As regional insecurity mounts, the Thai Foreign Minister’s visit underscored a shared imperative for India and Thailand to translate political intent into concrete cooperation
The late-November visit of Thailand's Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow to New Delhi marked an inflexion point in India–Thailand relations. Coming barely seven months after the elevation of bilateral ties to a Strategic Partnership on 3 April, the visit signals a clear intention on both sides to inject substance into a relationship long burdened by promise but constrained by inertia. At a time of regional flux—border tensions involving Thailand- Cambodia, instability in Myanmar, and the proliferation of cyber-scam networks in the Mekong region—the visit was far more than routine diplomacy. It was a test of whether India and Thailand can move beyond rhetoric and shape a more purposeful partnership rooted in shared vulnerabilities and converging strategic ambitions.
Unlike earlier high-level exchanges, this visit occurred amid mounting regional anxieties. Thailand is grappling with renewed pressure along its eastern border with Cambodia, while the spillover from Myanmar's continued conflict increasingly affects Thai security and border management. Transnational organised crime networks—many operating from territories along the Thailand–Myanmar–Cambodia axis—have expanded their operations dramatically. India, with hundreds of its citizens trapped or defrauded in scam compounds, has become an unwilling stakeholder in the Mekong region's crime governance crisis.
It is against this backdrop that the Thai Foreign Minister's three-day visit to India, from 30 November to 2 December 2025, must be understood. His discussions with India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval were not ceremonial; they were urgent and strategic, anchored in the need to stabilise an increasingly volatile neighbourhood.
Thailand's proposal for intensified intelligence-sharing and its invitation to India to join and co-host an international conference on combating online scams, to be held on 17-18 December in Bangkok, demonstrate a recognition that unilateral action is no longer adequate.
For perhaps the first time in recent memory, security cooperation overshadowed economic diplomacy during an India–Thailand ministerial interaction. Cyber-scams—once dismissed as marginal—now constitute a full-blown transnational security threat, blending trafficking, digital fraud and organised criminal networks. Thailand's proposal for intensified intelligence-sharing and its invitation to India to join and co-host an international conference on combating online scams, to be held on 17-18 December in Bangkok, demonstrate a recognition that unilateral action is no longer adequate.
For India, engagement in this domain is not optional. The repeated rescue of Indian nationals from scam zones in Myanmar's Myawaddy, Cambodia's Sihanoukville, or Laos' Golden Triangle SEZ has exposed New Delhi's vulnerabilities to crime ecosystems far beyond its borders. India has rescued and repatriated hundreds, potentially over 2,500, Indians from scam centres in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos since 2022. Thailand, with its geographic and intelligence advantages, is India's most crucial partner for mitigation.
Equally notable was the quiet but significant conversation on border tensions and maritime security. The fact that the Thai Foreign Minister raised regional security issues with the Indian NSA reflects a confidence that India is not just a diplomatic partner but a regional stabiliser. With uncertainty deepening within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), India's strategic weight in the Bay of Bengal–Andaman Sea continuum is increasingly seen by Thailand as a counterbalance to emerging insecurities.
While security dominated the tone of the visit, economics remained the structural pillar of the bilateral agenda. Both sides reiterated their commitment to expanding trade, with Thailand again pushing for its long-standing trade target of US$30 billion. Yet, it is here that rhetoric risks outpacing reality. According to the Ministry of Commerce of Thailand, India was the country’s 11th-largest trading partner in 2024.
The India-Thailand economic corridor remains underdeveloped, tariffs on several goods remain high, and non-tariff barriers—particularly in agriculture, processed food, and automotive components—continue to impede growth. India's own trade policy, increasingly cautious in the post-RCEP period, complicates Thailand's expectations of market access.
The India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway remains incomplete, with the Myanmar bit stalled due to conflict and governance vacuum. Thailand views the project as central to its "Look West" aspirations, and India has also reiterated its importance. However, completion of the project amid Myanmar's deteriorating situation remains uncertain.
Connectivity, too, though it features prominently, suffers from persistent delays. The India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway remains incomplete, with the Myanmar bit stalled due to conflict and governance vacuum. Thailand views the project as central to its "Look West" aspirations, and India has also reiterated its importance. However, completion of the project amid Myanmar's deteriorating situation remains uncertain.
The visit therefore brought clarity but also caution: economic complementarities exist, but structural constraints require patience and political will.
Behind the formal communiqués lies a deeper strategic logic. Thailand's foreign policy under the Srettha government signalled a more pragmatic engagement with Indo-Pacific dynamics, marked by its interest in diversified partnerships beyond China. Yet Thailand remains deeply embedded in ASEAN's principle of "cooperative neutrality," making India an ideal partner—non-intrusive, development-oriented, and aligned with ASEAN centrality.
For India, Thailand occupies a pivotal position in the Act East Policy. It is the bridge to mainland Southeast Asia, the entry point for ASEAN supply chains, and a maritime neighbour in the Bay of Bengal. India's endorsement of Thailand as a "valuable maritime neighbour" was therefore more than diplomatic nicety—it was an expression of India's intent to anchor itself more firmly in the Southeast Asian strategic landscape.
For India, Thailand occupies a pivotal position in the Act East Policy. It is the bridge to mainland Southeast Asia, the entry point for ASEAN supply chains, and a maritime neighbour in the Bay of Bengal.
Though overshadowed by more urgent agendas, cultural and soft-power ties remain an understated enabler of positive diplomacy. Centuries-old civilizational links—Buddhism, maritime trade, shared artistic traditions—have long made India a non-threatening partner for Thailand. Unlike major power partnerships, India–Thailand relations are not encumbered by anxieties of influence or dependency. The visit, with its cultural engagements and references to shared heritage, subtly reinforced this foundation.
Despite the warmth and symbolism, the India–Thailand relationship continues to suffer from structural challenges.
First, domestic priorities in both countries have constrained sustained engagement. India's bandwidth is stretched by its continental priorities and domestic economic agenda. Thailand's frequent political transitions have historically produced foreign-policy inconsistency.
Second, Myanmar remains an important though complex partner. Neither India nor Thailand has the leverage to meaningfully shape political outcomes within Myanmar. The conflict continues to disrupt border economies, delay connectivity projects, and fuel the criminal networks both countries now seek to dismantle. However, the Southeast Asian nation is vital to both for its strategic depth, economic connectivity, and border security interests. For India, Myanmar is the gateway to its Act East policy and the crucial land bridge to Southeast Asia. For Thailand, it is both a buffer and a conduit—shaping labour mobility, energy imports, cross-border trade, and overall regional stability. This shared dependence on Myanmar, juxtaposed with their limited ability to influence its trajectory, creates a structural dilemma for both India and Thailand. It is this convergence of vulnerability—rather than high-minded regionalism—that has pushed New Delhi and Bangkok to intensify consultations on Myanmar, even as they calibrate their approaches differently.
Third, China's overwhelming economic presence in Thailand and the broader Mekong region looms large, a reality that India must navigate. However, Bangkok's foreign policy is increasingly guided by national interest rather than alignment with great-power blocs. It chooses to hedge where necessary and diversify where possible. This pragmatic stance gives India space to engage Thailand on areas such as connectivity, trade, and emerging technologies without forcing Bangkok into uncomfortable geopolitical choices.
Despite these constraints, the Thai Foreign Minister's visit represents a renewed seriousness in India–Thailand ties—one shaped not only by aspirational connectivity projects but also by shared vulnerabilities. The focus on cybercrime enforcement, regional security, and trilateral cooperation acknowledges that the challenges binding India and Thailand today are more complex than those envisioned when the Act East Policy was framed a decade ago.
The visit should be seen as marking a transition from romanticism to realism in India–Thailand relations.
The visit should be seen as marking a transition from romanticism to realism in India–Thailand relations. If India and Thailand can translate this moment into concrete institutional collaboration—on intelligence-sharing, border-security coordination, trade facilitation, and connectivity—this could become one of the most meaningful bilateral relationships in the eastern flank of India's foreign policy.
The visit did not resolve existing challenges. But it signals that both sides recognise the stakes—and that the India–Thailand partnership is finally moving from potential to performance.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
Read More +
PREV
