Corruption and purge in the PLA: Apprehension and distrust

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On 28 November 2024, reports emerged that Admiral Miao Hua, a senior military officer from China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), had been arrested for disciplinary violations, a euphemism for corruption charges. Admiral Miao is the fourth high-ranking general to be implicated in President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. Earlier this year, former defence ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe faced prosecution, and even the current Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun is rumoured to be under investigation for corruption. Li Shangfu served only seven months before his dismissal, while Dong Jun seems unlikely to complete his 11^th month in office. The rapid turnover, accompanied by arrests and prosecutions for corruption, highlights a deep malaise and internal power tussle transpiring inside the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These developments raise serious concerns about the PLA’s combat capability, Xi’s confidence in the military, and the broader implications for China’s security and foreign policy.

The rapid turnover, accompanied by arrests and prosecutions for corruption, highlights a deep malaise and internal power tussle transpiring inside the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The DNA of corruption

Corruption in the PLA is deeply structural, rooted in the time-honoured Chinese philosophy that the military should be self-dependent and a helping hand in the economy. The PLA therefore, grew its food, raised its animals, manufactured its uniform and, by the 1980s, controlled 656,000 acres of farmland, producing 500,000 tons of grain, 650,000 tons of vegetables, and 104,000 tons of meat annually.^[1]

Deng Xiaoping, during his reforms in 1978-80, reduced the defence budget substantially. Then, in 1985, the General Logistics Department (GLD) under Deng’s instruction, gave authority to PLA units to launch small, medium and large-scale business ventures with seed money offered as a loan wherever needed. This policy led to PLA’s four general departments and services establishing major enterprises—Poly Group, Kaili Corporation, Xinxing Corporation, and China United Airlines, among others. Many of these ventures were headed by princelings (descendants of senior party officials), with Deng’s daughter reportedly having a substantial interest in Poly Group. These businesses were nominally taxed at 10 percent, but their large profit portions were siphoned off to offshore accounts, fostering systemic corruption. This nexus between the Chinese political leadership and the PLA’s higher echelons established a cycle of mutual dependence and pervasive corruption.

Over the years, various PLA units expanded their economic ventures into diverse sectors including hotels, construction, and hospitals. The adventurous lot even took a liking to running prostitution rings, smuggling rackets, and other criminal enterprises. The military’s control over armed power provided sufficient protection for these illegal activities, leading to widespread corruption, profiteering, smuggling, speculation, illegitimate sales and purchases. These practices seeped into the PLA’s core functioning, manifesting in the buying and selling of promotions, moonlighting, using substitutes, falsifying training reports, and diverting military resources to commercial ends such as the illegal sale of tank and artillery oil.^[2]

In 1985, the General Logistics Department (GLD) under Deng’s instruction, gave authority to PLA units to launch small, medium and large-scale business ventures with seed money offered as a loan wherever needed.

In response, the Chinese leadership introduced restrictions to the PLA’s commercial activities in 1993 and 1995, culminating in a complete ban in 1998-99.^[3] However, the ban’s effectiveness remains debatable, as entrenched corruption has persisted in the PLA. By 2015, retired PLA generals revealed that almost every rank in the PLA had a price and all crucial positions were reserved for cronies, often princelings. Bribery was rampant with amounts often reaching millions. For instance, one general reportedly paid US$ 2.75 million to former Vice Chairman Xu Caihou to ensure his promotion. Such corruption substantially undermined professionalism in the PLA.

Hunting tigers and flies 

As President of China, Xi Jinping has made anti-corruption a cornerstone of his governance outline, and his catching “tigers and flies” campaign has gained considerable momentum within the PLA in recent years. Over the past year alone, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has ensnared nine PLA generals including four chiefs and several CMC members. In addition, senior executives in the defence industry have faced dismissals and arrests. For instance, Tan Ruisong, the former chairman of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), was recently dismissed on corruption charges. He was accused of compromising quality by using substandard materials and outsourcing manufacturing to temporary workers, leading to defective and potentially risky components.

A small list of senior military officers prosecuted in this campaign is detailed in Table 1.

Table 1: Senior PLA Officers Prosecuted Under Corruption Charges

Source: Author’s own

Admiral Miao Hua’s purge appears to stem from his alleged involvement in selling promotions during his tenure as head of the Political Work Department that oversees all PLA promotions. Similarly, Admiral Dong Jun is likely to face prosecution for his role in the Equipment Development Department, a hotbed of corruption in the PLA.

However, among these sweeping purges, Xi has notably refrained from targeting his second-in-command at the CMC, General Zhang Youxia, a long-term chief of the Equipment Development Department and the General Armaments Department. As the son of General Zhang Zhongxun, a prominent communist general who fought in both the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, Zhang shares deep family ties with Xi. Their fathers served together in the First Field Army and Zhang and Xi are princelings from the same province. Zhang is also among the few PLA officers with combat experience. All these factors ensure his protection. Xi may prefer to wait and allow Zhang to complete his term peacefully.

Lack of trust at every level

The PLA’s prevalent corruption and organisational malaise can erode trust between junior officers, soldiers, and their seniors, many of whom have secured their positions through money, connections or hereditary privileges. This mistrust can severely undermine morale and raise suspicion about the rank-and-file’s willingness to die for this corrupt cohort.

The PLA’s prevalent corruption and organisational malaise can erode trust between junior officers, soldiers, and their seniors, many of whom have secured their positions through money, connections or hereditary privileges.

Complaints against superiors to disciplinary authorities have often proven futile as senior officers coalesce to suppress investigations. To remedy this, the CCDI was placed directly under the CMC. Consequently, higher-ranking officers remain consistently on edge as their rise and fall are increasingly tied to their proximity to Xi and his confidants. Corruption investigation appears arbitrary and often results in the complete downfall of an accused officer, confiscation of his family wealth and the dismantling of his beneficiary network.

Implications

Xi launched higher command reforms in the PLA in 2015-16, aiming for structural stabilisation within a decade. However, his plans were derailed by COVID-19, leaving the PLA in transition. In 2023, Xi purged the entire leadership of the PLA Rocket Force and in 2024, he dismantled the Strategic Support Force while prosecuting its erstwhile commander, Ju Qiansheng. The ongoing investigations into Admirals Miao and Dong suggest that, even after 12 years of an anti-corruption drive, Xi is neither sure of the PLA’s structural reforms nor its top leadership.

Trust, the cornerstone of a combat-ready military, has emerged as the most conspicuous casualty and appears absent in the PLA. Endemic corruption and prevalent mistrust raise questions about the PLA’s cohesion and reliability. With this deeply compromised PLA, it remains uncertain whether Xi could initiate an active conflict in any region.

Atul Kumar is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation

^[1] David Shambaugh (2002), Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects, Berkeley: University of California Press, p 196.

^[2] David Shambaugh (2002), Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp 200-204.

^[3] James C Mulvenon (2001), Soldiers of fortune, London: Routledge

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