With Africa emerging as an increasingly important region, and as China remains the continent’s dominant trading partner, the US, EU, and India must coordinate their developmental assistance in the continent
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In today’s emerging global order, development aid and connectivity cooperation have emerged as important domains of geopolitical influence in the developing world. The contours of this competition are most visible in Africa, a continent with immense economic potential, critical resource minerals, and a young and expanding workforce. Supporting the continent’s infrastructure development—not only through roads and bridges, but also with leading digital transportation systems, green technology hubs, capacity-building programmes, and more—carries with it opportunities for greater economic activity and trade, benefiting both African countries and their trade and development partners.
Likeminded democracies such as the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and India have increased their focus on infrastructure development in Africa, but they should step up their efforts.
Global powers and emerging economic players are not blind to these trends. Development in Africa has been a growing area of focus, but China is well ahead of the pack. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has successfully been in operation on the continent for over a decade. As a result, China has a serious foothold on the continent. Beijing is the continent’s largest bilateral lender at over US$100 billion as of 2023; under the BRI framework, Beijing also invested, loaned or contracted projects worth US$150 billion between 2013 and 2023. Interestingly, close to 43 percent of the BRI’s economic engagement in Africa is in the energy, metals, and mining domains.
Likeminded democracies such as the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and India have increased their focus on infrastructure development in Africa, but they should step up their efforts. Instead of working in silos, as they historically have, they should do so in partnership—even more so today, as the three entities have greater strategic alignment than ever before. This article analyses European, American, and Indian connectivity and cooperation in Africa, suggesting a framework for a broader cooperative mechanism.
The US, the EU and India have similar reasons to support Africa’s economic and infrastructure development. The continent is a growing hub of economic potential. The continent’s population is growing at the fastest rate in the world, and with it arrives an eager entrepreneurial workforce. Integrated trade networks and markets with Africa are mutually beneficial for the US, European, and Indian economies as much as they will be for African countries. Investment in key infrastructure to deliver services and improve connectivity will be crucial to that effort.
Sustainable trade relations with Africa are also critical for economic security. The continent is rich in the critical resources on which the next generation of green technologies will rely. Developing sustainable and reliable supply chains for these materials is critical as the US, EU, and India seek to de-risk from dependencies on China for such materials. Doing so sustainably will also help African countries benefit from trade in these critical goods, and not continue exploitative trends.
Integrated trade networks and markets with Africa are mutually beneficial for the US, European, and Indian economies as much as they will be for African countries.
Finally, fully connecting Africa’s potential to the world economy will help bolster the global free trade agenda, which is currently under the greatest threat it has faced since it was established in the post-World War II era. China’s investment in the region is a useful case study. Beijing’s investment correlates with growing positive views of China and its economic model across Africa. Countries like the US, the EU, and India are eager to revitalise (not reshape) the global economic agenda and should take note of the importance of investing in the continent.
Policymakers from the US, Europe, and India are not blind to these trends, and all three have increased their presence and investment in Africa in recent years.
The US, under the Biden administration, has made infrastructure development a priority. It has poured over US$65 billion into infrastructure development projects in Africa since 2022 via its network of development agencies, and it has specifically focused on unlocking investment in the continent. While the second Trump administration’s focus on democracy promotion and the green transition will almost certainly not continue apace, a more transactional approach to supporting Africa’s own development agenda as a trading partner and as an avenue of competition with China could see a continued focus on the continent’s infrastructure development.
Countries like the US, the EU, and India are eager to revitalise (not reshape) the global economic agenda and should take note of the importance of investing in the continent.
The EU is active too. Under the mandate of the previous European Commission, the EU launched the Global Gateway, which seeks to invest US$309.34 billion around the world, and much of the focus has been on Africa—the EU lists over 100 projects in Africa alone under the Global Gateway framework. The next European Commission will continue this focus. Individual EU members have also launched their initiatives, such as Italy’s Mattei Plan, though it is admittedly smaller in economic (US$8.4 billion) and geographic (the MPA focuses largely on North Africa) scope.
India is another major player on the continent, especially when it comes to financing. Delhi is Africa’s second-largest creditor and has completed over 200 infrastructure projects on the continent, with another 69 projects ongoing. India also has an eager private sector looking to be involved. Reports suggest that private Indian infrastructure firms could invest over US$100 billion into Africa annually.
The US and the EU have already been working in partnership through the Group of 7 (G7). At the G7 level, members have pledged to supply US$600 billion to developing countries through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), which also includes working together on joint projects. Investment into transportation networks across the Lobito Corridor between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Zambia, and Angola is the standard bearer for such projects. Over US$6 billion has been invested in the Corridor across the transportation, agriculture, energy, health, and digital arenas.
There are compelling reasons for the US, EU, and India to work together. First, the development needs in Africa will require more funds than any of the three could supply on their own. Around the world, studies find a US$15 trillion gap between spending and infrastructure needs through 2030, hitting developing countries such as those in Africa the hardest. The G7’s PGII ambition to spend US$600 billion by 2027 is miniscule in comparison. Moreover, each country brings its advantages. India is a major funder of capital, has decades of know-how in engaging with Africa, and has an eager private sector base. The US can help unlock private-sector funding, and the EU and its member states can help integrate their local supply chains.
Second, cooperation on joint projects supports the de-risking agenda for everyone and provides an important counterbalance to dependencies on China. Establishing secure supply chains for critical materials and minerals, with infrastructure supported by trusted allies and partners, provides extra security of supply for all three parties. Secure supply lines will also benefit US, European, and Indian efforts as all three have turned to each other to increase their economic security. They will all need more cooperation with each other if visions of a de-risking framework are to come to fruition.
India is a major funder of capital, has decades of know-how in engaging with Africa, and has an eager private sector base.
This de-risking agenda should extend to Africa. Integrating Africa into these critical supply chains by establishing infrastructure to process materials, instead of simply extracting them, provides a more attractive offer to African countries, as opposed to the model supplied by China.
Third, cooperation helps with the US and the EU’s bilateral relations with India. By engaging with India as a partner for global leadership, Washington and Brussels can signal the seriousness with which they take their bilateral relations with New Delhi. Much of the United States and the EU’s bilateral dealings with India focus on India’s development. Although a worthwhile effort, it fails to capture the full range of India’s potential as a partner and lends itself to criticisms of paternalism. Much more can be done.
The EU, for example, outlined a vision of cooperation with India in April 2022, focused on upholding the rules-based global order, fighting climate change, and supporting the digital transition. Its Global Gateway has framed India as a participant of development assistance for “new opportunities for cooperation and investments in secure and sustainable infrastructure in India and the region.”
Washington’s framing, like the EU’s, has focused on supporting India’s development, not seeing India as a partner for global development initiatives. The Modi-Biden vision from his state visit to the United States does refer to what India and the United States can do together, specifically in “improving the sovereign debt restructuring process; advancing the multilateral development bank evolution agenda, including mobilizing new concessional financing at the World Bank to support all developing countries; and raising the level of ambition on mobilising private sector investment for quality, sustainable, and resilient infrastructure” through the PGII.
By engaging with India as a partner for global leadership, Washington and Brussels can signal the seriousness with which they take their bilateral relations with New Delhi.
As the US and Europe look to solidify their relations abroad in the face of a slipping rules-based world order, engaging with India as a partner, rather than just a recipient of development assistance would help further bring India into the West’s vision for the world, in comparison to a Chinese one. For the West, where India is seen as a critical “swing state”, working with New Delhi would also be seen as a way to notch successful engagement, even amid frustrations over India’s ambivalence toward other geopolitical challenges, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Finding ways to collaborate and bring Delhi closer to the West is therefore important for both US and EU policymakers.
India, for its part, has reason to buy into this partnership too. In an increasingly multipolar world, India’s path to greater standing will include bolstering its relationship and presence in Africa. Partnering with the United States and Europe provides a basis for achieving that aim. New Delhi has managed to successfully continue its decades-long non-aligned approach, and will likely continue to do so, but it should also be concerned about the growing Chinese influence in Africa. Deepening connectivity and cooperation with the US and the EU would demonstrate its seriousness in supporting the global trading system.
There are already tools and frameworks to turn this potential into a reality. The G7 should be the starting point. As noted, the G7’s PGII has already started coordinating US and European approaches to infrastructure development. Still, more can and should be done to increase collaboration. At the last G7 Summit, leaders hosted a discussion on PGII. India’s addition to a G7+ format for discussions on the PGII would be a useful starting point. Inviting India to ministerial meetings throughout the year would be an additional benefit.
Regardless of whether it is through the G7 or otherwise, India, the US, and the EU, at the most basic level, could begin staff contacts to inform and map the planned or ongoing projects that they are supporting in the African continent. This effort would help deconflict and potentially find areas of discreet cooperation.
James Batchik is an Associate Director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
Prithvi Gupta is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, where he supports programming on the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, the ...
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Prithvi works as a Junior Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. His research primarily focuses on analysing the geoeconomic and strategic trends in international relations. ...
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