As the UNSC breaks its recent record of paralysis over the Iran crisis, the resolution highlights both the growing agency of Gulf powers and the persistent constraints of great-power rivalry
On March 11, almost two weeks after the US and Israel launched their strike on Iran, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution condemning Iran’s attacks on Gulf countries and Jordan, and calling for an immediate halt to hostilities. The resolution distinctly called out Iran’s “egregious attack” against its neighbours and pushed back against its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz amid the escalating conflict in the Middle East. With almost 135 co-sponsors, UNSC Resolution 2817 — which makes no mention of the US or Israel — was adopted, breaking the usual impasse in the UNSC witnessed in other conflicts. While the adoption signals a rare case of international consensus, primarily driven by the diplomatic efforts of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, historically, the UNSC has largely aligned with US interests during major military interventions.
UNSC Resolution 2817 invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, affirming the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” in response to armed attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and described these actions as a breach of international law and a threat to international peace and security. Procedurally, following the attacks, two draft resolutions were introduced in the UNSC — one drafted by Bahrain on behalf of the member states of the GCC, comprising Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), along with Jordan and numerous co-sponsors; and another text tabled by Russia.
The adopted text made no reference to the role of the US and Israel in the strikes or to the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the joint military operations. Despite this, the unprecedented level of international consensus — possibly the largest co-sponsorship ever for a UN resolution — made the use of the veto a politically costly move for Russia and China.
The resolution sponsored by the GCC was eventually adopted by a vote of 13 in favour — Bahrain, Colombia, Denmark, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Pakistan, Panama, Somalia, the US, the UK, and France — with two abstentions, China and Russia. The UNSC rejected Moscow’s draft by a vote of four in favour (China, Pakistan, Russia, and Somalia), two against (Latvia and the US), and nine abstentions.
Notably, the adopted text made no reference to the role of the US and Israel in the strikes or to the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the joint military operations. Despite this, the unprecedented level of international consensus — possibly the largest co-sponsorship ever for a UN resolution — made the use of the veto a politically costly move for Russia and China. Consequently, both permanent members chose to abstain, allowing the resolution to be adopted. However, the two states placed their reservations on record, stating that the US and Israel launched military strikes without UNSC authorisation and must cease their actions immediately, that the sovereignty of Gulf Arab states must be fully respected, and that the resolution “does not fully reflect the root cause and overall picture of the conflict in a balanced manner.”
The UN Charter tasks the Council with the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24, but the principle of non-intervention under Article 2(7) has remained a defining norm for the majority of states. However, there have been several instances in which the UNSC has ended up providing political backing — if not outright legal authorisation — for US-led military interventions through its resolutions.
For instance, at the cusp of the end of Cold War hostilities, owing to intensive lobbying by the US with other members of the “Permanent Five” (P5), UNSC Resolution 678 was adopted, authorising member states to use “all necessary means” to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, and effectively serving as approval for the subsequent Gulf War.
Similarly, in 1999, the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in Kosovo, circumventing the UNSC by not seeking prior authorisation to use force. The US-UNSC dynamic took another turn after 9/11, as the narrative on counter-terrorism and the principle of acting in self-defence took precedence. During major US-led interventions under the “Global War on Terrorism”, the UNSC stopped short of explicitly authorising the wars, but acknowledged the terrorist attacks as threats to international peace and affirmed the right to self-defence. The military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were justified on this principle and faced relatively few objections from other countries in their initial years.
Key UNSC Resolutions Related to US Military Interventions Post-9/11
| Conflict | UN Security Council Resolutions |
| Afghanistan War (2001) | UNSC Resolution 1368 — adopted unanimously; condemned the 9/11 terrorist attacks. UNSC Resolution 1373 — adopted unanimously under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; focused on suppressing the financing of terrorist groups. UNSC Resolution 1386 — adopted unanimously; authorised the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. |
| Iraq War (2003) | UNSC Resolution 1483 — drafted by the US and co-sponsored by Spain; passed with 14 out of 15 votes, as the Syrian Arab Republic did not participate in the voting. The text reaffirmed the need for the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and recognised the obligations of the UK and the US as occupying powers. UNSC Resolution 1511 — adopted unanimously; authorised the creation of a multinational force to establish security and stability in Iraq. |
| Intervention in the Libyan Civil War (2011) | UNSC Resolution 1970 — adopted unanimously; referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC), imposed an arms embargo, and introduced targeted sanctions, including an asset freeze and travel bans. UNSC Resolution 1973 — co-sponsored by France, Lebanon, and the UK; adopted with 10 affirmative votes out of 15. In favour: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, France, the UK, and the US. Abstentions: Brazil, Germany, India, China, and Russia. The resolution authorised a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, which led to the NATO-led intervention. |
However, the argument of self-defence gradually evolved into a broader interventionist aspiration through the invocation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle in the cases of Libya and Syria. Within the UNSC, growing fissures among the P5, along with reservations expressed by Global South countries, marked the beginning of a pushback against the interventionist R2P Pillar. For instance, Brazil and India abstained on key resolutions such as UNSC Resolution 1973 authorising the use of force in Libya, citing a lack of credible information from the ground and a fundamental contradiction in the use of force for the protection of civilians. The post-9/11 pattern of unanimous adoption of UN resolutions serving as political cover for interventions came to a halt in the case of Syria. Since 2012, Russia has used its veto to block several UN resolutions related to the Syrian conflict.
Within the UNSC, growing fissures among the P5, along with reservations expressed by Global South countries, marked the beginning of a pushback against the interventionist R2P Pillar.
With continuing airborne strikes and counterstrikes targeting military assets and critical energy infrastructure — most recently US strikes on military facilities on Iran’s Kharg Island, while oil-related sites were reportedly spared — alongside the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the conflict appears to be moving up the ladder of conventional escalation. As far as multilateral diplomacy is concerned, even as the US has increasingly pulled back from UN-led bodies and the UNSC remains ideologically fragmented, the resounding consensus behind the resolution reflects a few emerging patterns.
First, the broad consensus on the resolution is a testament to the economic and diplomatic weight of the Gulf states as a bloc rather than a diplomatic triumph for the US. In recent years, GCC countries have established themselves as stabilising mediators in regional and global conflicts; for instance, Qatar’s mediation with the Taliban and Saudi Arabia’s involvement in peace talks on Sudan. When faced with attacks, the GCC’s pragmatic and multi-aligned partnerships translated into widespread support within the UNSC.
The broad consensus on the resolution is a testament to the economic and diplomatic weight of the Gulf states as a bloc rather than a diplomatic triumph for the US.
Second, the resolution, albeit symbolic, is not definitive of how the “revisionist” permanent members — Russia and China — may navigate the UNSC going forward. Despite their abstentions, Russia and China clashed with the US at the UNSC, highlighting the “hysteria” around Iran’s alleged plan to develop a nuclear weapon. Although the resolution conveys a sense of collective resolve and mounting international pressure, the UNSC’s capacity for conflict mediation remains constrained. With military escalation already at an advanced stage and Iran framing the conflict in existential terms, de-escalation will ultimately depend on the willingness of the parties to pursue an off-ramp.
Heena Makhija is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Makhija is an Associate Fellow at ORF and specializes in the study of Multilateralism, International Organizations, Global Norms, India at UN, Multilateral Negotiations, and ...
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