Although India and China have reached a preliminary agreement to disengage, the future development path of China-India relations is still full of potholes and slippery slopes
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The fact that an agreement between China and India to move forward on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was in the works has been anticipated in both capitals. Since late 2022, both governments have pursued a modus vivendi for disengagement at Depsang and Demchok, with the issue discussed threadbare in the Corps Commanders’ meetings. The 17th Corps Commanders’ meeting on 20 December 2022 marked a critical point. Following the establishment of five buffer zones in Eastern Ladakh and the Yangtse clash on 9 December 2022, the meeting provided an in-depth dialogue on the disengagement frameworks and probable solutions. In the next two years, these frameworks were substantially refined by both militaries which received the political endorsement this year.
This agreement has initiated the disengagement process at both remaining locations. As discussed below, a review of the lead-up to the Kazan agreement, its specifics on the ground and perspectives on this agreement from China, indicates that within strategic and political constraints, the agreement is a constructive restart for both states, though tempered with cautious optimism.
By September 2022, China and India had established five buffer zones at Pangong Tso Lake from Fingers 4-8, Gogra, Hot Springs, Kugrang Nullah and the Galwan Valley. This belt of buffer zones was aimed to separate both forces from their face-to-face deployments and was located mostly on the Indian side of the LAC, creating a distance of 3–10 kilometres between both sides and establishing restrictions on human patrolling or grazing temporarily. Only electronic surveillance was allowed. The denial of grazing received substantial criticism in India as these areas were traditional grazing grounds for the local population. However, the Indian government argued that if they could not patrol or graze in these buffer zones, neither could the Chinese and that ensured stability and peace in these areas.
This belt of buffer zones was aimed to separate both forces from their face-to-face deployments and was located mostly on the Indian side of the LAC, creating a distance of 3–10 kilometres between both sides and establishing restrictions on human patrolling or grazing temporarily.
The negotiation for achieving a similar modus vivendi in Depsang and Demchok proved difficult. The standoff in these two places was a legacy issue, starting in 2008-09 and eventually becoming a part of the 2020 Galwan Clash discourse. After surveying this area in September 2013, the Shyam Saran Committee reported that the Chinese were not allowing the Indian Army patrol units to access patrolling points 10 to 13 in the Depsang bulge area and creating difficulties for patrols in the Sirijap and Demchok area. Therefore, these two locations proved to be the toughest to negotiate.
Nevertheless, the Indian establishment displayed adept negotiation skills, finally securing the Kazan Agreement. This accord avoids creating buffer zones in the area, allowing staggered patrolling by small patrol units from both sides. Indian troops can finally access patrolling points 10 to 13 in this region again.
Since the 2020 clashes, China-India relations have stagnated, marked by minimal engagement across trade, economics and regional political fronts. India, stepping away from its oft-professed neutral politics, has actively engaged in the Malabar Exercises and the QUAD, aligned closely with the United States (US), while restricting Chinese investments, apps, and airlines. India has often adopted positions countering China. Beijing believes India has become detrimental to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southern Asia and withheld support from multiple Chinese economic initiatives namely, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the China-Nepal India Corridor.
Beijing believes India has become detrimental to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southern Asia and withheld support from multiple Chinese economic initiatives namely, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the China-Nepal India Corridor.
China-India trade, however, has remained strong. Consequently, India’s trade deficit has grown over the last three years, often crossing US$ 100 billion a year. In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) in India has dropped substantially, to less than US$30 billion in the last financial year. The Indian Finance Ministry has, therefore, expressed concerns, prompting the Indian Chief Economic Advisor, Anantha Nageswaran, to advocate for renewed engagement with China in the 2024 Economic Survey. China, meanwhile, is in difficult terrain as its industrial overcapacity, high unemployment rate and collapsing real estate sector, along with severe societal repression by a paranoid Chinese state, has created a volatile economic environment. The Kazan Agreement is, thus, viewed as a mutually beneficial pact to reduce hostilities and reestablish a working arrangement to minimise the potential for bilateral conflict.
The border agreement with India has received intense attention within China’s strategic community. The big question everyone tends to ask “Now that India’s Modi has given a thumbs up, will China and India turn the page in terms of bilateral ties.” In the Chinese assessment, this is a substantial achievement, a hard-won success. It is being argued that this ice-breaker will revitalize China-India relations and can potentially open up new space for cooperation between the two countries on the global stage. For example, some Chinese scholars believe the Kazan meeting will pave the way for greater cooperation between China and India on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) platform. There are talks about PM Modi personally attending the summit in China next year and opening up a new chapter in bilateral cooperation.
As per Lin Minwang, a researcher at the Centre for South Asian Studies, Fudan University, the current positive turn in China-India relations shows that India's diplomatic strategy is gradually returning to its “multi-alliance” core position under the Modi government. Similarly, Zhang Jiadong, another India watcher associated with Fudan University argued that “both sides realize that their primary focus is still economic development and responding to changes in the international landscape. In that case, a costly border dispute is not in the interests of both countries.”
The warming of Sino-Indian relations will make the US and the West uneasy and may impact their strategic layout and global and regional policies.
The Chinese side further notes how the handshake across the Himalayas can be an important turning point in global geopolitics and have a far-reaching international political significance. The warming of Sino-Indian relations will make the US and the West uneasy and may impact their strategic layout and global and regional policies. It is, therefore, no coincidence, they argue, that the US has been building pressure upon India on the Khalistan issue and has threatened to adopt severe measures if India does not cooperate. Simultaneously, other Western powers continue to court India and lure it into the “trap of replacing China”. For example, Chinese scholars note with concern how German Chancellor Scholz recently led a delegation to India, promising the strengthening of German-Indian economic cooperation while publicly promoting a “de-risking from China” strategy and projecting India as an alternative to China.
However, while appreciating the development, Chinese scholars advise caution given the structural differences in China-India ties. There seems to be a consensus within the Chinese strategic community that “the border agreement signed by China and India does not mean that all issues have been resolved. The agreement’s implementation, the progress of subsequent negotiations, and whether the two sides can trust each other are all important factors in the future of China-India relations.” The signing of the agreement is only “a starting point”.
Chinese scholars argue that true reconciliation with India will require greater patience and sincerity, as the border issue is complex, involves sovereignty issues, and is subject to interference from third parties or external forces. Liu Zongyi, director of the South Asia Research Center at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), argued that although there have been some positive developments in bilateral ties, it will still take some time for the relationship to recover. Since India's great power ambitions and its overall strategic goals of outcompeting China have not changed much, China needs to exercise caution, particularly Chinese companies still need to adopt a cautious attitude when investing in India.”
The general feeling in China is that although both states have reached a preliminary agreement to disengage, the future development path of China-India relations is still full of potholes and slippery slopes. The two sides still face the possibility of a sudden escalation in conflicts and differences because the borderline has not yet been fully determined.
China will keep a keen eye on how India can maintain good relations with China while maintaining cooperation with the United States in the future.
In addition, the future direction of the China-US-India trilateral relationship is full of uncertainty. The US elections, scheduled for November 2024, will also impact China-India relations. China will keep a keen eye on how India can maintain good relations with China while maintaining cooperation with the United States in the future.
Similarly in India, the disengagement at Depsang and Demchok is ongoing, and the patrolling may begin around Diwali. However, hereafter both sides must negotiate de-escalation and de-induction and future access and patrolling in existing buffer zones. The completion of this process will bring back a modicum of sensitivity towards each other’s red lines and may generate mutual respect. The Kazan Agreement, in sum, has reduced the animosity and mistrust and opened the scope for bilateral cooperation. The trust between both Indian and Chinese militaries, however, is a long way ahead.
Atul Kumar and Antara Ghoshal Singh are Fellows at the Observer Research Foundation
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Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. His research focuses on national security issues in Asia, China's expeditionary military capabilities, military ...
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Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US ...
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