The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the critical need for robust biosecurity and biosafety measures worldwide
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When the COVID-19 pandemic hit the world, many speculated it was a biological weapon. While this claim has been debunked, the virus's origin remains unconfirmed, fuelling conspiracy theories. Some reports, including one released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the United States (US) in 2021, indicated a lab leak from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in China as a highly probable source. The same report also preceded the notable change in the US Energy Department’s stance on attributing the source to a lab leak in China.
This switch can be understood better with revelations in the 2023 DNI Report, a significant document in this context that revealed crucial findings about the WIV and its biosafety measures. The report, a comprehensive assessment of the WIV's operations and safety protocols, pointed out how WIV researchers did not diligently follow precautionary practices while handling high-risk pathogens, increasing the risk of exposure and leaks. Additionally, even one year after receiving its BSL-4[1] Level accreditation, including appropriately trained personnel, WIV was short of the required standard. The report also highlights that as of 2020, mere months after the virus spread, the equipment necessary for modernisation, including disinfectant equipment and updating ventilation systems. Further, China’s resistance to inquiries and investigations by the World Health Organization (WHO) is also not well accepted by other stakeholders globally.
While no evidence was found on viruses that preceded the SARS-Cov-2 strain, the PLA and WIV have worked on virology and vaccine development research on various viruses, including coronavirus.
Though the WIV operates independently from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and is a civilian lab, the US Intelligence Community (IC) has assessed that WIV personnel have collaborated with PLA scientists on public health and biosecurity research. This collaboration is not unusual in the scientific community and does not imply any military involvement in the WIV's research. While no evidence was found on viruses that preceded the SARS-Cov-2 strain, the PLA and WIV have worked on virology and vaccine development research on various viruses, including coronavirus.
The Biosecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China was enacted in April 2021. The law's primary objective is to prevent and control major new or sudden outbreaks of infectious diseases proactively, whether in humans, animals, or plants. Another significant aspect of the law is regulating biotechnology research, development, and application. Laboratories working with pathogenic microbes are critical in studying and managing infectious diseases. The law mandates strict biosecurity measures for these facilities to prevent accidental or deliberate releases of dangerous pathogens. The controversy surrounding the Wuhan lab leak hypothesis has highlighted the importance of these measures.
With the PLA’s involvement with the WIV for virology research, the law also outlines provisions to prevent and defend against such dangers. This involves enhancing surveillance, securing biological materials, and fostering international cooperation to track and mitigate bioterrorism activities.
One of the main offerings is establishing a central authority that will take overarching responsibility for coordination, monitoring, and decision-making in biosecurity, the National Biosecurity Work Coordination Mechanism. An expert committee comprising leading scientists and biosecurity experts will provide crucial decision-making advice on biosecurity strategy and policy implementation. This committee's insights, drawn from the latest scientific research and technological advancements, will be instrumental in shaping effective and evidence-based.
An expert committee comprising leading scientists and biosecurity experts will provide crucial decision-making advice on biosecurity strategy and policy implementation.
In addition to the Biosecurity Law, China also has governance tools overseeing biosafety. These include the Regulations on the Biosafety Management of Pathogenic Microbe Laboratories, the Measures for the Administration of Biosafety Approval of Laboratories and Experimental Activities Related to Highly Pathogenic Microbes Capable of Spreading from Person to Person, and the Measures for the Examination and Approval of the Biosafety Administration of Highly Pathogenic Animal Pathogenic Microorganism Laboratory.
Outside of the domestic regulations, China is also a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), a multilateral treaty aimed at conserving biodiversity and human integrity, and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists (Tianjin Guidelines), a set of 10 guidelines for ethical research by scientists and institutions. China has also signed up for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a multilateral treaty that prevents the stockpiling, development and trade of biological weapons.
Despite launching these domestic regulatory tools and participating in international treaties, China’s alleged involvement in the COVID-19 and the Wuhan lab leak hypothesis has been a focal point in laboratory safety discussions, especially in the global approach to biosafety and biosecurity. From this case, there are several key areas for relevant governance tools to be included in China and globally.
One main reason is the opacity of the country’s policies and approaches. To address this, China needs to take responsibility for raising biosafety standards by implementing improvements at the lab level. This will include enhancing safety protocols by international standards and ensuring checks by international collaborators in training, safety implementation and research. International collaboration can encourage this, which is crucial for enhancing global biosecurity measures and building trust. Openness and transparency in China's policies and approaches are key to this process.
The scrutiny surrounding the WIV and China makes it tempting to blame the country for irresponsible actions.
While China is already undersigned to the CBD, BWC, and Tianjin Guidelines, it must further ensure communication with the international scientific community, even at research stages. Research and development in science and technology must be held accountable globally and thus transparent. Open sharing of data and findings can help build trust and enhance global biosecurity measures.
The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the critical need for robust biosecurity and biosafety measures worldwide. The scrutiny surrounding the WIV and China makes it tempting to blame the country for irresponsible actions. However, while these accusations are still being investigated, China and other countries globally need to take accountability and ensure public health concerns through infection are not an outcome of human error and natural pandemics are mitigated. Enhancing domestic regulations and global standards can drastically reduce the probability of such leaks or pandemics. China's enactment of the Biosecurity Law and other related regulations marks a step forward in addressing these concerns. With further transparency and interactions with the international scientific community, such outcomes can be significantly reduced, ensuring a safer and more secure global environment.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation
[1] The highest level of biosafety is reserved for dealing with pathogens and viruses that have no immediate cure or treatment and high virulence.
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Shravishtha Ajaykumar is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. Her fields of research include geospatial technology, data privacy, cybersecurity, and strategic ...
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