A series of global flashpoints has triggered a reassessment in Beijing of whether American power is eroding or entering a new phase of assertive resurgence
Image Source: Getty Images
On 28 February, as the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on Tehran, targeting the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader and the presidential palace, an intense debate gripped China’s strategic community: Is US power declining or resurging? Is Washington losing or winning this round of great power competition?
The context for this debate can be traced back to the October 2025 Trump-Xi Busan summit, after which a growing consensus emerged within Chinese strategic circles that China had essentially won the trade war and successfully drawn the United States into a strategic stalemate. The view held that years of maximum pressure from Washington had failed to force Beijing to concede on systemic issues; instead, they had increased inflationary pressures and reduced productivity in the United States. In this reading, the Trump administration had come to realise that it was unlikely to secure victory in Sino-US competition through hard-line tactics and was left with little choice but to reconcile with China on Chinese terms.
Chinese scholars argue that this marked the beginning of a new phase in US-China ties, premised on the idea that the post-Cold War international order is undergoing profound change, with China’s power and position in the international system reaching new heights, while the United States faces a relative decline in power and prestige. In this view, China has sought to project and utilise its expanded influence under this shifting balance of power, proactively shaping narratives and setting the agenda in the China-US contest.
Accordingly, Chinese media have amplified narratives around the “rise of the East and decline of the West” and the claim that “the Chinese model is more effective, more competitive, and superior to the American model.” Discussions in Chinese strategic circles have extended beyond the shifting power balance between Washington and Beijing to the modalities of a possible power transition under a G2 framework.
Meanwhile, the American “Kill Line” discourse went viral on the Chinese internet, arguing that “Trump’s America is not a thriving America, but one in which industries have rusted, financial capital has become monopolistic, and exploitation across social classes has peaked,” and that the “United States is declining in its capacity to maintain order, sustain military power, and advancing its infrastructure capabilities” — implying that “the world has already entered a post-US and post-western era”.
However, Trump’s Venezuela experiment at the beginning of the year somewhat shifted the tide in Chinese public opinion, as commentators began to point out that, despite China’s perceived victory in the trade war, the actions taken by the Trump administration in recent months had inflicted a series of setbacks for China. These included the loss of equity in the Hamburg port acquisition in Germany, the turbulence surrounding Nexperia in the Netherlands, the potential revocation of the Darwin port lease in Australia, and the recent loss of control over key Panama port operations by CK Hutchison Holdings. In this view, China’s overseas investments, the industrial links and supply chains established by its enterprises in international markets, its trade routes, and its resource supply networks were perceived as facing unprecedented risks under Trump 2.0. Critics argued that, despite the hype surrounding a shifting balance of power in US-China relations, the Chinese government appeared unable to safeguard the rights and interests of Chinese enterprises operating overseas.
Some Chinese scholars have expressed concern that, despite widespread assertions of the US losing ground, Trump 2.0 has in fact “won” on multiple fronts.
Some Chinese scholars have expressed concern that, despite widespread assertions of the US losing ground, Trump 2.0 has in fact “won” on multiple fronts. For example, from this perspective, the United States bombed Iran last year and faced no significant consequences, while Middle Eastern states continued to pledge over $2 trillion in investment. Trump 2.0, in their view, also imposed steep tariffs across the world with little meaningful retaliation; instead, many countries pledged trillions of dollars in investment to the United States. Further, even China, despite recognising the Trump administration’s capriciousness and its clear intention to arm Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan against it, is reportedly considering massive investments in the US to stabilise China-US ties.
The inference drawn in Beijing is that the theory of US retrenchment is overstated. Rather than retreating, the United States is seen as pursuing a strategy of advancement and escalation toward China, even if the intensity, methods, and pace of that escalation have changed significantly. Trump 2.0, in this assessment, has triggered a series of developments that are comprehensively affecting China’s overseas investment, trade, and industrial and supply chain configurations, thereby challenging China’s broader globalisation strategy and the international expansion of its enterprises.
Chinese scholars such as Chen Wenling, Chief Economist at the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, and Yan Xuetong, Honorary Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, argue that recent events demonstrate that the United States still possesses formidable economic and military strength. In their assessment, China has undoubtedly achieved structural breakthroughs in several key areas. However, they argue that Trump’s willingness to resort to risky bargaining tactics, which could escalate China-US economic competition into military confrontation, rests on the premise that a significant gap in comprehensive national power still exists between the two countries. At the same time, they maintain that the narrowing of the power gap between China and the United States is an irreversible trend. If China “manages its own affairs well” for a few more years, they suggest, future US administrations may have little choice but to return to a more controlled and regulated form of economic competition with China.
The Venezuela and Panama crises triggered debate, with many arguing that if China does not respond forcefully now to Trump 2.0’s repeated provocations, it will forfeit any chance of prevailing in its strategic contest with the United States.
On 3 March, three days after the United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran, the Chinese military news agency published an article titled “Five Lessons from the US-Israel Attack on Iran” in both Chinese and English. The piece stated that the most fatal hidden danger is the enemy within; the costliest miscalculation is blind faith in peace; the coldest reality is the logic of superior firepower; the cruellest paradox is the illusion of victory; and ultimate reliance lies in self-reliance. Some Chinese strategists interpreted this message from the PLA at that juncture as a wake-up call to the nation, urging it to emerge from its "peace sickness."
Washington’s current hardline and overbearing stance does not necessarily reflect a genuine resurgence of strength; rather, it is an attempt to compensate for declining economic competitiveness vis-à-vis China, to offset perceived weaknesses, gain leverage in negotiations, and sustain its hegemonic posture.
Chinese scholars pointed out that recent US actions this year—including the military intervention in Venezuela, pressure surrounding Greenland, political and economic pushback in Panama, and the strikes on Iran—serve as a stark reminder that an era of intensified great-power competition has arrived. They contend that the post-World War II international order and the post-Cold War liberal framework that many states once took for granted are under significant strain, and the international environment is becoming increasingly perilous. In this view, since opening up its economy, China has operated within a relatively prolonged period of peace and stability, leading to domestic expectations shaped by tranquillity. Current shifts, in their assessment, may therefore require a fundamental recalibration of strategic outlooks in Beijing.
They argue that China must recognise what they describe as the United States’ status as the world’s “most war-loving nation”. In their view, Washington’s current hardline and overbearing stance does not necessarily reflect a genuine resurgence of strength; rather, it is an attempt to compensate for declining economic competitiveness vis-à-vis China, to offset perceived weaknesses, gain leverage in negotiations, and sustain its hegemonic posture. They contend that this may well represent a long-term strategy of the United States, regardless of who occupies the presidency. Faced with such an adversary, Chinese scholars argue that Beijing must reassess the framework of its “peaceful rise” and develop a credible and effective military deterrent vis-à-vis Washington.
President Trump’s decision to delay his much-anticipated visit to China at the end of this month must be viewed in the context of the ongoing power struggle between the two sides. Immediate triggers may include US preoccupation with the Middle East conflict, differences between Washington and Beijing over escort missions in the Strait of Hormuz and new Section 301 investigations, as well as the absence of any substantive breakthrough in the sixth round of Sino-US trade talks in Paris.
At the same time, the broader picture suggests that both sides are seeking to construct a “winning” narrative, accumulating as many bargaining chips as possible before the two heads of state meet, to extract maximum concessions from the other. Given the difficulty of predicting how far either side might go to declare itself “the winner,” India would be well advised to monitor this high-stakes rivalry closely.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US ...
Read More +
 (1).jpg)
PREV