-
CENTRES
Progammes & Centres
Location
While the GBGA promises participatory and efficient urban governance, its provisions centralise power, weaken local bodies, and risk reversing the spirit of constitutional decentralisation
Image Source: Getty
The government of Karnataka recently carried out an exercise in urban re-engineering, the results of which would be keenly watched by urban academicians and practitioners across India. This re-engineering is the Greater Bengaluru Governance Act (GBGA), 2025. The new statute replaces the existing Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) Act of 2020. The state government will need to undertake several consequential steps before the GBGA becomes fully operational. These include defining the boundaries of the Greater Bengaluru Area , splitting up the BBMP and establishing multiple municipal corporations, fixing their geographical boundaries, laying down their governance architecture, redrawing ward boundaries, and equipping the constituents for municipal elections. These steps are likely to take several months.
The state government will need to undertake several consequential steps before the GBGA becomes fully operational.
The cited Act proposes the establishment of the Greater Bengaluru Authority (GBA) to coordinate and oversee the development of the Greater Bengaluru Area. The Act’s ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ states that it was necessary to constitute the GBA to establish new civic authorities and deliver effective governance in the Greater Bengaluru Area . Furthermore, it stipulates splitting up the Greater Bengaluru Area into a maximum of ten city corporations to enable effective, participatory and responsive governance. It seeks to empower Ward Committees as the basic units of urban governance and facilitate community participation through the “Area Sabha”. The Act states that these measures would enhance the quality of life of all citizens by instituting a decentralised, participative, efficient and equitable governance framework.
Before the GBA, the statutory framework governing the city of Bengaluru was the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act of 1976. Following the significant expansion of the city in both geographical and population terms, this Act was replaced by the BBMP Act of 2020. The GBGA contends that the BBMP Act is now inadequate to address the “fragmentation of governance in Bengaluru due to the multiplicity of civic agencies and the lack of coordination among them.” The expedience of establishing the GBGA flows from that requirement, the Act asserts.
The GBGA identifies three civic authorities – the GBA, the City Corporations and the Ward Committees. It specifies that the Greater Bengaluru Area will be split into several City Corporations, each with a minimum population of ten lakh , a population density of 5,000 persons per square kilometre, and a minimum revenue- generation capacity of INR 300 crores per annum. Each corporation must also satisfy the criterion of at least 50 percent employment in non-agricultural activities. However, the state government retains the power to alter the geographical boundaries of a corporation at any time. While the municipal bodies may individually perform the functions assigned to them, the GBA will serve as the coordinating authority among the various City Corporations. The GBA, comprising seven state ministers, will be led by the Chief Minister (CM) Siddaramaiah as the ex-officio chairperson. Mayors of all the municipal corporations find a seat on the GBA, and each civic body may nominate two members to the Authority. The rest are state officials and chiefs of parastatal agencies.
It specifies that the Greater Bengaluru Area will be split into several City Corporations, each with a minimum population of ten lakh , a population density of 5,000 persons per square kilometre, and a minimum revenue- generation capacity of INR 300 crores per annum.
The position of the GBA chief commissioner is an important creation of the Act. Serving as the principal executive officer, the chief commissioner will hold the Authority’s executive power. The GBA will be assisted in discharging its functions by an executive committee headed by a minister nominated by the CM. The chief commissioner will serve as the member- secretary of the executive committee, which may also invite domain experts to its meetings.
The GBGA envisages a decentralised governance model within each municipal corporation. It proposes the formation of zonal committees for each zone of the urban local body (ULB), comprising a group of wards. Each committee will be headed by a councillor elected by the ward councillors of that zone. All councillors from the zone, zonal officials, and an expert member will serve as the committee’s members. The joint commissioner will serve as the coordinator. Breaking up the governance machinery further, the GBGA envisages ward committees in each ward of the City Corporation. The ward councillor will serve as the chairperson, and the corporation will nominate ten other members. The functions of the ward committee are also listed in the GBGA and include: preparing the ward development plan, identifying beneficiaries, ensuring proper fund utilisation and implementation of schemes, and overseeing service delivery. However, the committee's recommendations will only be advisory in nature.
To encourage citizen participation, the GBGA introduces the concept of ‘Area Sabhas’. This body will consist of all persons registered as voters in the electoral rolls of the Corporation pertaining to that area. While the Area Sabhas will have certain functions, their role will remain essentially advisory in nature.
The GBA’s affairs will require funding to carry out its many functions. To this end, a GBA Fund will be established and operated by the chief commissioner. Apart from central and state government grants, user fee charges collected by municipal corporations will be made available to the GBA Fund, in proportions determined by the state government. In turn, the state government will allocate a portion of these funds to City Corporations or relevant agencies to discharge their duties and functions. All financial allocations to the municipal corporations, except for statutory releases by the central and state finance commissions, will be routed through the GBA. The municipal corporations can set their rates of property tax, other taxes and fees, cess, and user charges, pending approval by the GBA and the state government. The government will also decide what administrative functions the GBA will perform in relation to City Corporations. The GBA will formulate and execute major infrastructural projects in the Greater Bengaluru Area . The GBGA integrates the hitherto separate municipal statute into itself by incorporating the Municipal Corporation Act as Chapters IV to XXV and Schedules I and II. In effect, the Municipal Act stands subsumed within the GBGA.
Apart from central and state government grants, user fee charges collected by municipal corporations will be made available to the GBA Fund, in proportions determined by the state government.
While embarking on a critical analysis of the GBGA, one must acknowledge that urbanisation in India is increasingly taking the form of mega urban areas, with populations exceeding 10 million and geographies extending up to 1,000 sq km. There has been growing concern that municipal corporations, functioning as single units, are finding it increasingly difficult to manage these urban giants. Therefore, an improved urban architecture for such mega-urban areas is undoubtedly necessary. However, such re-engineering ought not be at the cost of the basic premise of local self-governance mandated by the Indian Constitution. Unfortunately, the GBGA appears likely to undermine this principle and reverse its own stated objectives.
The GBGA declares that its central purpose is to improve the quality of life of all citizens through decentralised, participative, efficient and equitable governance. However, in practice, the decentralisation is likely to be limited to geography - through the division of Bengaluru into multiple corporations. Even this geographical decentralisation remains at the mercy of the state government and can be altered at any point in time. The Act concentrates power in the hands of the CM, who heads the Authority. The municipal commissioners, for all practical purposes, will work under the chief commissioner of the GBA, and the ward committees and the Area S abhas will merely serve as advisory bodies. They will have no real powers and will be limited to making recommendations. All parastatals that encroach upon the municipal mandate will continue to operate as before.
Municipal finances are likely to be further strained as the GBA will claim a portion of these funds to run its own affairs. Municipal corporations could be squeezed at the pleasure of the GBA, as all fund flow will be routed through it. Additionally, elected mayors will see their powers compromised by the overarching presence of the CM and other ministers in the GBA. The promise of improved efficiency also appears hollow, as the GBGA makes no mention of capacity building. The Act merely adds another bureaucratic layer to a cumbersome and failing urban governance architecture, and an essential element of good governance – transparency – is completely missing in its provisions. All in all, the GBGA appears to be a further nail in the coffin of local body empowerment.
While it promises decentralisation, citizen participation, and improved efficiency as its stated objectives, its structure and provisions suggest a re-centralisation of authority under the state government.
The GBGA represents a bold but contentious attempt at reconfiguring urban governance for one of India’s fastest-growing metropolises. While it promises decentralisation, citizen participation, and improved efficiency as its stated objectives, its structure and provisions suggest a re-centralisation of authority under the state government. With key powers concentrated in the CM-led Greater Bengaluru Authority and local institutions relegated to advisory roles, the Act effectively undermines the constitutional spirit of local self-governance. Unless amended to genuinely empower municipal corporations and grassroots bodies, the GBGA may exacerbate the very governance challenges it seeks to address.
Ramanath Jha is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Dr. Ramanath Jha is Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Mumbai. He works on urbanisation — urban sustainability, urban governance and urban planning. Dr. Jha belongs ...
Read More +.jpg)
PREV