish.
The CWC demonstrates a global dedication to banning chemical weapon use in warfare and neutralising existing stockpiles.
Iran
Iran, having witnessed the devastating impact of chemical warfare during the Iran–Iraq War, invested in chemical weapons development in the 1980s as a response to this experience.
Since then, Iran has continued to foster an interest in chemical weapons and has also proceeded into a more covert and sophisticated front by producing pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs). These PBAs are products of substances that are legal to use for medical purposes—such as anaesthetics—and are capable of incapacitating or killing when used as weapons. Iran has been suspected of shipping PBAs to organisations such as Hezbollah, Syrian government forces, and Iraqi Shia militias.
Under the supervision of the OPCW, Iran declared the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles after ratifying the CWC in 1997. However, in contradiction, the United States Department of State Report, 2021 (US DoS Report) has repeatedly hinted that Iran might still possess unreported chemical weapons capabilities. This also includes allegations of underreported existing stockpiles, facility declarations, and the potential development of PBAs for military use. Despite Iran's insistence that it abides by the CWC and opposes chemical weapons use, persistent scepticism draws attention to the shortcomings of the current verification system.
Russia
Russia's own experience with PBAs is noted in the 2002 Moscow Theatre Hostage Crisis, where Russian special forces employed carfentanil and remifentanil—chemicals closely related to fentanyl—to incapacitate Chechen terrorists. The gas killed over 100 hostages, highlighting the deadly capability of PBAs. Russia has since been implicated in utilising sophisticated nerve agents such as Novichok in an attempt to assassinate dissidents, including the 2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom (UK) and opposition leader Alexei Navalny in 2020.
The 2021 US DoS report revealed that Russia is in non-compliance with the CWC—citing undeclared activities, misuse of riot control agents in Ukraine and the use of Novichok—in the aforementioned targeted assassinations.
Despite declaring the completion of chemical weapons destruction in 2017, Russia had previously held 40,000 metric tonnes of such weapons. The OPCW confirmed Russia's 2017 declaration that it had destroyed its entire chemical weapons stockpile. However, the 2021 US DoS report revealed that Russia is in non-compliance with the CWC—citing undeclared activities, misuse of riot control agents in Ukraine and the use of Novichok—in the aforementioned targeted assassinations.
Other Notable Cases
Other notable cases include Syria, which, despite joining the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013 and declaring the destruction of its stockpiles, was found by multiple OPCW and UN investigations to have used chemical weapons in several attacks between 2014 and 2018. The United States (US) continues to certify Syria as non-compliant with the CWC. Nonetheless, with the fall of the Assad Regime, Syria is currently on the path of ensuring transparency in banning chemical weapon use, despite the region’s volatility.
According to the 2021 US DoS report, China’s compliance, although subject to extensive OPCW inspections and not currently accused of violations, cannot be fully verified.
North Korea, which is also not a signatory to the CWC, is believed to possess a substantial and active chemical weapons programme.
Neither Israel nor Egypt is a party to the CWC. Although historical allegations suggest offensive programmes in the past, their current chemical weapons capabilities status remains ambiguous.
Furthermore, North Korea, which is also not a signatory to the CWC, is believed to possess a substantial and active chemical weapons programme. The assassination of Kim Jong Nam with VX agent in 2017 underscores this threat.
Inconsistencies in the reporting of chemical weapons pose significant threats to global peace and security and are not just administrative errors. Incomplete or inaccurate declarations make it more difficult for the OPCW—in its current capacity—to confirm compliance. This damages international confidence, weakens the taboo of chemical weapon use that is necessary to uphold the CWC. To ensure that such inconsistencies are addressed, the chemical weapons control landscape must evolve in the following ways:
OPCW must be given more authority to make unannounced inspections and have enhanced access to a broader spectrum of intelligence sources. Its interactions with border control forces like INTERPOL, and common databases maintained for conforming with other treaties that deal with the trade of chemical and toxic substances—such as the Rotterdam Convention, Basel Convention, and Australia Group, are imperative. These facilities will enable the organisation to identify deviations early based on suspected chemical development and the movement of precursor chemicals.
Establishing or enhancing independent verification entities, funded independently from domestic governments, can ensure impartial evaluation, minimise political influence, and guarantee that state declarations are thoroughly examined. A multi-layered verification process would enhance trust in the integrity of checks for compliance.
The global academic and scientific community have an important role in discovering threats and developing solutions for chemical weapons. The formation of international research consortia, such as the Spiez Convergence Conference, and the exchange of best practices between countries can identify new threats, including new chemical agents, the impact of new age technologies, and enhance detection, decontamination, and verification technologies. Joint research also promotes an ethical culture of responsibility in chemistry and chemistry-related disciplines.
States ought to be made to notify the OPCW of large-scale or suspicious chemical transactions and impose tighter national controls on the import, export, and domestic handling of precursor chemicals.
One underutilised but key tool is tracking trade in dual-use chemicals or PBAs with civilian and military uses. States ought to be made to notify the OPCW of large-scale or suspicious chemical transactions and impose tighter national controls on the import, export, and domestic handling of precursor chemicals. Increased cooperation with customs and law enforcement authorities can also assist in uncovering and cutting off illicit chemical weapons-related trade networks.
The global prohibition of chemical weapons depends not just on treaties and declarations, but on the ability to verify them. Without accurate, transparent reporting and effective oversight, the CWC’s foundational promise is at risk. To meet the evolving challenges of chemical weapons non-proliferation, verification standards must evolve. This means giving the OPCW the tools it needs to act decisively, reinforcing oversight with independent bodies, and fostering a culture of transparency and cooperation.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology. Her research areas include Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) strategy ...
Read More +
PREV
