The IORA and China’s new forum represent two competing models of regionalism in the Indian Ocean
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In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean region was characterised by a sense of strategic inertia. However, that has significantly changed since the turn of the 21st century. Several reasons can be attributed to this new development. The rise of Asian economies—especially India, Southeast Asian nations, and China—have resulted in the Indian Ocean becoming a critical arena of global trade. This has resulted in critical trade routes passing through the region. Following this, securing critical chokepoints in the region has emerged as a major security imperative for stakeholders in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, with the onset of the Indo-Pacific as a unified strategic theatre, the Indian Ocean region has received growing strategic attention.
Securing critical chokepoints in the region has emerged as a major security imperative for stakeholders in the Indian Ocean.
With the growth of the Indian Ocean’s strategic relevance, several stakeholders have increasingly assumed greater salience in shaping the geopolitical order of the region. While littoral countries in the region have continued to exercise their strategic agency to pursue their security and economic interests, the initiation of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) marked the beginning of an era of institutional regionalism in the Indian Ocean. Mooted in 1997 as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORA-RC), the forum has increasingly come to symbolise the Indian Ocean’s institutional identity. Importantly, India has been a key architect of IORA.
Over the years, the Indian Ocean has witnessed competition for primacy between India and China. While India’s role in the geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean is a natural one, given its vital geographical location, China has sought to expand its presence in the region towards its continued pursuits of emerging as a leading power. Importantly, China is not an Indian Ocean power. However, the region serves as a crucial theatre for its strategic and economic interests. With its growing demand for resources, the Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming critical for Beijing. Moreover, bolstering its presence in the region is also likely to complement China’s strategic objective of enhancing its role in shaping the evolving geopolitics of the Indian Ocean. To enhance its presence in the Indian Ocean, Beijing has sought to focus on bilateral partnerships with littoral countries in the region. These partnerships are anchored on developmental engagement, whereby Beijing seeks to fund infrastructure projects and enhance the capabilities of Indian Ocean littoral countries. While this has cautioned India, given the security implications of Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean—its primary area of security interest, it has also spurred competition between New Delhi and Beijing to emerge as principal security and economic actors in the region.
With its growing demand for resources, the Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming critical for Beijing.
A new frontier of competition seems to have emerged in the Indian Ocean. Since 2021, China has been convening the China-Indian Ocean Forum through the China International Development Cooperation Agency, focused on key aspects of the Blue Economy. While it is designed to foster collective thinking among the Indian Ocean littoral states, it appears that through this initiative, Beijing seeks to construct its own regional forum for the region. This serves as a launchpad for China to emerge as a leader in the Indian Ocean. India’s omission from this forum is unsurprising. It appears that, through the China-Indian Ocean Forum, Beijing seeks to construct a regional approach in the Indian Ocean that presents China as a credible leader in the region. This is vital, given that China is not a natural stakeholder in the Indian Ocean but continues to have its interests anchored in the region.
Interestingly, the IORA and the China-Indian Ocean Forum present two varying kinds of regionalism in the Indian Ocean. While the IORA is an intergovernmental forum that seeks to operate through diplomatic dialogue on issues of maritime security, China remains the pivot for the China-Indian Ocean Forum. This has long-term implications for the nature of engagement in both forums. The China-Indian Ocean Forum reinforces a client-patron dynamic between China and the Indian Ocean littoral states, whereas IORA is a democratic forum fostering dialogue on issues of common interest. This is notably also reflective of the Chinese view of the Indian Ocean and extends Beijing’s existing engagement with littoral states of the region. For smaller littoral states, preserving their agency in norm-making and policy formulation at regional multilateral forums is key.
While the IORA is an intergovernmental forum that seeks to operate through diplomatic dialogue on issues of maritime security, China remains the pivot for the China-Indian Ocean Forum.
Therefore, two notions of regionalism appear to be competing in the Indian Ocean region. While IORA emphasises regional identity and geographical embeddedness, the China-Indian Ocean Forum seeks to advance Chinese interests by assuming a greater role rather than fostering shared opportunities. This further prompts a vital question. What is the role of geography in imagining a region? Regionalism divorced from geographical embeddedness can pose vital challenges. Regional thinking must be driven by the interests and priorities of all who share the geographical space. Through this logic, China is not a natural actor in the Indian Ocean. China’s role in the region is only driven by its interests and not its location. This will continue to perpetuate a difference in the outlook of China and other regional countries in the Indian Ocean. In this context, IORA is critical since it focuses on regional identity.
The competitive regionalism in the Indian Ocean is a result of China’s continued efforts to advance its presence in the region. This should prompt a vital reflection on how regionalism, especially in complex spaces such as the oceans, should be imagined. Prioritising geographical imperatives will continue to remain key in constructing an effective regional outlook. Thus, IORA will continue to have leverage over the China-Indian Ocean Forum, given its emphasis on geography and regional identity.
Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant at ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s research focuses on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions of ...
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