Trump’s muted response to Xi’s Taiwan red line during his recent China visit signals a dramatic shift in his Taiwan policy
During the recent trip of US President Donald Trump to China, Taiwan was front and centre. It became the only issue on which Xi Jinping drew a clear red line that any mishandling of the Taiwan issue by the US could lead to a conflict and “an extremely dangerous situation”. Since Trump wanted a multifaceted economic deal with China, he had to swallow his pride, unusual for his political style. In the end, he left China without any consequential breakthrough on technology, China, Iran, or Taiwan. Trump’s lack of a commensurate response to China on Taiwan or an administrative readout that countered Beijing’s rhetoric on Taiwan may have been a calibrated step to eke out an economic modus vivendi with China, but it could be dangerously consequential for Taiwan.
The first Trump administration took a more overtly anti-China stance on tariffs, technology transfer, and trade, thereby allowing Taiwan to remain competitive in critical sectors.
Just as with most policy shifts between the two Trump administrations, presidential policy on Taiwan has evolved, albeit without the starkness that some of Trump's other policy reorientations symbolise. The first Trump administration took a more overtly anti-China stance on tariffs, technology transfer, and trade, thereby allowing Taiwan to remain competitive in critical sectors. While the foundation of America's relationship with Taiwan remains the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the Trump administration has sent mixed signals about America's position on Taiwan. Depending on when and how the Trump administration has sought to signal China, it has used the Taiwan card to its own advantage. Yet these steps have not been conclusively directional. Instead, they have been seen as political symbolism, even as the second administration has oscillated between fierce competition with China and a G2 proposition that seeks to create an economic and military collaborative framework between the world's two leading powers.
Over the past few years, Taiwan has gained unprecedented relevance and importance in light of the growing global focus on semiconductor and chip capabilities, an area in which it has achieved global dominance. Consequently, the possibility of a mainland invasion of Taiwan has ceased to be a concern limited to a regional flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific involving only a few countries. Instead, it has evolved into a global concern, as an increasing number of countries are now tied to the demands and ecosystem of ongoing technological transformation, where semiconductor manufacturing capacity and related technologies are set to play a decisive role in redefining the global balance of power.
Taiwan has been at the heart of US Congressional debates that have witnessed shifting presidential positions on whether to extend political and military support to Taipei. In recent years, the rapid growth of Beijing's military strength, strategic signalling, power consolidation at home, and growing interventionist intent have all come together to impart a new urgency in Washington regarding the Taiwan question. Yet, Trump’s trip to China seemed to lack urgency.
The rapid growth of Beijing's military strength, strategic signalling, power consolidation at home, and growing interventionist intent have all come together to impart a new urgency in Washington regarding the Taiwan question.
Trump's National Security Strategy during his first term stated the following: "We will maintain our strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with our 'One China' policy, including our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan's legitimate defence needs and deter coercion." In positioning itself, the first Trump administration adopted an even more confrontational posture than its stated policy. It had two framework rationales for a robust relationship with Taiwan: a stated commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a declared competitive posture against a 'revisionist' China, ranging across military modernisation, influence operations, and predatory economics. As with most US presidential policies, Taiwan policy under Trump's first administration relied on the same foundational documents and policy tenets, except that Trump's China policy hardened from a force posture perspective. Furthermore, Trump increased arms sales to Taiwan during his first term, amounting to US$18.3 billion, and doubled down with another sale worth US$11 billion in 2025. By comparison, over his two terms preceding Trump, the Obama administration sold approximately US$20 billion worth of arms to Taiwan. Perhaps most importantly, Trump passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which allows US officials at all levels to travel to Taiwan to meet their Taiwanese counterparts; permits high-level Taiwanese officials to enter the US under respectful conditions and to meet with US officials, including those from the Departments of State and Defense; and encourages the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office and other bodies established by Taiwan to conduct business in the United States. Despite these seemingly favourable steps towards Taiwan, Trump's inclination to use Taipei as leverage was evident from the very beginning of his first term. In December 2016, Trump broke years of protocol by receiving a congratulatory call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, angering Beijing.
As with most US presidential policies, Taiwan policy under Trump's first administration relied on the same foundational documents and policy tenets, except that Trump's China policy hardened from a force posture perspective.
The second term, however, is largely different from his first, even as Trump's China policy has become highly unpredictable and focused on economics and investments. Unlike the first, where the focus was on the US-China relationship and where the president's policy priorities were positioned relative to China, the second term has widened the scope of strategic uncertainty beyond China alone to include allies and adversaries alike. Suddenly, the extension of a special case to Taiwan appears blunted. The second Trump administration's sweeping tariff policies, applied to almost every country in the world, including Taiwan, have complicated America's standing on the Taiwan question, particularly within its broader framework of opposition to Beijing. On the contrary, by equating Taiwan with its other allies, and Washington's competitors and adversaries, the tariff policy has levelled the frame of assessment from a purely strategic one to an economic one. Trump reinforced this by framing Taiwan as a country responsible for stealing the US’s advantage in the semiconductor sector, signalling that the defence of Taiwan had a quid pro quo price. As a presidential nominee in December 2024, Trump said that Taiwan should pay the US for defending it from China. Yet, there is a legislative dynamism in the US Congress on Taiwan. The Trump administration passed the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act, requiring a periodic review of US’ relations with Taiwan and has also moved the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act of 2025 through the House to the Senate.
The policy fluctuations of the Trump 2.0 have cut both ways. On the one hand, they have kept strategic ambiguity alive and, in fact, heightened it. On the other hand, they have given room to China, even as Trump appears more focused on other theatres and a grand bargain with Beijing. This, unfortunately, keeps Taiwan on tenterhooks, especially as China's preparedness for a potential takeover of Taiwan continues to grow under a perceived weakening US deterrence. In the most recent development, China has conducted a drill simulating a response to a nuclear attack by the US in the Taiwan Strait. On the positive side, Trump's unpredictability and military interventions in Venezuela and Iran have raised the stakes for China. If anything, both the Russia-Ukraine war and the Iran-US-Israel conflict have shown that battlefields can look very different from what was initially imagined, and that victory, even for great powers, does not come easily.
The second Trump administration's sweeping tariff policies, applied to almost every country in the world, including Taiwan, have complicated America's standing on the Taiwan question, particularly within its broader framework of opposition to Beijing.
In many ways, the 2025 National Security Strategy continues the US desire to defend Taiwan, placing it under the priority of threats to be deterred against, essentially by maintaining a favourable conventional military balance and strategic competition vis-a-vis China. Under the Trump administration, Taiwan’s strategic importance for the US is mainly two-fold–as a semiconductor and tech hub and as a strategic geography that provides access to the Second Island Chain while separating the northeastern and southeastern theatres of the South China Sea into two distinct theatres. The US under Trump now seeks greater cooperation from its allies in the First Island Chain, seeking a collective defence where the “American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone.”
The Trump administration continues to be shaped by personality-driven policymaking, with Donald Trump's own disposition accounting for much of its unpredictability. Divergent views amongst key officials have added further complexity. Elbridge Colby, while maintaining that Taiwan's fall would be a disaster for American interests, has also argued that it is not an existential interest for the US, which is a framework drawn from his 2021 book The Strategy of Denial. By contrast, Pete Hegseth has articulated a more robust posture, asserting that “America is committed to sustaining robust, ready and credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, including across the Taiwan Strait.” These competing views within the administration have since met with a significant reality check, as the US finds itself drawn into a protracted conflict with Iran, forcing readjustments in Trump's China strategy and, by extension, his Taiwan strategy.
The Trump administration continues to be shaped by personality-driven policymaking, with Donald Trump's own disposition accounting for much of its unpredictability.
A protracted Iran conflict forced a postponement of the summit between Trump and Xi Jinping. In the interim, China has moved adeptly, using Trump's distraction to invite Kuomintang (KMT) Chair Cheng Li-wun to Beijing, a move that has placed Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party under considerable pressure. As Trump concluded his visit to China, Taiwan may have found itself marginalised in Trump's strategic calculus. When Lai was asked to cancel his US stopover last year, Trump remained cautious about sending the wrong signals to Beijing on Taiwan, most prominently through the lack of a commensurate response to Xi’s polemical red line on Taiwan.
Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. His work focuses on US foreign policy, domestic politics in the US, ...
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