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China’s growing influence among various stakeholders in Myanmar reflects Beijing's willingness to engage across party lines to protect its strategic and economic interests.
Image Source: Getty
On 17 September 2024, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) announced that they would no longer cooperate with the National Unity Government (NUG) in fighting against the military government. The NUG is an exiled government formed by ousted representatives following the 2021 coup. This announcement came a few weeks after Beijing urged the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) to stop attacking the Junta. Since the escalation of violence in Myanmar following the launch of Operation 1027, China has been pressing both the military government and the resistance forces to secure its interests and maintain peace along the Sino-Myanmar border region, especially in the Northern Shan state. These actions highlight Beijing's willingness to engage across party lines to safeguard its strategic and economic interests in Myanmar.
Before the 2021 coup, China maintained a formal relationship with the Junta but there was a shift in dynamics after the military takeover. When almost all nations condemned the 2021 military takeover in Myanmar, China was amongst the few countries that refused to condemn the Junta and was also one of the first to recognise the military regime. Moreover, the sanctions imposed by the West and others in response to the Junta’s violent crackdown on civilians pushed Myanmar further into China’s sphere of influence. Since the coup, China has been a major supporter of the Junta, providing significant military, financial, and political backing. It has become a key arms supplier to the Tatmadaw and is its largest foreign trading partner. According to the UN Special Rapporteur, Chinese state-owned and private-owned companies sold defence equipment, such as aircraft, ammunition, fighter jets and tanks, as well as raw materials including copper, aluminium, steel, etc., valued at over US$ 260 million to the Myanmar military government between February 2021 and December 2022.
When almost all nations condemned the 2021 military takeover in Myanmar, China was amongst the few countries that refused to condemn the Junta and was also one of the first to recognise the military regime.
However, Beijing’s support for the Tatmadaw persisted even after the latter faced substantial setbacks following Operation 1027—a joint resistance movement launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in October 2023. Despite the Tatmadaw’s inability to resolve the political instability in the country, Beijing continues to support the military government. This is evident in the frequent high-level visits, collaborative military exercises and China’s commitment to support the Junta’s plan to hold an election in 2025. Moreover, the recent delivery of six FTC-2000G fighter jets from Beijing to Myanmar amid the violence signals China’s steadfast support for the Junta government.
China has continued to maintain an unofficial relationship with the Myanmar armed groups, especially with those based along the Sino-Myanmar border, after the coup. For instance, despite public denials, there have been reports of Beijing supporting the United Wa State Army (UWSA) with arms, ammunition, and military training. This may be because the armed group is the most influential force and has considerable authority along the Sino-Myanmar border in the Shan state. However, there are also reports that these Chinese arms and ammunition supplied to the UWSA are dispersed further to other armed organisations like the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the MNDAA and others to fight against the Junta.
The escalation of violence in Myanmar following the launch of Operation 1027, particularly the instability along the Sino-Myanmar border has further prompted Beijing to intervene actively in the ongoing civil strife to protect its strategic interests. China has heavily invested in Myanmar, including the strategically important Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone and a gas pipeline connecting Rakhine (Myanmar) and Yunnan (China). This SEZ is crucial for China, as it would provide its landlocked Southwestern provinces with direct access to the Indian Ocean.
China has heavily invested in Myanmar, including the strategically important Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone and a gas pipeline connecting Rakhine (Myanmar) and Yunnan (China).
China has thus been calling on both ends to stop the violence. To date, China has chaired five rounds of talks between the Brotherhood Alliance and the military Junta in Beijing and has successfully brokered two temporary ceasefire agreements regarding the Shan state. It has also attempted to mediate between the AA and the Junta for the Rakhine state. Its intervention in the Shan state is to restore the border trade which has been halted since the launch of Operation 1027. Similarly, China’s intervention in the Rakhine state is motivated by its multi-billion worth of infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
However, in cases where Tatmadaw has failed to offer guarantees, Beijing has increased its reliance on EAOs. When the Tatmadaw failed to address the cyber scam issue along the Sino-Myanmar border last year, there were reports of Beijing turning to an ethnic armed group—the MNDAA for assistance. This further underscores China’s willingness to engage with the EAOs and directly intervene.
Beijing deliberately closed the international border crossing along the Northern Shan state to pressure Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups into mediating with the military junta.
Beijing has also maintained significant leverage with both players. Although the Three Brotherhood Alliance has shown commitment to protecting China’s interests and the Chinese nationals in Myanmar, Beijing has been unresponsive to their demand of urging to stop supporting the military Junta. Moreover, Beijing deliberately closed the international border crossing along the Northern Shan state to pressure Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups into mediating with the military junta. The Chinese regional authority, the Ruili Town Security Committee, warned the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to stop fighting the military junta too. This shifted things in Beijing’s favour. The recent announcement of the MNDAA urging China to be a peacemaker and mediate the violence in areas controlled by them further demonstrates Beijing’s hedging strategy.
The launch of Operation 1027 has significantly changed the internal power dynamics in Myanmar. The Brotherhood Alliance, the military wing of NUG - the People’s Defence Force, and the independently fighting EAOs have gained control over significant parts of Myanmar's territory. This new political upheaval has also altered China’s role in the nation. Over the past year, Beijing has portrayed itself as a significant and dependable stakeholder/ally that could talk to the military government and the EAOs and could possibly bring back peace and stability in the country. This has made China the most influential country in today’s Myanmar and underscores the fact that it is willing to go to great lengths to secure its interests.
Currently, China’s Myanmar strategy is focused on bringing stability to the Shan and the Rakhine states. Its immediate goals in Myanmar seem to be motivated by its economic and strategic interests - reopening border trade in the Shan state, safeguarding Chinese-built infrastructure projects and protecting Chinese nationals currently stuck in the cyber scam issue. On the other hand, China’s multi-engagement strategy in Myanmar has gained leverage with multiple stakeholders—a position that the West lacks. This will thus help Beijing carry on with the infrastructure projects and further its BRI projects and strategic goals.
Ophelia Yumlembam is an M.A. Political Science graduate from Delhi University, India. She is currently working as a Research Assistant at Delhi University, Dept. of Political Science.
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Ophelia Yumlembam is a Research Assistant at the Dept. of Political Science, University of Delhi (DU). She graduated with an M.A. in Political Science from ...
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