Private digital and space infrastructure is reshaping warfare, embedding commercial actors as strategic assets while creating new dependencies, vulnerabilities, and hybrid competition
The US-Israel war against Iran highlights the increasing role of private entities in contemporary warfare. Companies such as MizarVision, a Chinese geospatial intelligence firm, have been publicly posting satellite imagery of American military movements, including locations of F-22 fighters, command and control aircraft, and aircraft carrier strike groups. Planet Labs recently delayed the release of its satellite images to limit potential access by Iranian actors. Similarly, Starlink has facilitated internet connectivity in Iran, bypassing a government-imposed blackout. This growing involvement of private entities in warfare operations as strategic assets is generating novel forms of dependencies, threats, and competitions, further fracturing an already complicated space. States increasingly depend on private and commercial actors for operations and data gathering/storage, creating asymmetries that were traditionally absent from the battlefield. These can range from commercial satellites that have access to real-time battlefield imagery to cloud-storage services that act as repositories of data, including sensitive battlefield data. As military operations become increasingly dependent on privately owned digital infrastructure, control over connectivity, data, and space-based networks is emerging as a new domain of hybrid competition.
States increasingly depend on private and commercial actors for operations and data gathering/storage, creating asymmetries that were traditionally absent from the battlefield.
States are increasingly depending on private hyperscalers (large cloud computing providers that operate global data infrastructure) like Amazon AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, etc., to access and store data. Thus, commercial actors now operate both orbital infrastructure (such as satellite constellations) and terrestrial digital infrastructure (such as hyperscale cloud computing platforms), presenting a unique opportunity for dual-use of civilian and military tactics. This dual-use is at the core of the grey-zone threatscape, as it thrives on ambiguity, asymmetry, deniability, and threshold management. Players such as Starlink, Planet Labs, ICEYE, Maxar imagery, and emerging EU systems are actively transitioning from civil infrastructure into active military platforms, and are receiving defence tenders and funding to operate as military actors.
Figure 1: State-sponsored militarisation militarisation of Starlink
Source: CSIS
As seen already in Ukraine, Starlink offered broadband and satellite-based communications services in regions affected by cyberattacks and damaged infrastructure to both military and civilian users. There were also reports that Starlink connectivity was used by Russian forces without authorisation. Thus, commercial systems are no longer supplements; they are embedded into military planning. This involvement often risks cybersecurity. In August 2022, researchers successfully hacked into the Starlink network via a land-based terminal, bypassing security measures to upload malicious code. Similarly, a global outage in Starlink also knocked down Ukrainian military communications for hours.
Over the past decade, strategic competition has increasingly shifted from open confrontation to calibrated ambiguity. Maritime militias, coercive patrols, and surveillance asymmetries have demonstrated how power can be exercised below the threshold of armed conflict. As these infrastructures become indispensable to state power, control over connectivity itself emerges as a new site of strategic asymmetry. The question is no longer who commands ships or sensors, but who governs the networks that bind them together.
The battlespace is increasingly defined by infrastructure rather than solely by territory or military assets. This dynamic can lead to “weaponised interdependence,” in which private actors may use their infrastructure provision as a weapon or bargaining tool against states and other entities. When private systems become operationally indispensable, states encounter switching costs, diminished redundancy, the need to maintain alignment, and experience crisis-time uncertainty. Factors such as service modulation, contractual constraints, or regulatory exposure can affect operational continuity.
When private systems become operationally indispensable, states encounter switching costs, diminished redundancy, the need to maintain alignment, and experience crisis-time uncertainty.
By being in control of essential infrastructure, businesses become “enactors and recipients” of weaponisation measures. In crisis conditions, uncertainty over the continuity of service becomes a strategic liability. States cannot fully predict whether commercial providers will align with operational objectives, comply with government directives, or restrict usage to manage reputational or legal risk.
The new competition is shifting from controlling platforms to controlling access to the networks that sustain them. In an unregulated space with fragmented governance, this competition risks further destabilisation of digital infrastructure. As a result, new forms of competition are emerging.
Congested Space-based Intelligence and Replication: Companies and organisations like Russia’s Yaliny, the UK’s OneWeb, Germany’s KLEO Connect, South Korea’s Samsung, India’s Astrome, Canada’s AAC Clyde and Telesat, and China Satellite Network Group have all introduced plans for large internet constellation deployment. This reflects the potential congestion of space-based players capable of harnessing intelligence.
For example, China continues to advance launch-vehicle technology, and private Chinese companies are now developing reusable launch vehicles, a commercial space-launch facility, and orbital internet providers similar to Starlink. Similarly, Beijing is increasingly viewing Musk’s projects as a budding global threat, given the increased collaboration between Starlink and the American government. Another concern is that these systems are vulnerable to cyber intrusion, signal jamming, and spoofing attacks, creating additional vectors for hybrid disruption.
China continues to advance launch-vehicle technology, and private Chinese companies are now developing reusable launch vehicles, a commercial space-launch facility, and orbital internet providers similar to Starlink.
Counter-Dependency and New Forms of Competition: States are trying to diversify their dependencies to reduce their overreliance on a limited number of private players. For example, the European Union (EU) is trying to set up its own satellite array – the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS2) initiative to reduce its overdependence. However, due to slow progress and Starlink's established dominance, the EU has lobbied its member states to refrain from entering into contracts with Starlink.
Similarly, Taiwan has explored partnerships with multiple satellite companies to build a resilient communications infrastructure, including with new commercial systems such as Amazon’s Project Kuiper, which aims to provide alternative connectivity providers to governments and institutions. Thus, there are novel forms of competition in the persuasion of counter-dependencies emerging.
Sanctions and Legal Warfare: China was accused of supplying Russia with commercial satellite services, according to US public declarations at the United Nations. As a result, Chinese commercial satellite imagery companies were recently sanctioned by the US for providing satellite imagery and assistance to the Wagner Group to aid in Russia’s war in Ukraine. This illustrates how privately operated satellite infrastructure can become embedded in geopolitical competition, blurring the boundaries between civilian services and strategic military support.
States must now begin treating privately operated digital systems as part of their broader security architecture. This requires mapping critical dependencies, building redundancy, and institutionalising mechanisms for public–private coordination during crises to avoid excessive reliance on a limited number of providers.
One such approach is vendor diversification, i.e., states attempting to diversify their dependencies by expanding their suppliers. Governments are trying to look towards new actors like Capella, Umbra, and BlackSky to offset reliance on Maxar and Planet. Similarly, intelligence partnerships such as the Five Eyes allies are also trying to combine multiple vendors in their future pipeline under their “Strategic Vision 2031”.
Governments are also exploring regulatory mechanisms to ensure reliability during crises. For example, the US Congress is considering legislation mandating operational continuity clauses and emergency-use controls in all national security satellite contracts. Such measures aim to ensure that critical services remain available during wartime or geopolitical crises, even when infrastructure is privately owned.
Governments are trying to look towards new actors like Capella, Umbra, and BlackSky to offset reliance on Maxar and Planet.
Despite these developments, most policy responses remain national or minilateral in scope. There is still limited international coordination on how states should regulate or integrate commercial infrastructure into defence planning. This gap is significant because digital infrastructure operates across borders. Purely national approaches risk fragmenting the global digital ecosystem into competing technological blocs.
The emerging policy dilemma, therefore, extends beyond a simple trade-off between autonomy and dependence. Instead, the central challenge is how to institutionalise effective public–private crisis coordination while avoiding deeper technological bifurcation of global digital infrastructure.
As seen, hybrid competition thrives on asymmetry, ambiguity, and the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities. Private companies are increasingly becoming embedded in military and security ecosystems, emerging as critical enablers of modern warfare. Systems operated by firms such as SpaceX, Planet Labs, and Maxar Technologies demonstrate how privately owned platforms can shape battlefield connectivity, intelligence gathering, and strategic decision-making. At the same time, this growing reliance introduces new vulnerabilities, including dependency risks, uncertain service continuity, and challenges in attributing responsibility when commercial infrastructure becomes entangled in geopolitical competition. Managing these dependencies will therefore require states to rethink how public and private actors coordinate during crises while ensuring resilience in an increasingly contested digital battlespace.
Sweekriti Pathak is a Research Intern with CSST at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sweekriti Pathak is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
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